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Teacher compensation reforms have been on the rise in recent years, yet research 
has yet to fully demonstrate how teachers interpret these policies and how they may 
influence their instructional practices and professional decisions. This qualitative study of 
a performance pay program in an urban district in Texas drew on cognitive approaches to 
policy implementation and theories of sensemaking to examine and explicate these 
issues. Teachers’ experiences in two schools were examined through interviews, focus 
groups, and document analysis. The experiences of school principals and district 
policymakers acting as sensegivers to teachers about the program’s goals, purposes, and 
theory of action were also examined. District policymakers’ understandings of the 
program varied, and were informed by their positions in the system and their own 
interests in the program. These differences resulted in a complex program with an array 
of objectives for teachers to implement in schools and classrooms, as well as varying 
expectations for teachers’ work, which were not always understood by teachers. With few 
clear and consistent messages from policymakers, teachers and principals interpreted the 
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program according to their own ideas about important outcomes, and then shaped it to fit 
their situations. Although accepting of the program, teachers and principals were not 
always able to focus on it in ways expected by policymakers given other demands on 
them, particularly those emanating from the accountability system. Some evidence of 
goal distortion in terms of teachers’ attention to student assignments and mobility was 
also found. These findings hold implications for cognitive theories of policy 
implementation, suggesting that teachers’ responses to policies are influenced by the 
amount of attention they are able to give them, as well as direct sensegiving about policy 
goals and expectations on the part of policymakers. The findings also suggest that 
performance pay programs can be expected to be adapted, co-opted, and selectively 
attended to in order to fit within the contexts in which they are implemented. Thus, 
policymakers should consider other demands in the policy environment that may compete 
with performance incentives, as well as the organizational contexts of schools in which 
they will be implemented.
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Chapter 1: Purpose and Rationale
Increasingly, districts and states are experimenting with performance-based 
compensation policies intended to shift the basis of teacher compensation from 
experience and credentials to performance. Nationally, approximately 10 percent of 
school districts and 20 percent of K-12 public school teachers in 32 states are working 
with performance-based compensation programs (Guthrie & Schuermann, 2008). Texas, 
Florida, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Tennessee have enacted statewide programs to 
implement performance pay for educators. Numerous school districts, including Denver 
Public Schools, Houston Independent School District, Dallas Independent School 
District, and New York City Public Schools are currently engaged in or are developing 
performance-based compensation programs. The Teacher Advancement Program (TAP), 
a prominent teacher improvement model incorporating performance-based compensation, 
is now being implemented in 49 districts and charter schools employing more than 7,500 
teachers.1 Three states, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas, have created statewide 
TAP initiatives. 
More educators can be expected to become involved with compensation reform, 
as new programs and funding continue to expand. Most recently, 62 school districts, 
nonprofits, and state education agencies were recently awarded $1.2 billion over five 
years as part of the federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program. The U.S. Department 
of Education also issued guidelines allowing states and districts to spend funds from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on innovative compensation programs. 
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Further, proposals to tie teacher evaluations and compensation to student performance are 
a key feature of the $4.35 billion federal Race to the Top grant competition. Apart from 
these federal initiatives, several school districts and states have created performance pay 
programs of their own. District of Columbia Public Schools Chancellor Michelle Rhee 
recently captured headlines nationwide with a plan to pay teachers up to $150,000 per 
year through performance-based compensation (funded in part by private foundation 
grants) in exchange for elimination of some seniority protections (Sawchuck, 2010). With 
the profile of compensation reform on the rise and increased funding for programs 
available, more districts can be expected to implement performance pay programs.
In order to determine the efficacy of performance pay in creating sustainable 
improvements in teacher quality and student learning, policymakers need to understand 
how teachers are responding to these initiatives. While a great deal of attention has been 
paid to teachers’ acceptance of performance pay and its potential impact on student 
achievement, less emphasis has been placed in research on the ways performance 
incentives are being integrated into teachers’ decisions about instructional practice and 
career plans. Yet this knowledge is vital to understanding the sustainability of 
performance pay and its capacity to induce lasting improvements in student outcomes. 
This purpose of this research was to examine these issues. In this chapter, I 
discuss the context of performance-based compensation in education and its theory of 
action in producing improvements in student learning. I argue that although models of 
performance incentives are fairly straightforward, their enactment is actually quite 
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complex. This study was aimed at unpacking some of those complexities, namely the 
way teachers interpret and make meaning of performance pay and how their interactions 
with policymakers influence those interpretations. 
Performance-Based Compensation in Education
It is widely accepted today that teachers are a key determinant of student success. 
Students’ academic performance depends to a great degree on the teachers they are 
assigned. Moreover, these differences are cumulative. Students who are consistently 
assigned to effective teachers perform better over time than students assigned to 
ineffective teachers or than students assigned to teachers of varying effectiveness 
(Sanders & Rivers, 1996). Some research has estimated that the effect of being assigned 
to effective teachers over consecutive years can be sufficient to close entirely the average 
achievement gap between low and middle income students (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 
2001). 
Unfortunately, recruiting and retaining effective teachers is a challenge for many 
school districts with large numbers of struggling students. According to various 
estimates, between one-quarter and one-third of beginning teachers leave the field within 
four years (Darling-Hammond, 2003; Rowan, Correnti, & Richard, 2002). The problem is 
even more pronounced in schools with high concentrations of students living in poverty, 
which also tend to be low-performing. Teachers who transfer to other schools tend to 
leave high-minority schools in favor of schools with fewer minority students (Loeb, 
Darling-Hammond, & Luczak, 2005). Teachers also tend to transfer from low-performing 
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schools to better performing schools (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004). Ingersoll (2001) 
found that annually, approximately 16% of teachers leave their schools, and that attrition 
rates in high-poverty schools are fully 50% higher than in low-poverty schools.  
Such findings have led to numerous efforts, from reforms of teacher preparation 
to development of mentoring and induction programs for new teachers, to improve the 
quality of teachers while also attracting them to high-needs schools. As a result, districts 
and school administrators have begun to face pressures to reform their human resource 
practices to recruit and retain more effective teachers. The No Child Left Behind Act, 
which defines highly qualified teachers and makes student achievement a central focus of 
education policy, has also stimulated interest in performance-based measures of school 
and teacher effectiveness (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Adding to this interest are 
sophisticated statistical techniques that provide quantifiable measures of teachers’ 
contributions to student test scores (McCaffrey, Han, & Lockwood, 2009). 
Performance-based compensation in education is not new, however. Teachers in 
Great Britain were paid on the basis of performance in the eighteenth century. In the U.S., 
districts have experimented since the early twentieth century with alternatives to single 
salary schedules based on experience and credentials (Texas Education Agency, 1998; 
Wilms & Chapleau, 1999). With the release of the A Nation at Risk report in 1983, which 
highlighted teacher quality as a factor in the relatively poor performance of U.S. students, 
states and public school districts began to consider in greater numbers replacing or 
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supplementing single salary schedules with differentiated pay based on performance 
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007).
These alternatives have included merit pay plans that provide bonuses or salary 
increases to high-performing teachers and career ladder systems that offer both increased 
compensation and advancement opportunities for professional development, attainment 
of credentials, and performance. For the most part, these programs have been short-lived, 
failing because of inadequate performance measures, insufficient funding, and political 
opposition from teachers’ unions and associations. Texas, for example, instituted a career 
ladder program in 1984 that created a system by which teachers’ pay would be increased 
based on appraisals of classroom, satisfaction of professional development requirements, 
and experience. By 1993, the system was abolished amidst dissatisfaction among teachers 
who questioned the impartiality of the appraisal system and among administrators who 
were often unable to distribute earned bonuses and supplements due to inadequate state 
and local funding (Davis, 2004; Texas Education Agency, 1998). 
School-based performance award (SBPA), or cooperative incentive plans, which 
provide bonuses to teachers and administrators for attainment of school-wide 
achievement objectives, have been more enduring. These programs began in earnest in 
the 1990s, as state accountability systems were being established. Texas and Kentucky, 
for example, began providing financial awards to schools achieving high ratings at the 
inception of their accountability systems in 1990 and 1993, respectively.  These awards 
are often provided to schools, which may or may not distribute them as bonuses to 
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teachers and other staff. Districts are more likely to establish programs that explicitly 
provide individual bonuses to teachers based on school performance (Raham, 2000). 
SBPA programs remain an important part of many states’ accountability systems, as well 
as federal accountability programs established by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.
Unlike these past efforts, the new generation of performance pay plans are 
multifaceted programs designed to address teacher compensation more comprehensively 
(Heneman & Kimball, 2008). Instead of focusing on attainment of credentials or 
appraisals, or on school performance goals alone, they integrate a variety of performance 
awards with recruitment and retention bonuses, and incorporate professional development 
and mentoring to improve knowledge and skills. TAP, developed by the National Institute 
for Excellence in Teaching (established by the Milken Family Foundation), was one of 
the first programs of this type. Launched in 1999, it incorporates multiple career paths for 
teachers, continuous professional development, standards-based teacher evaluations, and 
performance pay. Schools implement TAP much as they would a comprehensive school 
reform program, as a whole-school effort.
Denver Public Schools’ ProComp plan, implemented districtwide in 2005, is 
another prominent program that has attracted much attention. Like TAP, it provides 
awards for participation in professional development and attainment of credentials as 
well as awards for school- and classroom-level student achievement. ProComp, however, 
is a district program that affects all teachers hired since the 2005-2006 school year, as 
well as teachers already working in the district who opt in. Texas’s statewide District 
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Awards for Teaching Excellence (DATE) program similarly provides awards for 
achieving student achievement goals and engaging in collaborative professional activities 
along with bonuses for teaching hard-to-staff subjects in hard-to-staff schools. These 
comprehensive compensation programs have spurred larger efforts to alter school and 
district human resource practices to better integrate recruitment, placement, retention, 
development, and compensation, focusing more on student outcomes and less on 
experience and credentials (Milanowski, 2008b).
 Performance Pay and Policy Implementation
The theory of action underlying performance pay is relatively straightforward, yet 
the policy is employed to achieve varied and complex goals. A theory of action specifies 
and explains the assumed, hypothesized, or demonstrated causal connections between 
policy inputs that lead to desired outcomes (Patton, 2002). In the case of performance 
pay, teachers are provided bonuses and/or salary increases based on their attainment of 
specified performance goals. These monetary rewards are intended to directly increase 
teachers’ motivation to achieve desired student learning goals in their own classrooms, 
which should lead to overall improvement in student achievement. Performance 
incentives are further intended to attract high-quality teachers to schools and subject areas 
in which positions are often difficult to fill through the promise of higher pay and direct 
acknowledgements of performance. Scholars also point to the potential of performance-
based compensation to improve the overall quality of individuals entering teaching and to 
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drive low-performing teachers out of the profession (Koppich, 2008; Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007). 
At heart, performance-based compensation is an economic approach that attempts 
to alter individual decision makers’ preferences by manipulating the resources available 
to them. Specifically, monetary incentives are introduced to alter teachers’ decisions 
about where to work, what types of professional activities to undertake, and which 
instructional goals to pursue. As with other types of policies that employ such incentives 
to realign goals, such as accountability systems or school reconstitution, this model 
presents difficulties in implementation (Malen, Croninger, Muncey, & Redmond-Jones, 
2002). Teachers base decisions about their workplaces on a variety of factors, including 
the socioeconomic status of students, working conditions in schools, and proximity to 
their hometowns (Loeb & McEwan, 2006). Accountability systems are rife with 
opportunities to game the system by complying (or cheating) without genuinely altering 
practices or goals (Loeb & McEwan, 2006; Rothstein, 2009). Incomplete knowledge of 
teacher effectiveness, school effectiveness, and instructional improvement among 
teachers, administrators, and policymakers can also hinder the ability of incentive-based 
policies to achieve their objectives (Loeb & McEwan, 2006).
Given these complexities, implementation research that closely examines 
teachers’ responses to and interpretations of incentives is critical to understanding the 
potential of performance-based compensation policies to induce and sustain 
improvements in student learning. Policy implementation is a highly localized endeavor 
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that can determine policy success or failure (Berends, Bodilly, & Kirby, 2005; 
McLaughlin, 1987). Studies that examine the ways in which teachers make sense of 
education policies in the context of their school environments can illuminate the ways in 
which they are integrated into existing practices and decisions (Coburn, 2001a). 
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine and explicate the ways in which 
teachers make sense of performance-based compensation. Specifically, I examined the 
meanings and understandings they create about the goals and intentions of these policies, 
and how their professional decisions are being influenced by performance pay. These 
areas fit well with the theory of action of performance pay as primarily a lever for 
changing goals, motivations, and priorities more than altering specific classroom 
behaviors or practices (Rothstein, 2009).
A second purpose of the study was to understand the relationship between 
interpretations at the school level and those made by policymakers at the district level. 
Policymakers constructing definitions and meanings of policies and programs must 
contend not only with ambiguity and inexperience, but also with conflict between 
stakeholders and interest groups. They must act as sensegivers, creating their own 
meanings of policy mechanisms and processes and then communicating them to promote 
desired behaviors and outcomes (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Their meanings and 
definitions may or may not align with those of the teachers whose behaviors and attitudes 
they seek to change. This relationship has been studied in regard to teachers’ 
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interpretations of policy messages – normative, regulative, and cognitive pressures about 
teaching and learning (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Coburn, 2001a; Louis, Febey, & 
Schroeder, 2005). The messages themselves, though, have typically been treated as static 
and their development largely unexamined. However, the conceptual and theoretical 
assumptions and definitions that underlie policies influence the policy messages received 
by teachers, but are not always made explicit in the policies themselves. 
To understand the interplay between sensemaking and sensegiving, I examined 
the experiences of teachers, school administrators, and district policymakers in Hill 
Independent School District, a mid-sized urban school district in Texas. The district had 
been piloting a comprehensive performance-based compensation program since 2007 
(this program is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three). The program was 
characterized by several features that made it well-suited to an implementation study of 
performance-based compensation. First, the program was still in a pilot phase and under 
development. Meanings and interpretations about the policy were actively being 
negotiated and changed as guidelines and requirements are changes. Second, it was 
developed and was overseen by a steering committee made up of district, teacher, 
principal, and community representatives. This presented a unique opportunity to study 
not only the teachers and school administrators enacting the policy, but also the designers 
of the policy itself. Few studies have included both sets of actors to more thoroughly 
examine the policy messages received and interpreted in schools. Third, the program had 
been developed and implemented in a relatively conflict-free environment. Initiatives in 
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some other districts (though not all) have been characterized by political controversy that 
could affect teachers’ interpretations of them. Such controversy had been minimal 
(although not nonexistent) in this district, making it easier to focus on teachers’ 
experiences with the content and effects of the policy itself rather than with the political 
conflicts surrounding it.
Research Design and Chapter Overview
In examining this program, I drew on theories of policy implementation that 
emphasize the co-construction of policy implementation and the centrality of 
sensemaking and interpretation in the enactment of policies in schools and classrooms. 
The study addressed the following overarching research questions (these questions are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three):
1. What meanings and understandings do teachers construct about the goals, 
purposes, and intentions of performance-based compensation? 
2. How do these meanings and understandings compare with the assumptions and 
intentions of policymakers who design and communicate performance-based 
compensation policies?
3. What are the relationships between teachers’ experiences with performance-
based compensation policy and teachers’ goals for their students’ learning and 
their own professional goals?
To address these questions, I used case study methodology, which allows for 
nuanced exploration of the influence of context and for descriptions of events over time. 
The main focus of the study was teachers and their sensemaking and implementation of 
performance pay. To understand their meaning making and how it is influenced, I also 
11
included important sensegivers, namely principals and district policymakers who actively 
mediate between teachers and the compensation reforms.
In examining the meanings constructed about performance-based compensation 
by both district policymakers and school practitioners, I found that their interpretations 
varied in important ways, even as they engaged in similar processes of meaning 
construction. Teachers interpreted the performance pay program in relation to their 
existing practices and notions about important outcomes. District policymakers did the 
same, but because they prioritized and engaged with the program in unique ways, they 
came to different understandings of its purposes and goals. These goals were not always 
clearly communicated to teachers, and principals took on key roles in providing 
frameworks for teachers’ actions in implementing program activities in their classrooms.
Despite these differences in interpreting the program, teachers did change their 
instructional practices in some important ways in response to incentives. Examples of 
changes identified were focusing more attention on specific content or groups of students, 
and paying closer attention to curriculum standards. However, these changes appeared 
difficult to sustain in the face of other demands on teachers, particularly those emanating 
from the state accountability system. 
In the next chapter, I turn to the literature on performance pay, cognitive 
approaches to policy implementation, and sensemaking that informed my research 
questions and the design of the study. In Chapter 3, I describe the research design, 
including samples, data collection methods, and analytic techniques employed. Chapter 4 
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is focused on the policy context of the performance pay program studied here, which 
formed the environment in which policymakers in Hill ISD designed and enacted their 
performance pay program. The program itself is described in the chapter, as well. Chapter 
5 through 7 describe the experiences of district policymakers, school administrators, and 
teachers with Hill ISD’s performance pay program, and the meanings they constructed 
about it. These chapters show that, although these groups developed a variety of 
understandings of the program, they went about doing so in similar ways. Finally, in 
Chapter 8, I summarize my findings and discuss their implications for theories of policy 
implementation, performance pay policies, and research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Performance-based compensation is based on the assumption that individual 
decisions about where to teach, what professional activities to engage in, and which goals 
to pursue can be altered or guided by monetary incentives. It is a straightforward model, 
but one with complex goals. To understand the potential of this policy to create 
significant and lasting change, we must understand the way it is interpreted, adapted, and 
integrated within schools and communities of teachers. The aim should be not so much to 
uncover universal truths about enacting performance-based compensation in real-world 
settings, but to “build knowledge about what works for whom, where, when, and 
why,” (Honig, 2006b, p. 4).
In this chapter, I first review the current research on performance-based 
compensation. Most of this research has taken the form of evaluations of programs and 
emphasizes short-term outcomes on student achievement and teacher mobility. 
Implementation studies have focused mostly on teacher satisfaction, school climate, and 
compliance. Examinations of teachers’ responses to performance-based compensation 
and their understanding of it have been limited. Thus, we still know very little about how 
teachers are interpreting, adapting, and integrating the goals of performance-based 
compensation into their practices and professional decisions.
To shed some light on this issue, I next review literature on policy 
implementation, focusing on cognitive theories that are particularly well-suited to 
examining policies, such as compensation reform, that seek to effect substantial changes 
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in teachers’ behaviors and decisions. Much research within this framework has studied 
teachers’ implementation of curricular reforms, highlighting the centrality of 
sensemaking processes in their understanding and enactment of policy. To illustrate how 
cognitive theories of policy implementation can illuminate the processes by which 
performance pay policies are understood and enacted within schools, I then review 
studies of teachers’ responses to accountability policies that have used this approach. This 
research suggests that teachers’ responses to incentives and pressures are complex and 
highly influenced by school cultures and teacher communities. Finally, I discuss the 
implications of the literature for the study proposed here.
Research on Performance-Based Compensation
This review addresses first what is known about the effects of performance pay on 
student outcomes, and then addresses issues related to policy implementation. The focus 
here is primarily on “diversified” plans (Heneman & Kimball, 2008) that incorporate an 
array of performance incentives along with professional development and pay for 
knowledge and skills. Diversified pay policies have only been implemented in earnest 
since 2004, when Denver Public Schools’ ProComp plan was enacted throughout the 
district.2 Thus, the research base is still quite limited. At this point, few conclusions can 
be made about how performance pay affects important outcomes such as student learning, 
teacher mobility, and teacher recruitment. Most programs simply have not been in place 
long enough to make those determinations. More conclusive evidence exists on teachers’ 
attitudes toward performance pay and how it influences their practice. Even so, the 
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evidence offers sometimes contradictory findings, often leading to more questions than 
answers.
Effects on Student Outcomes.
At this time, only a handful of performance pay programs have been implemented 
long enough to demonstrate effects on student achievement. An evaluation of the pilot of 
the ProComp program showed that effects on student achievement (as measured by 
changes in mean normal curve equivalents in reading, writing, and mathematics on the 
Iowa Test of Basic Skills and the Colorado Student Assessment Program) varied by 
school level and by the rigor and attainment of classroom learning objectives set by 
individual teachers (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004). Pilot middle and 
high school students performed better than peers in control schools on most tests, while 
pilot elementary students performed below the levels of students in control schools. In all 
school levels, students of teachers setting more rigorous learning objectives and attaining 
two objectives had higher mean scores than students whose teachers set less rigorous 
objectives or did not meet all of their objectives. A later analysis using a value-added 
model after the program was implemented districtwide in 2006 showed mixed results. 
Students of teachers who opted into the program outperformed those of non-participating 
teachers. However, students of teachers required to participate performed below those of 
non-participating teachers (Wiley, Gaertner, Spindler, & Subert, 2008). 
An analysis of gains in mathematics among schools implementing the TAP 
program showed a modest, but significant effect of the program on mathematics 
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achievement in elementary schools. The effects on achievement in secondary schools 
were mixed, possibly because TAP schools at that level were performing better than 
controls schools before beginning participation in the program (Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 
2008). Finally, analyses of student achievement gains in mathematics and reading among 
schools participating in Texas’s Governor’s Educator Excellence Grants (GEEG) program 
produced mixed results depending on model specifications, leading the evaluators to 
conclude that evidence of effects on student outcomes were inconclusive (Springer, et al., 
2009). 
It is important to note that most of these findings are from programs that are still 
in their beginning stages. As with other systemic reform initiatives, such as 
comprehensive school reform, it may take several years of implementation to realize 
measurable improvements in student learning (Berends, et al., 2005). Additionally, 
performance pay programs are often structured in ways that make it difficult to identify 
relationships between the programs and student outcomes. For example, new teachers in 
Denver Public Schools have been required to participate in ProComp since 2005, whereas 
veteran teachers (i.e., those employed in the district prior to 2005) have the option to 
participate. In that context, Wiley et al.’s (2008) finding that students of teachers opting 
in outperformed those of teachers required to participate is not surprising. Not only are 
teachers opting in more experienced, but it is also possible that those veteran teachers 
who opt in are more likely to achieve performance objectives than those who opt out. The 
GEEG analysis of student achievement gains was confounded by the program’s eligibility  
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criteria, under which only high-performing, high-poverty schools were selected to 
participate. These constraints presented tremendous challenges in identifying an 
appropriate group of schools to which outcomes could be compared (Springer, et al., 
2009). 
Overall, research on the effects of performance pay on student achievement is still 
in its infancy. Findings from the few programs that have been in existence for more than 
a few years suggest that the policy may improve student achievement in some subjects 
and grade levels. However, a number of analyses have produced mixed or inconclusive 
findings that suggest that program design and within-program variations in 
implementation play an important role in effects on student outcomes.
Effects on Teacher Outcomes.
Performance pay programs are expected to improve student achievement not just 
by directly inducing teachers to pursue achievement goals, but also by reducing teacher 
attrition and attracting more qualified teachers into the profession (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007). Unfortunately, as with research on student outcomes, research on these 
outcomes is quite limited due to the limited time most performance pay programs have 
been implemented. 
Evaluations of two statewide performance pay programs in Texas estimated 
teacher mobility rates among participating schools (Springer, et al., 2009; Springer, 
Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Stecher, 
et al., 2008). Turnover rates among teachers participating in the Texas Educator 
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Excellence Grants (TEEG) program were slightly higher than those of similar non-
participating schools. Beginning teachers in schools participating in the first year of the 
program also had slightly higher turnover than beginning teachers in non-participating 
schools. No differences were found between participating schools on the basis of specific 
features of their performance pay plans. The actual distribution of performance awards, 
however, had a strong impact on turnover. Turnover among teachers who did not receive 
awards was more than twice that of teachers who received awards. Further, turnover rates 
decreased as the amount of awards received increased. Teachers receiving awards of 
$1,000 or less had turnover rates that were not significantly different from turnover rates 
prior to participation in the program. Awards of $3,000 or more reduced predicted 
turnover rates (based on school and teacher characteristics) to less than one quarter of the 
rate estimated based on turnover prior to participating in the program.
Similar results were obtained for the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grants 
(GEEG) program, which employs a nearly identical program design, but applies to a 
different set of Texas schools. Teachers who did not receive performance awards had 
higher estimated turnover than those who received awards. Turnover decreased 
substantially as award amounts increased. In this analysis, however, plan features had an 
influence on turnover. Teachers in schools with more individualized plans, as measured 
by the Gini coefficient (a ratio measure of income inequality), had higher than expected 
teacher turnover, particularly among beginning teachers. These evaluation findings 
suggest that amounts of performance awards may play a strong role in teacher attrition in 
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schools participating in performance pay programs. Given that only high-performing (and 
high-poverty) schools were selected to participate in both TEEG and GEEG, the findings 
that low award amounts (and lack of awards) resulted in higher turnover rates begs the 
question of whether performance pay programs could exacerbate attrition problems, 
depending on how they are designed and implemented. It is important to note that these 
findings varied by program year, so more analyses are needed before any conclusions can 
be made. Research that closely examines teachers’ experiences with these programs and 
the contexts in which they are implemented can also help in interpreting these findings.
Implementation of Performance Pay.
A number of program evaluations have examined teachers’ attitudes and 
perceptions about performance pay. From these evaluations, a few consistent findings 
have emerged. First, beginning teachers tend to be more supportive of performance pay 
than more experienced teachers (Goldhaber, DeArmond, & DeBurgomaster, 2007; Jacob 
& Springer, 2008; Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, 
Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Patterson, et al., 2008). Second, teachers who receive 
performance awards tend to be more satisfied with their performance pay programs than 
teachers who do not receive awards or do not participate in programs (Springer, et al., 
2009; Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, 
Lopez, Stecher, et al., 2008). Third, teachers overall tend to be more supportive of 
differentiated pay based on subject and school assignments than of pay based on student 
performance (Farkas, Johnson, Duffet, Moye, & Vine, 2003; Goldhaber, et al., 2007).
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Despite the central role of motivation and changes to instructional practice in the 
theory of action of performance pay, only a handful of studies have examined these issues 
in depth. Kelley et al. (2000) studied teachers’ motivational reactions to SBPA programs 
using a model of teacher motivation based on expectancy and goal-setting theories. Using 
survey and interview data, they found that the programs focused teachers on student 
achievement goals and clarified learning objectives. Performance awards were associated 
with both desirable outcomes related to goal attainment and learning, and undesirable 
outcomes related to stress and sanctions for not achieving goals. However, many teachers 
were skeptical that they could continue to achieve increasing performance standards over 
time. Teachers also interpreted performance awards in different ways, with some viewing 
them as a formal recognition of their work and others viewing it as compensation for the 
purchase of classroom materials. For others, the incentives were irrelevant. The 
researchers note that program design and context were important factors affecting 
teachers’ motivation. The way incentives are structured and the context in which they are 
implemented can have greatly affect the way they are interpreted and acted on.
Evaluators of the ProComp pilot also found considerable variation in the way 
teachers interpreted and responded to performance incentives (Community Training and 
Assistance Center, 2004). Using interview and focus group data, they found that teachers 
tended to alter their practices in ways that fit with their existing practices and ideas about 
teaching and learning. For example, the teachers they studied responded to the 
requirement to set student learning objectives by dismissing or marginalizing the practice, 
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by enthusiastically embracing it as a new benefit to their teaching, or by utilizing it as an 
extension of existing data use practices. In each case, the response fit with teachers’ 
existing norms of practice, philosophies of teaching, and professional identities. Teachers 
also described the policy as a secondary or potential influence on their teaching practice, 
not a primary influence or part of their core practice. These findings were used to explain 
survey data from pilot teachers that they had not changed their instruction in response to 
ProComp. Teachers were thought to be compartmentalizing the objective-setting 
activities mandated by ProComp as planning and assessment, which was separate from 
the teaching activities that made up their core practice.
Some other research has shown similar inconsistencies in changes to teachers’ 
practices in response to performance pay. Another evaluation of ProComp (conducted 
after the program had been implemented districtwide) found that teachers increased their 
engagement in professional development aimed at increasing student achievement, 
although they also felt more pressure and stress related to the program (Wiley, et al., 
2008). However, like the pilot teachers, they reported that the program had had little 
influence on their teaching. Teachers participating in the TEEG program reported similar 
lack of effects on practice (Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, 
Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Patterson, et al., 2008). At the same time, teachers in 
both programs reported that their use of practices such as aligning instruction to standards 
and focusing on student learning goals related to program objectives increased during 
their participation in the program. Neither of these evaluations included interview data 
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from teachers that might have illuminated these inconsistent findings, although the 
findings from the ProComp pilot evaluation provide some insight into possible 
explanations.
Limitations of Research on Performance Pay.
In all, evidence regarding the effectiveness of performance pay programs in 
improving student achievement and reducing teacher attrition is limited, but growing. 
Although this research has been hindered by program designs and implementation 
features, there is some evidence that performance pay can have a positive influence on 
these outcomes. A number of conclusions can also be made about the characteristics of 
teachers who support performance pay and the types of differentiated pay teachers prefer. 
We know relatively little, though, about how performance pay programs affect teachers’ 
professional decisions or the professional cultures within schools that play an important 
role in student learning. 
Research from the pilot evaluation of ProComp and Kelley et al.’s (2000) study of 
motivational effects of SBPA programs provides valuable insight into the ways teachers 
respond to performance incentives and the ways they are integrated into teachers’ existing 
frameworks regarding their teaching practices. However, these insights are focused 
largely on individual differences among teachers and place school and other contextual 
influences largely in the background. Evaluations of a number of performance pay 
programs has demonstrated that there are considerable variations in the way the policy is 
implemented across schools (Springer, Ballou, et al., 2008; Springer, et al., 2009; 
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Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, 
Patterson, et al., 2008), suggesting that school environments appear to play a central role 
in shaping teachers’ interpretations and enactment of compensation reform. 
Performance pay represents not only a change in school-based practices of 
evaluation and recognition, but also a change in the larger culture of teaching, which has 
long been characterized by seniority and privacy (Lortie, 1975). To truly understand how 
this policy might effect changes in teachers’ practices and professional identities, we need 
more research that examines how it is received, adapted, and integrated into the complex 
array of influences on teachers, particularly those emanating from school and 
professional cultures.
In the next section, I argue that implementation research based on cognitive and 
organizational frameworks can provide this kind of insight. I first provide a brief review 
of policy implementation research in education, focusing on research employing 
cognitive and sensemaking perspectives. The sensemaking framework is useful here in 
examining the way people respond to changes in their environments. I then review 
research on teachers’ implementation of accountability and curriculum policies that uses 
sensemaking frameworks as an example of how such research can inform us about 
implementation of performance pay.
Policy Implementation Studies in Education
Numerous studies of education policy initiatives have demonstrated that poor 
implementation is a contributor to reform failure, but is also a key factor when reforms 
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are successful (Berends, et al., 2005; Bryk, Sebring, Allensworth, Luppescu, & Easton, 
2010; Cohen & Ball, 1990; Corcoran & Christman, 2002; Southwest Educational 
Development Laboratory, 2006). Sustainable improvement occurs when individuals and 
organizations integrate new practices and ideas such that they change other aspects of the 
organization and individuals within them (Coburn, 2003; Elmore, 1996). This has long 
been the vision of standards-based reforms and other reforms that have arisen from them 
(such as comprehensive school reform and data-driven decision making). However, 
policies are frequently implemented in ways that look very different from the intentions 
of policymakers, impeding reform and contributing to the seemingly endless churn of 
reform movements in education (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). 
Policy implementation researchers have used different theoretical frameworks to 
explain the disconnect often found between policy design and the practical realization of 
policy. Traditional perspectives employ a technical-rational perspective drawn from 
economics and political science that emphasizes rational choice and principal-agent 
relationships (Amanda Datnow, 2006; Spillane, Reiser, & Reimer, 2002). These 
perspectives assume that failures to implement policy according to its design and intent 
are the result of limited capacity, willful noncompliance, or confusion among policy 
implementers. Within this framework, these problems can be addressed by reducing 
policy ambiguity, clarifying lines of authority and institutional structures to simplify 
relations between policymakers and implementers, or providing clear instructions to 
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implementers to ensure they properly understand policy mechanisms and intentions 
(Honig, 2006b). 
Technical-rational implementation researchers commonly define and measure 
implementation as fidelity, the extent to which a policy is delivered to the intended 
recipients in the manner intended by policy designers (O'Donnell, 2008). Measures of 
implementation fidelity are designed to provide information about whether the policy 
“works” by controlling variation in the “treatment,” as is done in randomized controlled 
experiments.3 While such measures can provide valuable quantitative information about 
the effects of policies on important outcomes such as student achievement and teacher 
retention, they do not adequately account for the complexity of implementing policies 
designed to bring about fundamental changes in teaching practice or educational systems 
(Spillane, et al., 2002). 
Teachers and school administrators implementing reforms must reconcile them 
with existing ideas within their communities about such matters as what students should 
learn, how they should be taught, and why they are being educated (Hatch, 2001). As a 
result, practitioners may continue to harbor philosophies and attitudes that run counter to 
those undergirding reforms (Booher-Jennings, 2005). School norms and professional 
traditions can also impede adoption of new practices promoted in policy (Berends, et al., 
2005; Ingram, Louis, & Schroeder, 2004; Little, 1995). In the case of compensation 
reforms, potential conflicts such as these are myriad. They must be reconciled not only 
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with existing school-wide norms and practices, but also with political values emanating 
from longstanding professional traditions (DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2008).
Researchers drawing on sociological perspectives make these complexities central 
to their examinations of the processes by which policies are carried out in schools and 
classrooms. This line of implementation research emphasizes the cultural contexts in 
which policies are implemented (Datnow, 2006; Spillane, et al., 2002). Using this lens, 
variations in implementation are the result of adaptations of policies made by 
implementers to fit them into their existing practices (McLaughlin, 1976). As such, 
variations are not necessarily “failures” of implementation or problems to be corrected, 
but reasonable and expected responses to the institutional and organizational pressures 
placed on schools (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Further, adaptation of policy is desirable 
to the extent it enables policies to be integrated into existing practices and cultures 
(McLaughlin, 1976).
Much cultural implementation research is limited to descriptions of differences 
between policy intent and its implementation by teachers and administrators inside 
schools, implying that such variations can be ameliorated through more coherent policy 
designs and capacity-building initiatives (Elmore, 1996; Massell, 1998). However, 
policies such as compensation reform that are designed to result in significant changes in 
systems and practice often require implementers (especially teachers) to make 
fundamental changes in their work. Cultural implementation research illustrates that such 
changes are extremely difficult to achieve broadly because they require changes in not 
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only behaviors, but also beliefs, values, and goals (Spillane, et al., 2002). Thus, the way 
teachers make sense of policies must be understood in order to understand why policies 
evolve as they do in implementation. 
Cognitive Approaches to Policy Implementation.
Recent researchers have come to view policy implementation as primarily a 
process of learning and sensemaking involving ongoing negotiations of meaning 
(Spillane, et al., 2002). These approaches can be useful to research on performance pay 
by illuminating how teachers come to understand policies, the understandings they 
construct about them, and the way those understandings affect their behaviors (Spillane, 
et al., 2002).
This line of research has taken both individualistic and social perspectives on 
learning. Scholars drawing on social psychological theories, for example, describe how 
implementation of complex policies essentially involves restructuring schemas developed 
through prior experiences and existing knowledge (Coburn, 2004; Spillane, 2000). These 
scholars point to the difficulty of restructuring existing schemas because of the tendency 
of individuals to focus on superficial aspects of policies and to overlook differences 
between the core principles of them and their own working theories and knowledge 
(Cohen, 1990; Spillane, Reiser, & Gomez, 2006). Thus, even extensive knowledge of a 
policy can still result in different interpretations among individuals, along with varying 
levels and forms of implementation.
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Other research has taken microsociological and situated cognition perspectives, 
pointing to interactions within social settings as mechanisms for crafting shared 
understandings of policies. Macro settings such as social class, racial groups, institutional 
contexts, and professional fields are influential social structures in which individuals 
develop worldviews that act as filters through which new events, such as policies, are 
interpreted and experienced (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dumas & Anyon, 2006; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). Especially important, though, are the immediate environments of 
schools in which implementers interact with one another and draw on existing collective 
knowledge and social norms to determine the meaning of policy and decide on courses of 
action (Coburn, 2001a; Spillane, et al., 2002). 
In studies of teachers’ implementation of policy, professional communities have 
emerged as important sites for these interactions (Coburn, 2001a; Little, 2003; Louis, 
Marks, & Kruse, 1996). A teacher professional community refers to any grouping in 
which teachers learn from one another, model practices that support student learning, and 
share expertise (Bransford, Derry, Berliner, Hammerness, & Beckett, 2005). Researchers 
distinguish professional communities from other forms of school culture through the 
presence of five elements: shared values, focus on student learning, collaboration, 
deprivatized practice (practice that is shared and open to critique and reflection), and 
reflective dialogue (Louis & Marks, 1997). 
Through these activities and interactions, teachers are able to collectively 
negotiate meaning about policies and initiatives. The process of developing shared values 
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about teaching and learning provides teachers with a common language about instruction 
and set of standards and goals by which to evaluate their effectiveness and identify ways 
to better address student needs (Louis & Marks, 1997). Teachers also articulate tacit 
beliefs in the context of professional communities, which enables those beliefs to be 
examined and challenged (Richardson & Placier, 2001). Through this process, 
professional communities create representations of policies based on their shared 
knowledge, prior experiences, and cultural norms. Lesson plans, assessments, curriculum 
documents, and other tools become the basis for instructional practices and activities that 
prompt further negotiation, reification, and participation. This ongoing process comes to 
constitute learning, which gradually transforms practice across the professional 
community (Coburn & Stein, 2006). 
Datnow (2006) has expanded on these theories of meaning making in policy 
implementation by arguing that policies are not interpreted solely within the schools and 
professional communities where they are implemented. They are interpreted by groups 
and individuals throughout the system. Districts and states are not merely contextual 
backdrops to teachers’ sensemaking and enactment of policy. They interact with schools 
and professional communities to “co-construct” policy through the same types of 
sensemaking processes teachers undertake in schools and classrooms. The relationships 
between levels within educational systems, rather than being “top-down” or “bottom-up” 
are, instead, multidirectional, with actions and messages coming from one level 
influencing those at another at different points in time.   This systemic view of 
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implementation and policy construction suggests that understanding how policies are 
interpreted and acted upon necessitates examining how individuals and groups at multiple 
levels in the system make sense of them.
These approaches to policy implementation can provide insight into teachers’ 
understanding and enactment of performance pay policies. To be used to their greatest 
effect, though, it is necessary to better understand the mechanisms through which 
teachers interpret and construct meanings about policies. To elaborate on this, I turn now 
to theories of sensemaking. Many properties of sensemaking overlap with theories in 
social and cognitive psychology that have informed cognitive approaches to the study of 
policy implementation. It is, though, a microsociological theory that is concerned with 
meaning construction that happens through social interactions in groups. To those 
concerned mostly with the actions of groups and communities, as are most researchers of 
educational policy implementation, sensemaking provides a useful framework for 
understanding the influence of organizational cultures and group dynamics on policy 
interpretation and adaptation (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
Sensemaking.
Theories of sensemaking are derived from the microsociological traditions of 
symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, which emphasize the role of social 
interactions in the interpretation of events and the creation of social environments 
(Weick, 1995). It has been most developed and widely used in the field of organizational 
behavior, where it refers to “…the ongoing, retrospective development of plausible 
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images that rationalize what people are doing.” (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 409). 
Sensemaking comes into play when people encounter disruptions to their worlds – events 
that deviate from the normal order of things, people who challenge their preconceived 
notions, or actions that are unexpected or unusual. When people experience these kinds of 
interruptions to the norm, they seek to explain them using their preexisting frames of 
knowledge, or worldviews. When confronted with a new policy initiative, teachers use 
their prior knowledge and experiences, and cues from their environments to interpret and 
develop responses to it. They may develop coherent understandings that facilitate actions 
or focus on inconsistencies in the policy that hinder responses (Coburn, 2001a; Louis, et 
al., 2005).
Sensemaking involves more than just explaining unexpected events or 
interruptions. It is a cycle of creating experiences and environments by such activities as 
identifying the specific problems within problematic situations and identifying cues to be 
attended to in the process of interpreting events. As Weick (1995) noted, “Sensemaking is 
about authoring as well as reading.” 
The Process of Sensemaking.
Coburn (2001a) describes three processes through which teachers engaged in 
sensemaking about reading instruction policy. They first collaboratively constructed 
meanings about the policy by linking directives to familiar frameworks. These meanings 
were then used in a gatekeeping function by which teachers selected in some policy 
messages and selected others out to maintain a sense of coherence with their shared 
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understandings. They also negotiated technical and practical details to translate their co-
constructed meanings of the policy into concrete action in the classroom. 
These processes mirror Weick’s (1995) framework of sensemaking as a process of 
labeling and categorizing, creating plausible explanations, and then taking action which 
results in further sensemaking. Sensemaking begins with something that creates 
confusion and chaos (Weick, et al., 2005). At first, it is unclear what the problem is, or 
whether there is even a problem to be addressed as opposed to simply a momentary 
interruption or one-time unusual event. Eventually, as the situation progresses, people 
begin to organize the event into smaller, manageable pieces that relate to existing mental 
models and frameworks of knowledge and experience. This process of noticing and 
bracketing experience is the fundamental process of sensemaking. Discrepancies to the 
normal flow of events must be selected out as noticeable and then labeled to differentiate 
and identify them. These new labels are generated within categories of relevant 
experience. Once events are noticed and bracketed, plausible explanations are generated 
that locate the events within their context and prior histories and experiences. 
One of the hallmarks, and more difficult properties, of sensemaking is that it is 
driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (Weick, 1995; Weick, et al., 2005). 
Sensemaking involves embellishing the meaning of cues by linking them with more 
general ideas, as well as elaborating on them by invoking past experiences to explain 
them (Weick, 1995). In one sense, given that sensemaking is a retrospective process, 
complete accuracy in the recall and interpretation of events is not possible. With any 
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event, there are multiple possible ideas and experiences upon which cues can be 
embellished and elaborated.  Events are also rarely stable, but instead shift and change as 
they unfold and as people make sense of them. Furthermore, past experiences are recalled 
as reconstructions, not faithful depictions, making accuracy even more unattainable 
(Weick, et al., 2005). The purpose of sensemaking is to orient new circumstances and 
events to present environments. In this context, “Accuracy is nice, but not 
necessary,” (Weick, 1995, p. 56).
Sensegiving.
A corollary to sensemaking is sensegiving: attempting to influence sensemaking 
toward some preferred interpretation of events. The two processes often occur iteratively, 
sequentially, and reciprocally (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). They can also overlap, as 
when sensemakers convey meanings to others in the process of retrospection and 
labeling. Sensegiving in organizational contexts can take on many forms, from direct 
espousals of visions (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) to less obvious actions such as 
structuring activities to appeal to implementors’ values (Bartunek, Krim, Necochea, & 
Humphries, 1999). 
Like sensemaking, sensegiving is triggered by certain types of events. Some 
events present minimal disruption or have meanings and consequences that are readily 
apparent and easily understood. Others require more active guidance to interpret. Maitlis 
and Lawrence (2007) found that such events are characterized by ambiguity and 
uncertainty, and are highly relevant to stakeholders’ interests. In these situations, leaders 
34
are more likely to engage in active sensegiving to bridge differences between 
stakeholders. 
Sensegiving enhances sensemaking theories by providing a venue to examine the 
role of power in the process. People in positions of power and authority (formal and 
informal) typically have greater influence over the ways people interpret and act on 
disruptions. Leaders and those with other forms of authority tend to have disproportionate 
influence over social relations, group identities, definitions of plausibility, acceptable 
interpretations, availability of environmental cues (by highlighting or suppressing 
information), and approval of actions and responses (Weick, et al., 2005). However, 
leaders’ effectiveness as sensegivers is not always assured by their positions of authority. 
In order to shape interpretations of events, they must be seen as expert and credible 
(Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007).
It is not only those at the top of organizations that have influence as sensegivers. 
Intermediaries, such as middle managers, can also be influential in shaping perceptions of 
events, particularly in organizations characterized by limited interactions between 
workers and senior managers (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Subordinates, as well, can 
shape events, cues, interpretations, and responses insofar as they have expertise or access 
to information that authority figures do not have (as in decentralized, loosely coupled 
environments) (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). These types of power dynamics influence the 
way disruptions are interpreted and incorporated into the ongoing flow of activity.
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Sensemaking theory can enhance our understanding of teachers’ responses to 
performance pay by clarifying the social cognitive processes through which it is 
understood and acted upon. It also explicates the role of social interactions as the central 
mechanism through which teachers shape meanings about policies and devise means of 
carrying them out within their existing practices. The concept of sensegiving further 
provides a framework for examining how policymakers and teachers may interact as both 
givers and receivers of policy messages about performance pay. This relational 
framework prompts a more systemic, flexible view of policy implementation in which 
multiple actors negotiate policy meanings on an ongoing basis (Datnow, 2006).
 Teachers’ Sensemaking of Incentive-Based Reforms: The Case of Accountability 
Policy.
We currently have very limited understanding of the role of sensemaking in 
teachers’ implementation of performance pay. However, researchers have examined 
teachers’ sensemaking of accountability policies, which employ similar theories of action 
and tools to promote certain goals and behaviors. This work, thus, provides a useful 
example of what can be learned about performance pay with sensemaking frameworks.
Accountability policies, like performance-based compensation, seek to align 
teachers’ goals with those of districts and states through the use of rewards (Loeb & 
McEwan, 2006). They are driven by learning standards and student performance data. 
States provide common sets of clearly defined learning standards, which form the basis 
for curriculum, instruction, assessments, and performance objectives. Schools and 
districts are evaluated on the basis of their performance in meeting these standards, with 
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limited guidance over specific curricula or instructional methods to be used (Smith & 
O'Day, 1991). Performance pay policies are similarly centered on standards and the 
attainment of performance goals (Heneman, Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007; Mohrman, 
Mohrman, & Odden, 1996; Odden, Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2001).
The literature on teachers’ responses to accountability initiatives highlights the 
importance of understanding the circumstances under which policies work in particular 
settings and with particular participants (Honig, 2006b). Since accountability policies 
emphasize outcomes and objectives, and leave the process of attaining those goals to 
practitioners, interpretations of policy and capacity at the school level takes on 
heightened importance. When standards and objectives are misunderstood or when 
practitioners are uncertain about effective strategies to pursue, the mechanisms of 
accountability can fall short of achieving the desired end of improving learning for all 
students (Elmore, 2004; Spillane, 2005). Performance-based compensation, which 
employs the same types of policy levers, also runs the risk of failure if standards and 
objectives are not clearly understood or if teachers lack capacity or resources to make 
needed improvements in instruction.
However, the emphasis on learning standards and use of student performance data 
can also result in an increased focus among teachers on student learning and 
improvements in student achievement. Louis, Febey, and Schroeder (2005), using 
qualitative observations and interviews, found that district accountability policies 
prompted teachers to construct common interpretations of new directives as they 
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developed plans to implement the policies. In the high schools they studied, the policies 
facilitated instructional improvement by providing a framework around which teachers 
could discuss practice and make collective changes to curriculum and instruction.
The emphasis on achievement outcomes and student performance data that arises 
from accountability policies can also negatively affect teachers and instructional 
practices. Valli and Buese (2007) examined changes in elementary teachers’ role 
expectations during a period of increasing high-stakes accountability mechanisms. They 
found that roles increased, expanded, and intensified as teachers incorporated policy 
directives to use student data for instructional planning and differentiate instruction. 
Teachers increased their collaborative work, but most of their time together was focused 
on analyzing data to group students for instruction and special programs and curriculum 
alignment and pacing. They spent little time in substantive discussions of pedagogy and 
learning.
In the same vein, Booher-Jennings (2005) examined elementary teachers’ 
responses to a new requirement that students pass state achievement tests to be promoted 
to the next grade. Performance data became used to equate good teaching with high 
percentages of students passing district benchmark and state achievement tests. These 
measures were subsequently used by teachers to evaluate each other’s competence and 
teaching effectiveness. The public presentation of teachers’ passing rates at planning 
meetings further created a high-anxiety atmosphere that increased complaints about 
colleagues’ effectiveness and eroded trust between teachers.
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Overall, what this body of work suggests is that teachers’ sensemaking of 
accountability policies can result in widely varying outcomes, depending on the specific 
policy being examined, the systemic context, and teachers’ interactions with one another. 
As a social process, sensemaking leads teachers to collaboratively develop interpretive 
frameworks for policy that are constructed around not only the messages they receive 
about requirements, goals, and intent, but also their histories, existing practices, and 
shared knowledge. In some instances, the incentives contained in accountability policies 
focus teachers’ efforts toward meaningful instructional improvement. In others, teachers’ 
sensemaking results in compliance-oriented actions or behaviors that have a negative 
impact on relationships and the quality of instruction.
Implications for the Study
Research using sensemaking theories has explored the processes by which 
teachers interpret policies, developing shared understandings of policy messages that 
guide their adaptation or rejection of them in their classrooms. This research has, for the 
most part, concentrated on instructional, curricular, and accountability policies that 
directly affect teachers’ core work of instruction (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Coburn, 2001a; 
Louis, et al., 2005; Valli & Buese, 2007). Performance-based compensation affects 
teachers’ work more tangentially, by setting goals, promoting certain professional 
behaviors and activities, and altering conceptions of the qualities associated with 
professionalism and success (Milanowski, 2008a). Nonetheless, these policies represent 
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changes to norms, values, and objectives that influence teachers’ interactions and 
priorities, prompting interpretation and sensemaking. 
The influence of teachers’ interactions on sensemaking is perhaps the most 
problematic for policymakers because it suggests that the same policy can be interpreted 
and acted on in very different ways. Indeed, policymakers and reformers expend a great 
deal of effort in trying to control teachers’ interpretation and adaptation of policy through 
such means as technical assistance and efforts at obtaining “buy-in” (Hatch, 2001). 
Implementation research on performance-based compensation is indicative of this type of 
technical-rational perspective on implementation, stressing satisfaction and views about 
fairness in an attempt to determine whether teachers will allow incentives to influence 
their behaviors in intended ways. Such research has done little to inform policymakers or 
researchers about how teachers are acting on performance incentives in their schools and 
classrooms or about the potential of performance-based compensation reforms to lead to 
lasting improvements in student outcomes.
Cognitive approaches to policy implementation can help to fill in these gaps by 
unpacking teachers’ sensemaking of performance pay and paying closer attention to 
contextual influences and social interactions in the process of implementation. By 
looking closely at the way performance pay is interpreted and acted on within schools 
and professional communities, we can better understand how these incentives may be 
received and responded to in different types of school environments. Given the often 
controversial nature of performance pay, more nuanced and comprehensive theories of 
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implementation could be valuable to policymakers in designing these policies and 
developing strategies for introducing them in different types of settings and 
circumstances. In terms of research, incorporating sensegiving processes into cognitive 
frameworks of policy implementation can help researchers to better understand how 
policymakers and policy implementers co-construct policy by simultaneously and 
iteratively making sense of policy meanings and messages. Explicit examination of these 
processes can lead research toward more interactive, flexible, and systemic models of 
educational policy implementation.
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Chapter 3: Research Methods
The purpose of this study was to describe teachers’ interpretations of 
performance-based compensation policy and to examine the relationships between their 
interpretations and those of policymakers driving the policy. These issues were explored 
using a sensemaking framework, which captures the processes through which people 
create meanings about new information and events. 
The study addressed the following questions, which guided data collection and 
analysis:
1. What meanings do teachers construct about the goals, purposes, priorities, and 
intentions of performance-based compensation? 
A. How do they define the policy’s goals, purposes, priorities, and intentions? 
What changes do they believe the policy is meant to bring about in the 
district? In the participating schools? Among teachers?
B. What sources of information are most influential to them?
C. How do they interpret formal policy messages from the district?
D. How do they integrate policy messages from different sources?
2. How do these meanings compare with the assumptions and intentions of 
policymakers responsible for developing the program?
A. What are the goals, intentions, priorities, and purposes of the policymakers 
responsible for the program? What changes do they hope to bring about in 
the district? In the participating schools? Among teachers?
B. What do they think teachers think and believe about the policy?
C. In what ways are teachers’ and policymakers’ interpretations of the policy 
and of each others’ goals, intentions, and purposes similar? In what ways 
are they different?
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3. What are the relationships between teachers’ experiences with performance-
based compensation policy influence and teachers’ goals for their students’ 
learning and their own professional goals and identities?
A. How do teachers’ interpretations of the policy influence their decisions 
about where to teach, what types of professional activities to engage in, 
and which instructional goals to pursue?
B. How do teachers’ interpretations of the policy influence the collective 
goals and activities they pursue within their schools?
In this chapter, I describe the study’s research design, samples, data collection 
methods, and analytic process. I also provide an overview of performance pay policy in 
Texas, arguing that its history and current policy context make it particularly appropriate 
for a study of sensemaking and implementation.
Research Design
The National Research Council, in articulating a framework for scientific research 
in education, noted that, within social science, a range of research methods can and 
should be used to answer different types of research questions (Feuer, Towne, & 
Shavelson, 2002). Along with research questions, the theories employed to frame 
research questions usually call for certain methods of inquiry (Merriam, 1998). The 
research questions that emphasize interpretations of performance pay, as well as the 
cognitive theories of policy implementation and sensemaking frameworks that informed 
these questions, guided the study design. 
The study employed qualitative case studies, a methodology uniquely suited to 
these questions and theoretical frameworks. Case studies, in which both historical and 
contemporary events are documented, focus on holistic examinations of the meaningful 
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aspects of real-life events and settings (Yin, 2003). They call for the incorporation of an 
array of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations – into rich 
descriptions of particular settings that can be analyzed individually or as groups in 
connection with variables of interest (Yin, 2003). In terms of sensemaking, case studies 
enable documentation and analysis of many different influences on interpretation (Gioia 
& Thomas, 1996; Weick, 1995). They also allow direct examination of policy 
deliberation and enactment (Coburn, 2001b; Cohen & Ball, 1990).
Case studies may employ either quantitative or qualitative research methods, or 
both (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2003). Merriam (1998) distinguishes qualitative case studies 
as being particularistic (focused on a particular situation, event, or phenomenon), 
descriptive, and heuristic in explaining how and why phenomena occur in particular 
ways. The advantage of qualitative case study methodology for this study was that it 
allowed for the depth of data collection and analysis needed to document teachers’ 
construction and reconstruction of policy messages while also allowing comparisons 
along relevant policy dimensions (Coburn, 2001b; Yin, 2003). Qualitative inquiry, 
particularly interpretive approaches, emphasizes understanding the meanings people 
construct about their worlds (Merriam, 1998).4 Theories of sensemaking similarly place 
these concerns at the center of examinations of how events influence people’s actions. In 
contrast to quantitative research, in which relationships between variables of interest are 
examined by isolating them from the influence of other variables, qualitative research 
attempts to “reveal how all the parts work together to form a whole,” (Merriam, 1998, p. 
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6). This makes qualitative inquiry ideal for examining the interactions between 
sensemakers, sensegivers, and context in constructing particular meanings about 
performance pay. 
This type of data is difficult to attain with survey methods that have been more 
often used to study implementation of performance pay. As noted in Chapter Two, 
research on teachers’ responses to compensation reforms has largely focused on measures 
of satisfaction, attitudes toward performance pay, and self-reports of impacts on 
instructional practice. Apart from the threats to external validity that arise in the use of 
self-reported data, survey methods are inherently limited in their ability to gather 
complex data on the processes of interpretation due to the need to limit responses to 
specific categories and the difficulty of clarifying or expanding on subjects’ responses 
(Babbie, 1990). 
The iterative nature of qualitative data collection and analysis, on the other hand, 
allows for exploration of topics and issues as they emerge, facilitating an examination of 
the interactive and nonlinear relationships between different system levels and events 
(McLaughlin & Talbert, 2001; Patton, 2002). This depth of analysis and rich description 
of experiences can generate new theory about the implementation of performance pay. 
While the findings from a small group of case studies cannot be used to make claims 
about large populations of schools or teachers participating in performance pay programs, 
they can be used to generate useful new theoretical models and hypotheses that can be 
later explored in more generalizable studies (Yin, 2003).
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The study design was multilevel, cross-case, and cross-sectional (Coburn, 2001b). 
It was multilevel in that multiple levels within the social system of the district were 
examined. The primary levels were the school and the district, but the state policy 
environment was also analyzed as an important influence on sensemaking and 
sensegiving. The use of multiple school sites facilitated comparative analysis of the ways 
in which school contexts influence teachers’ interpretations of performance pay policies, 
enabling what Yin (2003) calls “theoretical replication” – contrasting results for reasons 
predicted by theory. Theoretical replication enables generalization to theory and bolsters 
the internal validity of qualitative research (Yin, 2003). In this study, factors relevant to 
implementation of performance pay policy and school performance acted as the 
predicting theory. Finally, the study is cross-sectional in that I collected data at a specific 
point in each school’s participation in the program, some that were in the beginning 
stages and some that had had more experience.
Samples
I selected schools participating in a comprehensive performance-based 
compensation program in a mid-sized urban district in Texas. The district, Hill 
Independent School District, implemented its program as a pilot in 2007. The program 
had been in development, though, since 2004. The district and compensation program, 
along with an overview of performance pay policy in Texas, are described further in 
Chapter 4. In this section, I describe the case study schools and policymaking groups 
examined in the study.
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Case Study Schools.
For this study, I selected two schools and two policymaking groups, the district 
central office and a district steering committee in which to examine teachers’ and 
policymakers’ sensemaking of this program. 
As noted earlier, a study of this size cannot be used to generalize to a larger 
population of schools or teachers. Because qualitative inquiry was deemed the most 
appropriate method for my research questions and theoretical framework, I elected to 
create a sample of schools that would enable generalization to theories of performance 
pay and cognitive approaches to policy implementation. Generalization to theory entails 
selecting cases that vary on or exemplify variables of interest within a theoretical 
framework (Yin, 2003). This strategy enables findings to be related to theoretical 
assumptions and claims in order to elaborate and expand, if not directly test, them. A 
multiple-case design was selected over a single-case design to enable exploration of a 
variety of contexts that could influence teachers’ meaning making about performance 
pay. 
Purposive sampling (Patton, 2002) was used to select a panel of schools that 
varied on several criteria relevant to the policy. These criteria are as follows:
4. Average teacher experience
5. Percentage of economically disadvantaged students
6. School accountability rating
7. Time in program
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 Teacher experience has been found to be an important indicator of teachers’ 
attitudes toward performance pay, as discussed in Chapter Two. Specifically, less 
experienced teachers tend to be more receptive to performance pay (Goldhaber, et al., 
2007; Jacob & Springer, 2008; Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, 
Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Patterson, et al., 2008). Sampling both schools and 
teachers on this criteria (respondent sampling is described later in this section) provided 
an opportunity to better understand this common research finding by examining how (or 
whether) teachers with different levels of experience construct different meanings of 
performance pay.
Student socioeconomic status and school academic performance were included 
because they present different challenges to achieving performance objectives. Not only 
do schools with high percentages of economically disadvantaged students tend to have 
lower rates of academic achievement than schools with fewer disadvantaged students, but 
they also tend to have higher percentages of uncertified, undercertified (i.e., emergency 
or probationary certification or teaching out of field), and less experienced teachers 
(Ingersoll, 2001; National Commission on Teaching and America's Future, 1996). Student 
demographics, specifically percentages of economically disadvantaged, English language 
learner, and special education students, are also an explicit part of the pilot program. 
School performance ratings were included as a criterion since the compensation program 
provides incentives for improvements in student performance. Student demographics and 
overall school performance have been found in studies of teachers’ interpretations of 
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accountability to be important influences on the way they integrate policy pressures into 
instructional practices (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Valli & Buese, 2007). Thus, sampling on 
this criteria both draws on and extends this literature by enabling examination of how 
these factors may influence teachers’ interpretations of individual as well as school-wide 
incentives.
Sensemaking theory suggests that teachers’ interpretations of the program can be 
expected to change as they participate over time and have different experiences with it 
(Weick, 1995). To make sense of events, individuals and groups look at an outcome and 
then create accounts, or histories, of events to explain them and fit them into their 
frameworks of values and beliefs. These frameworks are socially constructed and so the 
histories that people create will differ according to their own experiences (Coburn & 
Stein, 2006; Weick, et al., 2005). Thus, schools’ time in the program was included to 
capture changes that occur as teachers have more experiences with it. This criterion also 
makes the study unique in research on performance pay, which has thus far produced 
little information on teachers’ long-term experiences. 
Two schools were selected that presented a range of possibilities among all of 
these variables. A larger sample of 3-4 schools would have been optimal to provide more 
variation across the sampling criteria and to increase the overall number of subjects. 
However, given the data collection design, which relied primarily on interviews, and the 
inclusion of district-level subjects, a larger sample of schools would have been 
prohibitive in terms of time and resource demands. On the other hand, no single school 
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within the district represented a unique, critical, or revelatory circumstance that could 
have compelled a single-case design (Yin, 2003). Thus, a sample of two schools was 
deemed both appropriate and feasible. Both schools are elementary schools, due to the 
demands that would be presented by including secondary schools with larger faculties, 
different academic departments, and more complex administrative structures. 
Additionally, participating schools were classified in the program as Highest Needs, 
Higher Needs, or non-high needs based on their proportions of low-income, English 
language learner, and special needs students. Only one school in the program was 
classified as Non-Highest Needs, so the two schools were selected to represent one 
Highest Needs and one Higher Needs school. The schools are described in Table 3.1. 
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Note. School data are taken from the year prior to beginning participation in the performance-based 
compensation program (McCoy, 2006-2007; Thompson, 2008-2009). Averages and modes are based on 
data from the original cohort of nine participating schools in the year prior to participation in the program 
(2006-2007).
The two case schools selected had demographics at the lower, middle, and upper 
ranges on each criterion. McCoy Elementary had average populations of economically 
disadvantaged and English language learners, but higher than average percentages of 
special education students. It also had the highest average teacher experience of all 
schools participating in the program, with nearly half (45%) of its teachers having 20 
years or more teaching experience. McCoy began participation as a non-high needs 
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school. In 2008, Hill ISD created a new category for pilot schools, Higher Need, which 
identifies schools that are in the top 50% of Hill ISD schools based on their percentages 
of economically disadvantaged, special education, and English language learner students. 
Based on this new classification, beginning in 2009, McCoy teachers were newly eligible 
for bonuses for retention and mentoring. This change in classification made the school an 
even more interesting case for this study since teachers underwent a change in the 
program after having already participated for two years.
Thompson Elementary had the highest percentages of economically 
disadvantaged students and English language learners of all participating schools. At the 
same time, its teachers were relatively less experienced and it had a relatively low 
percentage of special education students. McCoy had participated in the program since it 
began in 2007, whereas Thompson was in its first year of participation during the study’s 
data collection period. Taken together, these schools provided a wide range of 
experiences with and perceptions of Hill ISD’s compensation initiative and performance 
pay.
School Respondents.
Within each school, I identified, with the assistance of principals, a group of four 
to eight teachers (which represented about 10 percent to 20 percent of teacher full-time 
equivalents at each school) for data collection. Teachers were contacted by principals at 
each school and asked to indicate their willingness to participate. I then contacted 
interested teachers regarding participating in focus groups or individual interviews. 
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Principals and, at Thompson Elementary, the assistant principal, assisted in scheduling 
focus groups. All interviews and focus groups took place at the schools, either after 
school or during professional development days.
As with school selection, teachers were selected based on their teaching 
experience and their time in the program. Using teacher performance on program 
objectives as a selection criterion was considered since an external evaluation of the 
program found that teachers who achieved performance objectives held more favorable 
views of the program (Burns, Gardner, & Meeuwsen, 2009). However, performance was 
ultimately rejected for two reasons. First, and most importantly, one of the case study 
schools was just beginning participation in the program and so did not have performance 
data available for its teachers. Second, almost all teachers in the program (83%) met at 
least one SLO and a majority (64%) met two . Thus, there were few teachers who did not 
meet any SLOs. Performance appears to be an important factor in teachers’ views of 
performance pay (Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, 
Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Stecher, et al., 2008), and would be a valuable factor to include 
in future studies. For this study and this sample, however, it was deemed less important 
as a selection criterion. 
Administrators at each school were also included in data collection. These 
included principals and, at Thompson, the assistant principal. These administrators were 
included to provide information on implementation of the program across teachers in 
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each school and to serve as a check on teachers’ descriptions of their schools’ 
participation in the program. The samples for each school are described in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. School Sample Descriptions

















PreK-5 Beginning-8 years ELL
Four teachers and one administrator were interviewed at McCoy. Eight teachers 
and two administrators were interviewed at Thompson (the teacher interviewed 
individually had also participated in the focus group). The difference in sample sizes 
between the schools was due to some difficulties in recruiting participants at McCoy and 
scheduling interviews around an after-school tutoring program there. However, the 
teachers interviewed at both schools represented a range of grade levels and experience 
that fit with the overall profile of the schools (see Table 3.1). Overall, the samples 
presented a sufficient panel for a case study of this nature. 
Across both schools, teachers ranged in teaching experience from beginning (i.e., 
in the first year of teaching after receiving full certification) to 18 years. Six of the eight 
teachers at Thompson were in their first 5 years of teaching, one was a beginning teacher, 
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and one had eight years of experience. Three teachers at McCoy had more than ten years 
of experience, and included the most experienced teacher in the sample. These ranges 
matched well with the overall experience levels of teachers in both schools. Three of the 
four teachers at McCoy taught English language learners, and one taught special 
education students. Three teachers at McCoy taught TAKS-tested grades (grades 3-5), 
and one taught prekindergarten. Five teachers at Thompson taught TAKS grade levels, 
and three taught in grades prekindergarten through second grade. The sample also 
included teachers who had participated in all aspects of the compensation program, 
including mentoring (one mentor at McCoy and one mentee at Thompson) and 
professional development activities (one teacher at McCoy). It also included one teacher 
at McCoy who was serving as a campus support representative for setting performance 
objectives.
District Policymakers.
The policymakers selected for the study included members of the Steering 
Committee overseeing the compensation initiative, made up of district, teacher 
association, and community representatives. The Steering Committee was created in 2007 
to implement and oversee the program after it was approved by the Board of Trustees. 
The committee was responsible for developing the components of the program, for 
working with external consultants during the development phase, and for overseeing 
implementation of the pilot in its first year. Besides the Steering Committee, the district 
created a program office responsible for managing the program. The program office 
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consists of a director, public relations specialist, administrative staff, and a staff of 
liaisons who work directly with pilot schools on implementation of the program.
Steering Committee Respondents.
Membership on the Steering Committee changed somewhat over the years, but 
several key members had remained since its inception. Three of these members, who 
were selected to provide institutional history and unique insight into program goals, 
purposes, and changes, were included in this study. They included the Program Director, 
the president of the district’s teacher association, and a representative from the city’s 
business community (a former president of the Chamber of Commerce). These three 
individuals also represented perspectives from sources (district, teacher association, and 
business community) that have greatly influenced the development of the program and 
were expected to be influential in teachers’ interpretations of it.
Program Office Respondents.
Within the program office, four staff members were recruited to participate in the 
study. This group included four administrators, supervised by the Program Director, who 
provided training and support to teachers and principals in developing student learning 
objectives submitted by teachers as part of the program, evaluated and approved those 
objectives, oversaw mentors, and managed the professional development component of 
the program. These were key features of the program. Their interactions with pilot 
schools also gave them unique insight into schools’ implementation experiences and the 
ways in which program goals and processes were communicated to teachers.
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Data Collection
The primary methods of data collection were interviews and focus groups. 
Documents such as program guidelines, informational materials, funding applications, 
Board of Trustees meeting packets and minutes, grant applications, and technical 
assistance materials pertaining to the program, the district, and the schools were also 
reviewed. Student learning objectives submitted by teachers at each school were 
examined for their content. Additionally, quantitative data on school and teacher 
outcomes and demographics were incorporated into the case studies for descriptive 
purposes. Interviews for this study began in November 2009 and concluded in February 
2010. Steering Committee members and district program office staff were interviewed 
between November 2009 and December 2009. School participants were interviewed 
between December 2009 and February 2010. At both schools, administrator interviews 
were conducted before teacher interviews. Table 3.3 describes the data collected for each 
case included in the study.
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Table 3.3. Data Collection by Case
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Interviews and focus groups with all participants focused on their accounts of the 
development of the program; perceptions of program goals, purposes, and 
implementation; and communication between the district and schools about the program. 
Teachers and administrators were also asked about changes in instructional practices 
since beginning participation. Central office staff were also asked to describe their work 
with teachers and principals. Interviews and focus groups were semi-structured, with a 
protocol of predefined questions used while allowing the order of questioning to vary 
somewhat and clarifying questions to be asked as deemed necessary (Weiss, 1994). All 
interviews and focus groups were recorded. Audio recordings were transcribed into 
written texts for analysis. Interview protocols are included in Appendix A. 
Many studies of sensemaking have included observations as a central method of 
data collection (Coburn, 2001b; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Louis, et al., 2005). Most of 
these studies have examined sensemaking of policies and initiatives that affect 
organizational practices and so are actively discussed and deliberated within group 
settings. Coburn (2001b), for example, studied teachers’ interpretations of a reading 
instruction policy. Teachers discussed the policy collaboratively to understand how to 
alter their practices to fit the new requirements. With performance-based compensation, 
few such structured opportunities exist for teachers to actively negotiate the meaning of 
incentives and requirements at length. Thus, observations were not an explicit part of my 
data collection plan. Additionally, observations in sensemaking research seems to serve 
primarily the function of describing the processes of sensemaking. While such study and 
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analysis has been invaluable in clarifying sensemaking processes, existing frameworks 
were sufficient to enable analysis for this study (see, for example Coburn, 2001a; Louis, 
et al., 2005; Weick, 1995).
Analysis
Interview and focus group data formed the basis for individual case and cross-
case analyses describing the interpretations made of the Hill ISD performance-based 
compensation program, comparisons between different groups of participants, and 
comparisons between schools. These analyses were conducted according to two 
analytical frameworks. One used the theory of action of performance pay, as described in 
Chapter One, as a means of examining the implementation of the program. I derived this 
theory of action from my examination of the literature on performance pay discussed in 
Chapter Two. According to the model graphically displayed in Figure 3.1, analysis 
focused on the perceptions of teachers and district central office administrators of the 
purpose and goals of the program as well as its influence on two key areas of teacher 
behavior: instruction and retention. This analysis was not intended to present causal 
findings about outcomes in these areas, but to highlight the ways these two different 
groups of stakeholders understood the role of performance pay in teachers’ actions and 
decisions in them.
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Figure 3.1. Theory of Action of Performance Pay 
While this model provided the framework for developing interview and focus 
group protocols, and defining areas of coding, sensemaking theories provided the 
framework for interpreting subjects’ responses. For each case, accounts of the program’s 
purpose, development and implementation were constructed. These types of accounts are 
central to the sensemaking process, which involves clarifying situations and fitting them 
into prior experiences and worldviews in order to understand and act upon them (Weick, 
1995). These accounts were integrated with descriptive data to develop profiles of the 
four main sub-cases - McCoy Elementary, Thompson Elementary, the district central 
office, and the Steering Committee. These profiles were then used to develop thematic 















between schools collectively and the district, between individual schools and the Steering 
Committee, and between subject groups (teachers, principals, policymakers). Profiles of 
individual participants were not included in the analysis both because of the limited data 
obtained from each participant, and because of the focus of the research questions on 
organizational sensemaking.
Data were coded inductively using an iterative process to develop increasingly 
specific coding schemes that described and categorized respondents’ comments (Patton, 
2002). Coding was performed using HyperResearch qualitative analysis software. This 
program enabled transcripts to be organized into cases for coding, for frequencies of 
codes by case to be generated, and for analytical models to be developed using codes and 
data from transcripts. 
The codes fell into 12 main categories, or families. Most of these families 
contained several sub-codes that described them in more specific terms. Appendix B 
presents the families and sub-codes, along with frequencies for each case - Steering 
Committee, District Central Office, McCoy Elementary, and Harris Elementary.The 
coding families and sub-codes were derived solely from the data, and largely followed 
the topics in the interview protocols. The families included Challenges to 
Implementation, Changes Resulting from Program, Communication, Effects of 
Incentives, Goal of Teacher Retention, Instructional Practices, Participation in Program, 
Policy Environment, Program History, Program Purpose, Program Components and 
Requirements, Program Theory of Action, and Reasons for Participating. 
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These codes were applied to all cases, enabling comparisons of the occurrence of 
themes across cases. It is important to note that these frequencies reflect interview 
passages that varied in length and complexity, from brief mentions to lengthy exchanges 
between several participants in focus groups. The coding frequencies represent the 
number of times any passage of any length contained information relevant to a particular 
theme (Merriam, 1998). As seen in Appendix B, code frequencies between cases broke 
down largely according to levels in the system: teachers and school administrators tended 
to comment on different topics than did district administrators and policymakers. There 
were also several differences in frequencies between the two schools and between the 
Steering Committee and the District Central Office. Additionally, even on topics on 
which all cases provided data, there were numerous differences in the frequency of 
themes between cases. These difference add to the internal validity of the data by 
demonstrating that the four cases were distinct in their patterns of responses (Patton, 
2002).  
Throughout the analytic process, I used information from different respondents, as 
well as documents, to triangulate data so that interpretations were supported by more than 
one source of data or subjects (Patton, 2002). In analyzing patterns in the data and 
generating explanations for them, I looked for disconfirming evidence and alternative 
themes to enhance the external validity of the study (Yin, 2003). District program 
evaluation reports were a particularly useful source of data for assessing validity since 
they examined teachers’ attitudes, behaviors, and program outcomes across program 
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schools and participants. These evaluations provided some means for determining the 
generalizability of findings from this study to other teachers and schools in the program. 
Additionally, I obtained descriptions of events and facts to individuals who did not 
participate as interviewees in the study, but were familiar with the program and its history  
for their confirmation. Given the complex and political nature of the program, I felt that 
the perspectives of individuals not involved with data collection would provide me with 
the most impartial information about the program’s history and development.  
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Chapter 4: Performance Pay in Texas and Hill Independent School District
 In this chapter, I describe the policy context of performance pay in Texas, as well 
as Hill ISD and its performance pay program. This overview demonstrates that Hill ISD 
created and enacted its performance pay program in an environment in which there were 
numerous calls for performance pay policies by state policymakers and interest in other 
performance pay initiatives around the country. However, there was little consensus about 
its goals or about how to structure such policies. This policy context was reflected in Hill 
ISD’s program, which incorporated multiple incentives and mechanisms that advanced 
multiple goals. 
Performance Pay Policy in Texas
At the time Hill ISD implemented its pilot performance pay program, Texas had 
gained a high profile in teacher compensation reform, with one of the largest performance 
incentive systems in the nation. The District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE) 
program affected teachers in nearly 2,000 schools (approximately 22% of all Texas public 
schools). Like programs in other states, DATE was relatively new, but was not the state’s 
first experience with performance pay. Texas had experimented with compensation 
reform for over 20 years. However, most recent policy initiatives had yet to have an 
impact on large numbers of teachers even though they have created considerable debate 
among state policymakers. This created a context for Hill ISD’s program in which 
policymakers had been working with performance pay for several years, while most 
teachers in the state were either new to the reform or had yet to experience it firsthand.
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Early Compensation Reform Initiatives.
Texas began experimenting with compensation reform at the state level in 1984 
with the passage of the landmark school reform bill, House Bill 72. Some districts had 
already implemented incentive-based compensation programs, such as compensation for 
advanced degrees, but HB72 created the first statewide incentive program. This bill, 
along with new requirements for student achievement testing, graduation requirements, 
and grade requirements for extracurricular activities, included requirements for teachers 
to pass competency tests to earn (and, for current teachers at the time, maintain) 
certification. It also created the Texas Teacher Career Ladder, which provided 
advancement opportunities for teachers who gained knowledge and skills through 
professional development and continued education. It also provided monetary incentives 
to teachers who performed well on appraisals. To that end, a uniform teacher appraisal 
system, the Texas Teacher Appraisal System (TTAS)5 was authorized in the bill. 
The Career Ladder created four steps in the salary scale through which could 
teachers could advance with experience, appraisals, and professional development. Upon 
being promoted to each step, teachers could earn salary supplements ranging from $1,500 
at Step 1 to $6,000 at Step 4. Districts had authority to set exact supplement amounts and 
make decisions about teachers’ advancement through the steps. When it was introduced, 
all new teachers and most current teachers were placed at Step 1, meaning they had to 
advance to Step 2 to begin earning salary supplements (Texas Education Agency, 1998).
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From its beginning, funding for the Career Ladder program was problematic. 
Districts were allocated funds based on student enrollment rather than on teachers 
employed. The allotment for the 1983-1984 school year was $50 per student. This 
increased to $90 per student by 1992-1993, or $291 million for 132,855 teachers (Texas 
Education Agency, 1998), which amounted to roughly $2,200 per teacher. Nearly ten 
years after it began, no teachers had been placed at Step 4 and local funds were needed to 
pay supplements to teachers at Steps 2 and 3. Besides insufficient funding, the Career 
Ladder faced other challenges. Teachers were skeptical about the objectivity of 
performance appraisals and the qualifications of appraisers, including their principals 
(Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, 
Lopez, Stecher, et al., 2008). On the other hand, there were also concerns that appraisers 
may have been reluctant to give teachers low scores since above average performance 
was required to advance to higher steps (Cornett & Gaines, 1994). Consequently the 
Texas Legislature repealed the program in 1993 (Texas Education Agency, 1998).
Before the Career Ladder was repealed, efforts had begun to align compensation 
and funding with Texas’ burgeoning student assessment and accountability system. In 
1990, Governor Ann Richards created the Governor’s Educational Excellence Awards 
Committee to develop a pilot program to provide monetary awards to schools with high 
levels of improvement in student achievement (Texas Education Agency, 1998). In 1991, 
the Texas Legislature expanded this program, which became the Texas Successful 
Schools Awards System. This program provided school-based performance awards to 
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schools based on performance in the Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS), 
which compiles various school and district performance indicators and is used to assign 
performance ratings. Schools could receive monetary awards for either high performance 
or high improvement as compared to schools with similar student populations. Awards 
ranged from $250 to $175,000 and were based on student enrollment. They could be used 
for a variety of school improvement purposes, but most schools used them for technology  
and instructional materials. A small number of schools used them for direct awards to 
teachers (Texas Education Agency, 1998).
By the 2001-2002 school year, the Texas Legislature had stopped appropriating 
funds for the Texas Successful Schools Awards System. While more popular than the 
Career Ladder, the program was beset by several problems. The criteria for awards were 
complicated and not easily understood, awards were often very small, and there were 
long delays between assessment of performance and distribution of awards. These issues 
were seen as muting the potential effectiveness of the program in inducing greater efforts 
toward improving student achievement (Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-
Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Stecher, et al., 2008). 
An evaluation of the Texas Successful Schools Awards System by the Texas 
Education Agency (1998) had concluded that the best use of the awards was to distribute 
them directly to teachers and professional staff as performance incentives. They also 
recommended that incentives be based on multiple indicators of performance and that 
eligibility criteria be stable and understood well by teachers. These recommendations, 
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along with the state’s experience with the Career Ladder, helped to inform the larger and 
more assertive actions toward implementing performance pay in the 2000s.
Performance Pay Policy in Texas in the Twenty-First Century.
In 2003, a sea change in Texas politics and governance took place. The 
Republican party won a majority in the Texas House of Representatives for the first time 
since Reconstruction. The party already held a majority in the Texas Senate and Governor 
Rick Perry was also a Republican. This gave the party an opportunity to enact a more 
conservative agenda in many areas of public policy. At the same time, education had 
again come to the policy fore due to a school financing lawsuit filed in 2001 against the 
state by over 300 school districts. Filing under the name West Orange Cove, the districts 
argued that limits on property taxes contained in school funding formulas were 
unconstitutional and that state funding for schools was unequal and inadequate. The legal 
imperative to reform school financing provided the new majority party an opportunity to 
advance myriad other educational reforms. Between 2003 and 2006, the Texas 
Legislature addressed school finance in two regular and seven special sessions.6 During 
this period, along with finance, legislators addressed policy issues related to 
accountability, teacher compensation, student assessment, and a variety of special 
programs.
Teacher compensation figured prominently in the school finance debates, as 
teacher salaries represented the largest expenditure item for most schools and districts. 
Distribution of teachers and teacher quality were also central issues in debates over 
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funding equity and adequacy. In 2004, the same year the West Orange Cove suit went to 
trial, Governor Perry proposed a Teacher Excellence Incentive Plan, the first in a series of 
proposals to introduce performance pay into statewide teacher compensation programs. 
The plan featured a state incentive fund to finance incentives, voluntary participation by 
districts and schools, locally designed incentive plans, and awards to teachers for 
performance and assignment to underperforming schools with high proportions of 
economically disadvantaged students (Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-
Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Stecher, et al., 2008). Later that year, the 
Legislature’s Joint Select Committee on Public School Finance recommended an 
Educational Excellence Fund to provide performance awards to teachers performing in 
the top 15% of teachers in their districts on value-added measures of student 
achievement. They also recommended incentives for school performance that would be 
distributed to teachers, administrators, and professional staff in top-performing schools. 
These proposals were included in a bill filed during the fourth called (special) session of 
the 78th Legislature that year. The bill also included reforms to school funding formulas 
to address issues arising from the West Orange Cove suit. However, it did not pass.
By 2005, when the Legislature met in regular session, the district court presiding 
over the West Orange Cove case had decided in favor of the plaintiff school districts. The 
Texas Attorney General appealed the decision, but school finance and education reforms 
were nonetheless high priorities for the Legislature. The Chair of the House Committee 
on Public Education sponsored House Bill 2, an omnibus education reform bill that was 
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similar to the bill filed in the special session the previous year. Along with school funding 
proposals, it included a proposal for an Educator Excellence Incentive Program. It was 
similar to the proposal made by Governor Perry, except that it did not specify awards for 
teachers assigned to hard-to-staff schools. It did specify that awards must be distributed 
to schools with high achievement, growth in achievement, or both. It also allowed 
incentives to be distributed to teachers based on performance indicators other than 
student achievement. The bill passed in the Texas House, but met resistance in the Texas 
Senate, where the Chair of the Senate Committee on Education had proposed a simpler 
incentive program that would provide awards to schools with high proportions of 
economically disadvantaged students that demonstrated high improvement in test scores. 
Funds would be used to provide incentives to teachers based on performance as well as 
assignment to hard-to-staff schools or subjects. Both of these proposals failed to pass the 
Legislature, and other performance pay proposals failed to pass in two subsequent special 
sessions as legislators continued to grapple with school finance.
In November 2005, Governor Perry issued an executive order directing the Texas 
Education Agency to create a pilot performance pay program with $10 million in annual 
federal discretionary funds. The agency created the Governor’s Educator Excellence 
Awards (later known as the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant, or GEEG), which 
provided grants to high-performing or high-improving schools with proportions of 
economically disadvantaged students in the top third of schools in the state. Schools 
receiving grants developed plans to provide incentives to teachers for student 
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performance, collaboration, and other demonstrations of professionalism related to 
student achievement. Funds could also be used, in part, to award teachers assigned to 
hard-to-staff subjects, for professional development, for mentoring and induction, for 
awards to other school staff, or for other professional activities. One hundred schools 
were selected and invited to participate (all but two accepted; the two that declined were 
replaced with other eligible schools that accepted). The program was designed to last 
three years, beginning in the 2006-2007 school year and ending in 2008-2009 (Springer, 
et al., 2009).
That same month, the Supreme Court of Texas struck down most of the decision 
of the district court in the West Orange Cove case regarding school funding equity and 
adequacy. However, they held that property tax limits contained in school funding 
formulas were unconstitutional and gave the Legislature until June 1, 2006 to rectify the 
problem.  
In response, Governor Perry called another special session for the spring of 2006. 
In this session, the Legislature passed House Bill 1, which contained school funding 
reforms, programs to improve college readiness among high school graduates, funding 
for teacher mentoring programs, and two performance incentive programs. The Awards 
for Student Achievement program (later known as the Texas Educator Excellence Grant, 
or TEEG) was very similar in structure to GEEG. It authorized up to $100 million 
annually to be distributed to schools along the same criteria as GEEG, except that schools 
were required to be in the top 50% of schools statewide in percentage of economically 
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disadvantaged students. The criteria for awards to teachers were nearly identical to those 
of GEEG. The Educator Excellence Awards program (later known as the District Awards 
for Teacher Excellence, or DATE) was similar to the proposal that had been made by the 
Chair of the Senate Committee on Education. It provided grants to districts (any district 
could apply) to distribute among schools for the provision of performance awards to 
teachers. Awards must be made on the basis of student achievement, but grant funds 
could also be used for mentoring, stipends for assignment to hard-to-staff subjects, 
attainment of advanced degrees, awards to principals and other staff, or to implement 
components of TAP. TEEG began in the 2006-2007 school year, while DATE began in 
2007-2008. Both programs were structured as annual grants, meaning schools and 
districts were selected and funds provided each year. They were funded through an 
Educator Excellence Fund that could provide up to $1,000 per classroom teacher each 
year, totaling close to $300 million ("Texas Education Code," 2006). At the time, this was 
the largest teacher performance incentive program in the country (Springer, Podgursky, 
Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Stecher, et al., 2008).
In the 2007 regular legislative session, $247 million was authorized for the 
Educator Excellence Fund, with $97 million allocated for TEEG and the remainder for 
DATE. These funds were in jeopardy briefly during the session when the House 
surprisingly voted to eliminate all funding for TEEG and DATE, and instead direct those 
funds toward an across-the-board increase in the minimum salary schedule for teachers. 
The move was later reversed by passage of a later budget bill. Aggressive lobbying from 
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teacher associations opposed to the programs was seen as one of the primary reasons for 
the move (Fikac, 2007). 
In the 2009 regular session, the Legislature did not authorize funds for TEEG. The 
program, in its third cycle, had met with several problems. First, the eligibility criteria 
had resulted in many schools being eligible in one year, but not the next. This was due 
partly to fluctuations in school performance ratings, but also to changes in proportions of 
economically disadvantaged students. Evaluations had also shown little impact on student 
achievement, while teachers reported that the program had had little influence on their 
teaching (Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, 
Jansen, Lopez, Stecher, et al., 2008). These problems caused some legislators to doubt the 
program’s potential to be effective, instead preferring to dedicate resources to the 
competing DATE program (Stutz, 2009). 
The Legislature authorized $147 million for the DATE program, which had not 
been without controversies of its own. About 100 districts that had indicated their intent 
to apply for DATE grants in 2007 subsequently changed their minds and did not apply 
(Stutz, 2008). Among all districts that did not apply, some voiced concerns about the 
program’s effects on school culture and professional collegiality. Many also indicated that 
they would consider participating in the future if either awards were larger or 
requirements for districts to contribute matching funds were eliminated (Springer, Lewis, 
et al., 2010). At that time, districts were required to provide a 15% match in awards 
during the first year of participation, and additional matching funds in the second and 
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third years. These requirements were eliminated in 2009. As of 2009-2010, about 2,000 
schools in 203 districts (including Hill ISD) participated in the DATE program, 
representing about 22% of all public schools in Texas (Springer, Lewis, et al., 2010). 
These statewide programs have greatly increased the reach of performance pay 
policy in Texas. Before the creation of TEEG and DATE, only about 12% of districts in 
Texas incorporated performance incentives into their compensation programs (although 
considerably more offered incentives for qualifications, assignment to hard-to-staff 
schools and subjects, and other professional activities) (Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, 
Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Stecher, et al., 2008). A few 
districts had implemented high-profile performance pay plans in the 1990s, notably the 
Dallas Independent School District and the Aldine Independent School District. With the 
creation of TEEG and DATE, as well as the federal Teacher Incentive Fund (Dallas ISD 
and the Houston Independent School District were recipients in 2006), considerably more 
districts, schools, and teachers are gaining experience with this policy. 
At the same time, performance-based compensation remains a relatively new and 
limited phenomenon for Texas public school teachers. As of the 2007-2008 school year, 
only 27% of districts had compensation plans that incorporated incentives for 
performance (72% of these districts were participants in TEEG or GEEG) (Springer, 
Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Stecher, 
et al., 2008). This percentage was an increase from years prior to the creation of the 
statewide incentive programs, but it still represented fewer than one-third of districts in 
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the state. While policy debates over performance pay had been ongoing among state 
policymakers for almost a decade when Hill ISD began its performance pay program, 
many Texas teachers had yet to experience these initiatives. For most of those who had 
become involved with performance pay, it remained a new and evolving practice. This 
included teachers in Hill ISD, which had never had a performance-based compensation 
system. Teachers in the district were thus reliant on policymakers to provide them with 
frameworks through which to interpret the new performance pay program.
Performance Pay in Hill Independent School District7
The Hill Independent School District is a mid-sized urban district encompassing 
the city limits of a mid-sized city that had experienced rapid change over the previous 
10-15 years. From 2000 to 2009, district enrollment increased by only less than 10%. 
However, the composition of the student body changed more dramatically. Enrollment of 
Hispanic students grew by nearly 30%; enrollment of English language learners increased 
by almost 75%; enrollment of economically disadvantaged students grew by more than 
30%.8 These changes made the district majority-Hispanic as well as majority-
economically disadvantaged. At the same time, Hill ISD had been classified by the state 
since 2000 as a “property-rich” district under Texas’s school financing system. That 
means the district was required to provide a portion of its tax revenue to the state to be 
distributed to poorer school districts, a process known as recapture.9 
This classification belied the challenges faced by Hill ISD in educating its 
increasingly diverse student population. Schools in low-income neighborhoods with high 
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proportions of African American and Hispanic students on the city’s east side consistently 
performed below their counterparts in wealthier neighborhoods with larger proportions of 
white students. In response, the district began an initiative in 2002, known as the 
Blueprint to Leave No Child Behind, to improve these underperforming schools. It 
provided curriculum programs, training for teachers and administrators, student 
assessments, technology, and parent involvement structures to schools designated by the 
district as underperforming. Two middle schools and four elementary schools were 
selected to participate. This initiative was expanded to include high schools, and was 
eventually combined with a high school redesign initiative when the district received a 
grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in 2005 to improve the quality of 
secondary education. Two of the district’s lowest performing high schools were identified 
for this initiative.
In 2008, however, the district was forced by the state to close one of these high 
schools because of persistent ratings of Academically Unacceptable in the state 
accountability system. In 2009, the district’s superintendent of ten years, who had 
ushered in the Blueprint and High School Redesign, as well as other reform initiatives, 
retired. Shortly after, the state threatened the closure of another low-income middle 
school and issued a warning that a second high school (also low-income and in the same 
geographic area as the other two) could be closed the following year barring substantial 
improvement in student performance (both schools remain open).
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Catalysts for Hill ISD’s Performance-Based Compensation Program.
In 2004, as the High School Redesign initiative was being developed and as the 
Texas Legislature was beginning its engagement with performance pay policies, Hill ISD 
began developing its strategic plan for 2005 through 2010. It was during this process that 
performance pay began to emerge as an initiative in the district. Over the next three years, 
the performance pay program was developed, funded, and began to be implemented as a 
pilot program. Figure 4.1 presents a timeline of key events in the program’s creation. As 
this timeline shows, there were many groups and individuals involved in developing Hill 
ISD’s performance pay program. What is clear from examining this history, though, is 
that the district administration, particularly the Superintendent, appeared to be the 
primary catalyst for the initiative. The district administration, along with the teachers 
association, guided the program toward an agenda of instructional support and 
professional development, minimizing the role of financial incentives in its theory of 
action.
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Figure 4.1. Key Events in the Development of Hill ISD’s Performance Pay 
Program










Board of Trustees 
establishes Task 
Force on Teacher 
Compensation 
and Support
Board of Trustees 
approves strategic 
plan that includes 
compensation reform
Task Force submits 
report to Board of 
Trustees on teacher 
recruitment and 
retention
District and Teachers 
Association negotiate 
two-year salary 
agreement with base 
pay increases and 
Association support for 
performance pay













launched in 9 
schools
The strategic planning process formally started in June of 2004. The process 
involved examination of trends and indicators, along with discussions with numerous 
stakeholders about the district’s goals and priorities. A Strategic Planning Panel on Goals, 
Priorities, and Performance Indicators used this information to develop recommendations 
for the district administration. The committee was chaired by two local business leaders 
and a law enforcement official. Membership included representatives from district 
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administration, schools, the private sector, and community-based organizations. These 
recommendations were then reviewed and the Superintendent presented a final draft plan 
to the Board of Trustees in August of 2005. 
One of the Panel’s six recommended priorities was to “recruit, develop, and retain 
highly effective teachers and administrators.” One of the recommended strategies under 
that priority was to “develop and implement a comprehensive long-range plan to provide 
greater supports and incentives to teachers, principals, and staff, and encourage highly 
effective teachers to continue service in our highest-needs schools.” They also 
recommended enhancements to professional development, improved internal 
communications, strategies to ensure that school reconstitutions do not result in loss of 
highly effective staff, and greater workforce diversity in the district. All six of the Panel’s 
recommended priorities were included in the final plan approved by the Board of 
Trustees. However, the priority above was altered in the district’s final submission to 
“recruit, develop, retain, and reward highly effective teachers and 
administrators,” (emphasis added). The above strategy was likewise changed to “develop 
and implement a comprehensive long-range plan to provide greater supports and 
incentives, including compensation, to teachers, principals, and staff, and encourage 
highly effective teachers to continue service in our highest-needs schools,” (emphasis 
added). Both sets of recommendations are in Appendix C.
These changes indicate that a great deal of the press for performance pay arose 
from the interests of the district, particularly the Superintendent, who was responsible for 
80
developing the final strategic plan, more so than from generalized community interests 
such a policy. The most likely source of interest from the community would have been 
from the business community. This community was indeed highly engaged in education. 
Indeed, the local Chamber of Commerce had embarked on a five-year regional economic 
development strategy in January of 2004 that encompassed four sets of goals: recruiting 
new businesses to the area, retaining businesses in the area, improving regional 
competitiveness, and strengthening investor relations. The regional business community 
had committed to investing $14.4 million to the strategy. The Chamber’s primary 
education goal was to increase the number of high school students who enter and 
complete higher education by closing the achievement gap between minority and non-
minority students. While this goal was associated with the largest percentages of the five-
year budget in the area of improving regional competitiveness (15% of the total budget), 
it paled in comparison to the investment in recruiting new businesses (58% of total; 
retaining businesses also took 6% of the budget). Additionally, the Chamber did not 
specify performance pay or other teacher quality policies as strategies for achieving their 
educational goals, although they did support Hill ISD in developing its performance pay 
program by creating their own Task Force on Compensation to advise the district. 
In August of 2004, as Hill ISD’s strategic planning process was getting underway, 
the Board of Trustees approved the Superintendent’s recommendation to establish a 
Teacher Compensation and Support Task Force (which was also referred to as a 
committee or a working group). The Task Force’s charge was to study and make 
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recommendations for strategies to recruit and induct highly qualified teachers, provide 
quality working conditions and support for teachers’ continued growth, ensure all 
students equitable access to effective teachers, and examine the potential of pay for 
performance in Hill ISD. The Task Force was comprised primarily of representatives 
from the education sector, including classroom teachers, principals, district human 
resources representatives, representatives from four area teachers and administrators 
associations (including the president of the main association in the district, who was also 
on the Steering Committee)10, and two representatives from the district advisory 
committee (a group of parents and community representatives that provided feedback to 
the district on a range of policy issues). The Task Force was facilitated by a researcher 
from a local university. 
The Task Force reported to the Board of Trustees in June of 2005 on district 
recruitment and compensation targets, current recruitment and retention efforts, 
recruitment and retention in high-needs schools, and pay for performance initiatives. The 
Board requested they continue their work in developing a comprehensive strategy to 
recruit and retain effective teachers, and to staff high-needs schools. 
Also in 2005, Hill ISD began negotiating a salary agreement with the teachers 
association that had consultation rights with the district (the president of which was on 
the Teacher Compensation and Support Task Force). At the end of that year, they reached 
a two-year agreement (2006-2007 through 2007-2008) that, among other things, 
increased teacher salaries by 10.5% by the end of 2007-2008 (7.5% in first year; 3% in 
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the second). In exchange, the association agreed to support a proposal to voters to 
increase the Maintenance and Operations property tax rate for 2006-2007 by four cents to 
pay for the salary increases. One cent of that rate (approximately $4.3 million) would be 
dedicated for the incentive pay program being developed by the Task Force. The 
association also agreed to support the district’s application for a DATE grant in 2007. If 
the application was approved, the salary increase for 2007-2008 would be increased to 
4%. The salary agreement is included in Appendix D.
Creation of Hill ISD’s Performance Pay Program.
In December of 2006, the Task Force presented its plan for a comprehensive 
performance pay plan to the Board of Trustees. They had spent two years examining 
several broad issues and policy proposals related to teacher quality, including teachers’ 
contribution to student achievement, teacher recruitment and retention, and performance 
pay. They also met with representatives from Denver Public Schools to learn about 
ProComp, which had just been implemented. ProComp had been developed and piloted 
collaboratively by the district and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association. DPS 
subsequently gained approval from voters for a tax increase to fund the program 
permanently. Denver’s success in developing the program and gaining voter approval for 
funding had sparked tremendous interest among policymakers in similar programs. TAP 
was also gaining in popularity among districts and state policymakers, adding to the 
burgeoning national interest in performance pay (Springer, 2009). 
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 This nature of performance pay as an emerging national interest fit with other 
initiatives the Superintendent had been pursuing and promoting, such as high school 
reform, a policy initiative that was also receiving attention across the country due to its 
promotion by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The district’s high school redesign 
program was being funded by the foundation, and they were also receiving assistance 
from the School Redesign Network at Stanford University, lending national perspectives 
to the project.
The plan the Task Force presented contained the program elements largely as they 
existed three years later at the time of this study’s data collection. It included measures of 
student growth that were tied to incentives for teachers and principals, a mentoring 
program for novice teachers in their first three years of teaching, recruitment stipends for 
novice teachers in high-needs schools, retention stipends for all teachers in high-needs 
schools, and stipends for professional development. The Task Force recommended hiring 
an outside consultant to develop the specifics of the program. 
They also recommended the creation of a steering committee to guide and oversee 
the consultant’s work. The Teacher Compensation and Support Task Force would remain 
in place as an advisory group to facilitate communication between the Steering 
Committee and stakeholders, including teachers and school administrators, and to review 
draft policies, communications, and implementation strategies. The Steering Committee 
was proposed to include five co-chairs. These included two former officers of the 
Chamber of Commerce (one of whom had been president during development of the 
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Chamber’s regional economic strategy), the president of the consulting teachers 
association, a parent representative to the District Advisory Council, and the district’s 
Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources Development and Information Systems. 
Other members included two teachers, a principal, the university researcher who had 
facilitated the Task Force, the district’s Director of State and Federal Accountability, and 
a Special Assistant to the Superintendent (who later became the program director). 
The Task Force’s plan was approved by the Board of Trustees, and work on 
developing the program for implementation began in earnest in January of 2007. During 
the spring of 2007, the Steering Committee hired two consultants (one was the same firm 
that consulted with Denver Public Schools on ProComp) and began developing program 
guidelines, processes, and requirements. They decided, due the expense of the program 
and skepticism held about it among some teachers and principals, to pilot it in nine 
schools beginning in the 2007-2008 school year.11 Principals and teacher leaders from 18 
selected schools were presented with information about the program in the spring of 
2007. The criteria the committee used to select schools included academic performance, 
teacher turnover, stable principal leadership, and student demographics. Schools were 
selected to create a group that varied on the academic performance, turnover, and student 
demographic criteria. Schools with high proportions of English language learners, special 
education students, and economically disadvantaged students were especially targeted 
and made up the majority of selected schools. It should be noted that these criteria were 
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loose guidelines, not specific requirements. School selection was ultimately at the 
discretion of the Steering Committee. The requirements are included in Appendix E.
Of the 18 schools identified, nine were later formally invited by the Steering 
Committee to participate in the pilot. These schools were given information about the 
program just before the beginning of the school year and were asked to conduct elections 
among faculty to decide whether to participate. The Steering Committee established a 
threshold of 75% of teachers voting in favor in order for a school to be approved to 
participate. All nine schools voted in favor of participating. At five of the nine schools, 
more than 90% of teachers voted to participate. At three schools, more than 80% of 
teachers voted to participate. The remaining school barely met the threshold with 78% 
voting to participate. The following year, two more schools entered the program. In 
2009-2010, an additional five schools participated and one of the original schools 
dropped out of the program, bringing the total number of schools to 15. This represented 
about 15% of all schools in the district. In 2007, the pilot phase was expected to conclude 
in 2008-2009. By 2008, however, the Steering Committee had extended the pilot phase 
through 2010-2011. 
Structure of the Program.
The structure of Hill ISD’s performance pay program was similar to ProComp, 
which was clearly a source of inspiration for the Task Force and Steering Committee. In 
communications to teachers, evaluation reports, and presentations to the Board of 
Trustees and other audiences, the program was cast as a combination of supports and 
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rewards. The perspective communicated by the Steering Committee was that financial 
incentives alone were unlikely to change teachers’ behaviors because “most teachers 
already work diligently and experience a variety of reasons to be motivated to help their 
students learn (e.g., school accountability ratings and self-motivation)” (see note 10). 
Thus, the financial bonuses in the program were structured less like incentives meant to 
directly change behavior and more like rewards intended to recognize excellence. In fact, 
the Steering Committee’s stated goals claimed that the program aimed to recruit, retain, 
and recognize outstanding teachers (see Appendix F; emphasis added). 
Like ProComp, the program offered incentives to recruit and retain teachers; for 
professional development and mentoring; and for student performance. Specifically, it 
provided stipends in varying amounts for attainment of objectives in three areas: Student 
Growth, Professional Growth, and Recruitment and Retention at Highest Needs Schools. 
The Student Growth component included School-Wide TAKS Growth based on the 
Comparable Improvement indicator of the Texas Academic Excellence Indicator System 
(AEIS)12 and teacher-developed Student Learning Objectives, which applied to individual 
teachers. The Professional Growth component included participation in Take One!®, a 
program developed by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS), 
in which teachers developed and submitted one portfolio for one certificate area for 
NBPTS certification. Passing scores could count toward full NBPTS certification. This 
component also included a novice teacher mentoring program for teachers who were in 
their first through third years of teaching. The Recruitment and Retention component 
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provided stipends for teachers who were new to pilot schools and who returned to those 
schools. 
Schools in the program were classified as Higher Needs, Highest Needs, or not 
high needs. Higher Needs schools were those that fell within the top half of schools in the 
district in proportions of economically disadvantaged, special education, and English 
language learner students; Highest Needs schools fell within the top third in these areas. 
Stipend amounts and eligibility for awards varied among these groups of schools. As of 
the 2009-2010 school year, 13 schools were classified as Highest Needs, three were 
Higher Needs, and one was not high needs. Table 4.1 presents the program components 
along with their associated stipends.
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Table 4.1. Hill ISD Performance Pay Program Components
Program 
Element

































































































































































































Note. Table derived from documents retrieved from Hill ISD website.
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Within the program, “teachers” included not only classroom teachers, but also 
instructional specialists, librarians, counselors, and project advance facilitators. 
Counselors and facilitators were made eligible beginning in the 2009-2010 school year. 
Assistant principals were eligible for the same stipends as teachers. Other administrative 
staff, paraprofessionals, custodial staff, and food service staff were not eligible to 
participate.
Teachers at Highest Needs schools could receive between $6,400 and $9,400 
(depending on experience and tenure at the school) if they achieved all student growth 
objectives and successfully participated in Take One!® (they could receive up to $9,000 
in additional stipends for serving as mentors); teachers at Higher Needs schools could 
receive between $6,400 and $7,900, with up to $7,000 in additional stipends for serving 
as mentors; teachers at Not High Needs schools could receive $6,400. 
It is important to note that principals also received awards based on the 
performance of their teachers. Principals at Highest Needs schools could receive up to 
$14,400 (principals may participate in Take One!®); principals at Higher Needs schools 
could receive between $12,900 and $14,400. Principals in schools not classified as 
Higher Needs or Highest Needs could receive $11,400. Principals received stipends for 
the Student Learning Objective element whether or not teachers achieved objectives to 
compensate them for their efforts in working with teachers to develop objectives and 
monitoring teachers’ progress.
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Program Funding and Funding Requirements.
Hill ISD’s performance pay program was funded through a number of sources. 
Upon authorizing the pilot to begin in 2006, the Board of Trustees dedicated 
approximately $4.3 million per year in Maintenance and Operations tax funds to the 
program. School finance reforms emanating from the Texas Legislature played a key role 
in this funding because those changes enabled the district to raise its tax rate from $1.00 
per $100 of property value to $1.04. One cent of this increase, fixed at the 2006-2007 
fiscal year value, was dedicated to the performance pay program. The remainder was 
used to fund salary and benefits increases that had been agreed upon in 2005. However, 
this was not enough to support more than the original nine schools. In 2008, the district 
applied for and received a $5.5 million grant from the statewide DATE program. These 
funds were used for the 2008-2009 school year. They also received $1 million over two 
years from the statewide Beginning Teacher Induction program to supplement local funds 
for the mentoring component.
The DATE program separates grant funds into two categories, Part I and Part II. 
Part I funds make up at least 60% of each grant and must be used to provide awards to 
classroom teachers who meet performance criteria based on measures of student 
achievement. Part II funds make up no more than 40% of each grant and may be used for 
a variety of activities, including teacher recruitment and retention stipends, mentor or 
master teacher stipends, professional development, instructional data management 
systems, or performance awards for school administrators and other school staff. 
91
Hill ISD used Part I funds for learning objective and school-wide TAKS growth 
stipends for teachers. Part II funds were used partly for student growth awards to 
principals, assistant principals, librarians, and instructional specialists. Part II funds were 
also used for recruitment and retention stipends, and for an assessment system that was 
used in the 2008-2009 school year (this assessment system is described below and in 
Chapter Seven). While DATE funds did not substantially alter the design of the program, 
they did come with other requirements that affected program implementation, particularly 
a requirement to redistribute unused funds to teachers who had already received 
performance stipends (also discussed further in Chapter 6).
Key Processes and Changes.
To understand how teachers, district administrators, and the Steering Committee 
interpreted and responded to Hill ISD’s performance pay program, it is necessary to 
understand the processes through which they experienced it. The program made a number 
of new demands on teachers and school administrators. It also resulted in a new 
department in the district central office with staff performing new and unique functions. 
In describing program processes, I will focus on those that emerged from my data as 
particularly salient or important in shaping sensemaking. These included the process of 
developing student learning objectives and a the addition of required assessments in the 
program’s second year.13
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Student Learning Objectives Process.
While the Student Learning Objectives component was not associated with the 
largest awards available to teachers (School-Wide TAKS Growth had the largest 
associated award at a possible $4,000 for teachers and $8,000 for principals), it was 
easily the most visible one to teachers, school administrators, and district central office 
staff. Developing learning objectives involved a complex process on their part. A flow 
chart of the process developed by the program office is displayed in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. Student Learning Objective Process Flow Chart
Note. Figure derived from document retrieved from Hill ISD website.
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First, teachers examined student achievement data in consultation with their 
principals and identified two learning objectives based on areas for growth. For each 
objective, the teacher had to then define: (1) the content area; (2) the grade level; (3) the 
rationale for selecting the objective; (4) the classroom or course population targeted; (5) 
the time period for which the objective applies (i.e., whole year or semester); (6) the 
assessment to be used to measure outcomes; (7) students’ expected growth; (8) the 
curriculum standard, knowledge or skill being measured; (9) the strategies the teacher 
will use to meet the objective; and (10) any professional development that could assist the 
teacher in achieving the objective. 
 After the learning objectives were approved by principals, teachers submitted 
them to the district central office through an online system. Each objective was then 
reviewed by central office staff for the appropriateness of the content area in relation to 
student needs, completeness of the objective, cohesion among objective elements, and the 
rigor of assessments to be used and performance expectations set. Teachers were given 
opportunities to revise objectives, if needed. This process took place during September 
and October. At the beginning of the spring semester, teachers were required to submit to 
the central office, by a predetermined deadline, a roster of students who would be 
assessed for each objective. In elementary schools, students were administered pretests in 
October and November and posttests in May (just after TAKS administrations in April).
Along with the multiple steps required to develop, submit, and implement student 
learning objectives, teachers, principals, and district administrators had to ensure that 
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they might numerous criteria in multiple areas. For each piece of information teachers 
had to provide, there were several criteria district administrators used to evaluate them. 
Presumably, principals also used these criteria in approving their teachers’ objectives. The 
program office’s guidelines for learning objectives and objectives disseminated as 
examples are included in Appendix G. Meeting these criteria entailed analyzing student 
performance data, examining school improvement plans and state standards, evaluating 
assessments, planning instructional and professional development activities, and 
identifying other potential resources for achieving the objective. To help teachers and 
principals navigate these criteria and the process of developing objectives, the program 
office conducted workshops and one-on-one trainings at schools, posted videos detailing 
the process on their website, provided written materials, and communicated frequently 
with principals on procedures and deadlines.
Like other elements of the program, the learning objectives component underwent 
some changes after the program began. One of the most significant changes was that 
teachers were given the option of defining so-called tiered objectives in Year Two. This 
allowed them to differentiate performance expectations for students based on their pretest 
performance. Tiered objectives enabled teachers to differentiate expectations for students 
based on their pretest performance levels. As will be described in the discussion of 
teachers’ experiences with the program, this change was important in maintaining some 
teachers’ sense of efficacy about the program and in improving their attitudes about the 
fairness of the learning objectives.
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Required Assessments in Year Two.
In the first year of the program, teachers were given several options in identifying 
measures to use for learning objectives. They could use standardized tests already in use, 
such as TAKS or district benchmark assessments (which include beginning-of-year, 
middle-of-year and end-of-year assessments aligned to state standards for each subject 
and grade level). They could also opt to use teacher-made assessments, provided they 
were approved by both their principals and the district central office.
During the first year of the program, the Steering Committee and some 
stakeholders became concerned that teacher-made assessments did not accurately 
measure growth and lacked rigor .14 They were also concerned that teacher-made 
assessments might not appear credible to outside stakeholders, such as parents and the 
business community (E. Fuller, personal communication, September 2, 2010). To address 
these concerns, the district contracted with Tests for Higher Standards, a private test 
development company to create pretests and posttests aligned with state standards that 
could be used to measure growth during the school year. They ultimately created 82 tests, 
as well as an item bank that teachers could use to create their own customized 
assessments. The assessments were disseminated to teachers, scored, and reported by way  
of a student data management system provided by D2 Data Driven Software Corporation. 
The assessments, as well as the data management system, became referred to by teachers 
and principals simply as “D2.” 
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In the program’s second year (2008-2009), all teachers of core subjects 
(mathematics, reading, science, and social studies) in grades 3 through 11 were required 
to use the D2 assessments or item bank in at least one of their learning objectives. 
Further, that objective had to address a predefined student learning need as identified 
through school and district needs assessments conducted by the district. This was a 
significant departure from the first year, when teachers were responsible for identifying 
student learning needs with their principals. 
Teachers throughout the pilot schools reported a number of difficulties and 
dissatisfaction with the D2 assessments and system . Some encountered technical 
difficulties using the data management system, particularly with scanning and uploading 
completed tests. Many third through fifth grade teachers also reported that the 
assessments were not well aligned to the state curriculum standards in mathematics. An 
evaluation of program outcomes in Year Two indeed found that teachers were less likely 
to achieve learning objectives measured by D2 assessments than to achieve learning 
objectives measured by other assessments, either standardized or teacher-made . Teachers 
also reported feeling frustrated that they were not able to use teacher-made assessments 
that they had created in the first year, and that they were disappointed that the district had 
changed the program to require a particular assessment (see note 10). 
By the end of the 2008-2009 school year, the Steering Committee had decided to 
remove the requirement to use the D2 assessments, although they remained available to 
teachers to include in learning objectives. However, as the experiences of teachers at 
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McCoy Elementary will later demonstrate, this experiment in restricting teachers’ 
autonomy in the learning objectives process resulted in a loss of trust among some 
teachers in the program and the policymakers directing it.
Discussion
Hill ISD created and enacted its performance pay program in a context of growing 
interest among state policymakers in these policies and an expanding field of such 
programs nationwide. The Superintendent at the time had also demonstrated interest in 
other systemic reforms and had sought resources and ideas for initiatives outside the 
district’s region. These interests, along with the Chamber of Commerce’s activities in the 
education community and the backdrop of strategic planning and salary negotiations, 
created the setting in which the district initiated performance pay. 
Their relatively early entry into the performance pay field enabled the district to 
take considerable time in crafting its program and garnering support for it among 
stakeholders. Had they embarked on developing the initiative two years later, in 2006, the 
district would have been pressed to develop a program in time to apply for state funds. 
They would also likely have met with some resistance to the idea among teachers since 
the new state programs attracted considerable attention toward performance pay at the 
time. 
Despite the deliberateness with which Hill ISD pursued its performance pay 
program, and their careful inclusion of stakeholders, the program remained rather hidden 
from many teachers in the district. All but one of the teachers interviewed for this study 
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had little or no knowledge of the Task Force on Teacher Support and Compensation or 
the Steering Committee. Most of them had not known about the program at all until they 
were approached by their principals about participating in it. They had had limited 
experience with any kind of performance pay before participating in this program 
(Thompson Elementary had participated in the TEEG program for two years just before 
entering the Hill ISD program; McCoy Elementary teachers had had no experience with 
performance pay). The school administrators interviewed also had little experience with 
performance pay and knew little about the Hill ISD program until they were invited to 
participate. 
Thus, the teachers and school administrators charged with acting on the program 
through implementing student learning objectives in their classrooms, engaging in 
mentoring, and participating in professional development entered into these activities 
with relatively fresh eyes, having little prior knowledge about the program or 
performance pay policies to inform their interpretations. This was also the case for the 
Steering Committee and the district central office staff. Although they were more familiar 
with performance pay than most teachers and school administrators, they had never 
designed or implemented such a program before. Everyone involved was, in a sense, 
learning on the job. As will be described in the next few chapters, these actors at each 
level in the system - schools, district central office, and policymakers - took on 
perspectives about the program that diverged in a number of ways, resulting in sometimes 
conflicting ideas about its purpose, goals, and potential to induce change. These different 
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perspectives led to different sets of expectations for teachers’ work, which were not 
always understood. In response, teachers and school administrators adapted the program 
to their own goals and existing practices.
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Chapter 5: Sensemaking on the Steering Committee
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Steering Committee was one of the driving 
forces in the development of Hill ISD’s performance pay program. Although the Task 
Force on Teacher Compensation and Support spent two years developing the basic 
structure of the program, the Steering Committee was responsible for its implementation 
and evaluation. It established processes and requirements, which were carried out by the 
program office. Once established, the Steering Committee took on the responsibility of 
guiding and overseeing the program, while the Task Force became an advisory group. 
Figure 5.1 shows the organizational chart for the program. This figure is based on a 
document provided to the Board of Trustees by the Steering Committee in 2008.
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Figure 5.1. Hill ISD Performance Pay Program Organizational Chart
Steering Committee
Charge: 
To provide policy guidance and general 
oversight of the performance pay initiative 
as well as maintain communication with 
key community stakeholder groups and 
the Board of Trustees.
Chamber of Commerce Task 
Force on Compensation
Charge: 
To provide Hill ISD with 
feedback on the design of the 
performance pay plan that will 
accelerate progress toward 
meeting the goals of the 
2005-2010 Strategic Plan.
Teacher Compensation and 
Support Task Force
Charge:
To provide campus-based input 
on the implementation and 




To provide operational 




Carry out all district-level 
activities associated with 
implementing the performance 
pay program in schools
Note. Figure derived from document retrieved from Hill ISD website.
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Sensemaking about the program among the Steering Committee members 
interviewed was characterized by a division between the perspectives of business 
interests and those of education professionals. Business interests on the committee saw it 
as a means of motivating teachers and altering the attitudes and skills of the teacher 
workforce. District administration and the teachers association, for somewhat different 
reasons, viewed it as an opportunity to provide needed instructional support to teachers 
and to recognize teachers’ work. 
The administration and the teachers association were uniquely aligned in their 
goals for the performance pay in the district, and their views came to dominate decisions 
about program design and implementation. The business perspective remained relevant, 
though, resulting in sometimes conflicting visions of the program’s goals, purposes, and 
theory of action. These differing perspectives were evident in the program’s design, 
which included both financial incentives and instructional supports. Over time, however, 
the program moved away from its emphasis on financial awards toward greater reliance 
on supports to create improvements in teaching and student achievement. Yet, because 
this “evolution...from a pay to a teaching and learning initiative” (in the words of the 
program’s director) was not universally supported (at least not enthusiastically) by all 
members of the Steering Committee, the program included compensation as well as 
supports. It was able to satisfy all the interests on the committee, but also increased the 
complexity of the program provided to teachers to incorporate into their practice.
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Structure of the Steering Committee 
Membership on the Steering Committee largely mirrored that of the Task Force, 
yet there were some notable differences between the two groups. The Task Force had had 
only one representative from the business community. Two of the Steering Committee’s 
co-chairs were business representatives. Both were former officers of the Chamber of 
Commerce, which had created its own advisory task force in support of the performance 
pay program. One of the representatives had been the Chair of the Chamber of 
Commerce when it created its regional education initiative. So, the business community 
had a greater voice on the Steering Committee than it had had on the Task Force. The 
Steering Committee also included a Special Assistant to the Superintendent (who later 
became the Program Director), who had been hired to manage the performance pay 
program. He had joined the Task Force in 2006, and had presented their proposed 
program, along with the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources and Information 
Systems, to the Board of Trustees. 
Although the number of members on the Steering Committee vacillated, all but a 
few individuals remained on it throughout the course of the program. Table 5.1 describes 
the membership on the Steering Committee in 2007, 2008, and 2010.
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Table 5.1. Steering Committee Membership, 2007-2010
Member 2007 2008 2010
Co-Chair: Former Chair, Chamber of 
Commerce (1)* X X X
Co-Chair: Parent Representative, District 
Advisory Committee (1)* X X X
Co-Chair: President, Teachers Association 
(1)* X X X
Co-Chair: Assistant Superintendent, 
Human Resources and Information 
Systems (1)*
X X X
Co-Chair: President of Area Urban 
League and Former Vice President of 
Education for Chamber of Commerce (1)*
X X X
Special Assistant to Superintendent/
Program Director (1)* X X X
University Researcher (1)* X X X
Teachers Association Representatives* 0 1 1
Principals* 1 3 2
Teachers** 2 5 4
Other District Staff 1 1 (Superintendent)
    1***
(in program 
office)
Total Members 11 17 15
*     Same individual in all years.
**   One individual in 2005 not a member in other years. All other members same in all years.
*** Individual had been a member as a principal prior to joining as a district staff member.
As can be seen in this table, the committee became more tilted toward educators 
over time. The number of teachers increased to five and the number of principals to three 
in the program’s second year. Their numbers decreased slightly in the third year, but, 
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along with the teachers association representatives and district representatives, 12 of the 
15 members in 2010 were education professionals. By contrast, only two members 
represented the business community. It should be noted that, while the committee 
included teachers and principals, the core members were the co-chairs and the program 
director, as confirmed by all the Steering Committee members interviewed as well as the 
university researcher. These were the members who had the most influence on the 
committee and were the most involved in its decision making.
To reflect the Steering Committee’s membership, I interviewed one of the 
business representatives, the president of the teachers association, and the district 
program director. These individuals were recommended as participants by the university 
researcher on the committee, who was familiar with the program and the workings of the 
Steering Committee and was able to identify individuals who had both extensive 
knowledge of the program’s development and represented the primary perspectives on 
the committee. The program director also recommended the teachers association 
president and the business representative as potential interviewees.
The business representative (referred to here as Business Representative) was a 
banking executive who was also a former chair of the Chamber of Commerce. He 
oversaw development of the Chamber’s regional economic development strategy that 
included public education goals and initiatives. He had been involved in past Hill ISD 
initiatives and expressed an interest in charter schools and in improving low-income 
schools. He was also a trustee of a local historically Black university. 
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The president of the teachers association (referred to here as Teachers Association 
President) had been a bilingual teacher in Hill ISD. After earning a Master of Public 
Administration, he joined the teachers association, eventually becoming its president. He 
had held that position for 15 years and had extensive experience working with the Hill 
ISD administration. 
Finally, the program director (referred to here as Program Director) came to Hill 
ISD in 2006 to serve as a Special Assistant to the Superintendent as part of a residency 
for a doctoral program in educational administration at a nationally prestigious university. 
He stayed on at the district and eventually became director of the office overseeing the 
performance pay program. Before coming to Hill ISD, he had worked as a policy advisor 
at the National Board for Teacher Certification, and had been a White House Fellow 
participating in the development of No Child Left Behind. He was also a Board-certified 
teacher and had been named Teacher of the Year in his home state (outside of Texas). 
Sensemaking on the Steering Committee
The Steering Committee was unique in Hill ISD. No other similar committee of 
external stakeholders had been formed in the district to develop and oversee an initiative. 
Initiatives were typically designed and overseen solely by district administration. In 
creating the Steering Committee (as well as the Task Force that preceded it), the 
Superintendent had likely been influenced by the process used to develop ProComp, in 
which a similar committee of teachers, district administrators, teachers union 
representatives, and business representatives had been employed successfully. Despite 
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their unique task and the disparate interests and voices they represented, the Steering 
Committee’s work proceeded quite smoothly. All three committee members interviewed 
for this study commented that the collaboration within the Steering Committee had made 
the program more effective than it would have been otherwise, and was a point of pride 
for them. 
 There were disagreements, however. Most notably, the Chamber of Commerce 
Task Force on Compensation pressed the Steering Committee to set specific performance 
targets for the pilot phase to provide clear indicators of its effectiveness. District staff, 
however, thought that it would be difficult to establish valid benchmarks without 
historical data on program components (i.e., baseline performance on achievement of 
student learning objectives). Ultimately, some implementation, rather than outcome, 
targets were established (see note 10). The Steering Committee also committed to 
considerable evaluation of the program by internal and external evaluators. Additionally, 
the teachers association was initially resistant to including the school-wide TAKS growth 
component, but eventually agreed, according to the Teachers Association President, based 
on their expectation that this measure would be found to be less effective in changing 
teachers’ behaviors and improving student achievement than the student learning 
objectives component. If evaluations of the program found this to be the case, the 
association would be well positioned to recommend removing incentives for school-wide 
TAKS growth from the program.
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Within this context, I interviewed the Business Representative, the Teachers 
Association President, and the Program Director about their perspectives on the 
performance pay program and the Steering Committee’s work in implementing it. Their 
responses fell into three categories: the purpose and goals of the program, the program’s 
theory of action, and program successes and challenges. These categories reflect the 
Steering Committee’s role as program designers and decision makers, which resulted in a 
broad view of the program across multiple years and schools. 
These respondents held different opinions and perspectives about the program’s 
intentions and theory of action. The Business Representative saw performance pay as a 
tool to directly motivate teachers’ behavior and alter characteristics of the teacher 
workforce in the district. The Program Director and Teachers Association President held 
similar views that the purpose of the program was to professionalize teaching and provide 
supports to teachers to improve instruction. These two perspectives were both reflected in 
the program’s design, although those of the Program Director and Teachers Association 
President were predominant.
Program Purpose and Goals.
While all three Steering Committee members acknowledged that the primary goal 
of Hill ISD’s performance pay program was to improve student achievement, two distinct 
perspectives on the purpose of performance pay in achieving this goal emerged among 
the respondents. The first, expressed most fully by the Business Representative, was to 
improve teacher quality. The second, expressed by the Teachers Association President 
110
and the Program Director, was to increase supports and professional authority for 
teachers. Both of these perspectives were evident in the program’s structure, which 
incorporated both incentives and supports. While their coexistence did not appear to 
create conflict among the Steering Committee, it did result in mixed messages to school 
practitioners about the program’s focus.
The Business Representative viewed Hill ISD’s program as not only a new 
initiative, but, more importantly, as a cultural shift in schooling toward a more 
businesslike mindset. The need for performance pay in schools emanated, for him, from a 
lack of capacity among teachers and from weaknesses in the way districts not only 
compensate, but also recruit teachers. He commented,
Teachers came into the profession over the last 100 years for lots of 
reasons, but one of them wasn’t, for the most part, how can I measure my 
students at the beginning of the semester and move their competency to a 
predetermined increase? Very few teachers entered the profession for that 
reason because school districts, by and large, don’t measure that way… 
Our recruitment of teachers, anybody will agree, says here’s the high bar 
and here’s who we’ll recruit, and [the recruits are] all down here, so let’s 
lower the bar.
The logic expressed here was that there were many teachers who did not have 
either the inclination or the ability to set and work toward specified goals for student 
learning. Because these teachers made up a large proportion of the teacher labor pool, 
districts had either not been able to or had not wanted to recruit teachers who could and 
would teach in a more goal-oriented manner. To this point, he distinguished between 
“student achievement” and “teaching,” explaining the difference as working toward a 
goal versus implementing lessons without regard to objectives. He explained, “They 
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teach whatever they felt like today, as opposed to [saying], ‘The day’s beginning and this 
is what I have to accomplish today.’” 
These views about the need for performance pay in Hill ISD contrasted with those 
expressed by the Teachers Association President and district Program Director. The 
Teachers Association President elected to become involved with the program so that the 
association could shape it to fit their needs and interests, one of which was to increase 
teacher compensation. Not only did the program offer an opportunity to directly increase 
some teachers’ pay, it was also seen as a way to lay the groundwork for broader pay 
increases in the future. As he remarked,
If we can demonstrate that spending money on teachers in a certain way, 
whether it’s paying them more, or training them better, or supporting them 
in new ways, leads to higher student performance, then we [can] go out 
and make that argument [to the community]. [We can] say, ‘It’s worth 
raising the property tax. It’s worth taking the next $10,000,000 and putting 
it into this.’ Because we’ve already shown that these kinds of investments 
pay.
The association also hoped to bring about systemic changes in the way district 
administration worked with teachers. In his view, the district, mainly through the 
curriculum and instruction department, had become too focused on standardizing lessons 
and interventions, eroding teachers’ professional discretion. He commented, 
They really tried hard to set up these systems that would identify 
underperformance and give some kind of standard response rather than 
investing in the quality of the teacher so [that] the teacher picked up on 
[students who were] struggling and got in there and did something about 
it. 
112
For him, the performance pay program, particularly the student learning 
objectives component, presented an opportunity to provide teachers more authority over 
their instruction. As he explained,
Our members complain bitterly when they’re at schools that are struggling 
and their professional autonomy is taken away from them. The school 
district has these instructional people, and they call [teachers] downtown 
and they send [their staff] out to the school. And they hand out the lesson 
plans and they hand out the Friday assessment. And they say, “[You’re] a 
bad school. And you’re a bad teacher. So somebody else is going to do 
your thinking for you. And this is what you’re going to do.” Boy, teachers 
really hate that. So that’s one way to think about [improving student 
achievement]. The other way is to say, “Here’s your kids. Here’s your 
data. You need to analyze it. You need to set goals. They need to be clear 
and transparent. They need to be negotiated with your principal. But 
you’re going to get the job done. You’re the teacher here, the expert, the 
professional. And we’re here to help you.” Boy, that’s a whole different 
approach. So that’s part of what was in it for us. It was getting out of this 
top-down, punishment approach that the district had been using.
The Program Director expressed a similar “hidden agenda” (in his words) to 
“professionalize the work of teaching.” He explained,
[T]his is complex work that teachers engage in. Those student learning 
objectives, as an example, are a way to highlight the thinking, the deep 
thinking and measurement and interventions that teachers are involved 
with every single day that I think many in the public are just not aware. So 
I do want to raise perceptions of the work of teaching, which does mean 
higher pay. But it also means different expectations for being transparent 
in that work as well.
His last point about different expectations was shared by the Business 
Representative and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the Teachers Association President. 
All three agreed that teachers’ compensation should be higher, but the Program Director 
and the Business Representative emphasized the notion of tying increased compensation 
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to increased expectations for performance. The Teachers Association President did not 
express disagreement with this view, but rather saw demonstrations of improved 
performance as a means to agitate for increased compensation. In other words, his goal 
was to increase compensation, whereas the goal of the Business Representative was to 
increase performance. The Program Director shared both of these goals, but wanted 
increased compensation to be coupled with higher expectations for performance.
These differing opinions about the purpose of the performance pay program led to 
different aspirations for its effects on teachers and schools. The Business Representative’s 
intentions to change teacher recruitment and selection practices and criteria led him to 
hope for fundamental changes in the Hill ISD teacher workforce. He commented,
If [this program] is successful, one could predict there will be at least 50% 
turnover in the teacher group from when we started. Remember, the kinds 
of people who entered the profession entered, not for the wrong reasons, 
but for different reasons than being held accountable semester by semester 
with pre-approved goals. It isn’t top-down, but it isn’t teachers close the 
door and you’re subject to whatever teaching they feel like that day. Good 
teachers [are] internally driven. Well, we don’t have that many like that. 
Unfortunately, that will mean, I hope, if we do it correctly, a lot of 
selecting out.
It is important to note that he did not express a desire to terminate large numbers 
of teachers. In fact, he later stated the opposite. Rather, he expected that the program 
would lead to a cultural shift in expectations for instruction and performance that would 
prompt many teachers to leave the district of their own accord. 
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The Teachers Association President’s goals centered on creating a more teacher-
centered environment in the district and improving teachers’ working conditions, 
particularly in low-income schools. He explained,
[I’d like to see] this become the way we do business, and that this kind of 
intense support and recognition lead to us not having schools, especially 
on the East side of the city, where turnover is a given. That this be the 
driver for a new way to provide professional development that is very 
teacher-directed. Where every year, the teacher sits down and does an 
analysis, maybe in conversation with the principal. What am I focusing on 
this year? What are the skills I’m trying to build? What are the challenges 
that I’ve dealt with or that I’m going to deal with with the kids I’m 
working with? And as teachers do that and demonstrate it in the 
classroom, they’re able to earn more money for it. So that the teacher who 
stays in the classroom has all these different ways, as they demonstrate 
their effectiveness, of being paid more.
He also expressed a goal for his association to continue to build its influence in 
the district through the program’s focus on sending resources for professional 
development and technical assistance to schools rather than administering them at the 
central office. In his view, this was not only a best practice for supporting teachers, it was 
beneficial to his association and its members. He noted,
I see this as starting to help the district reshape how it uses its resources. 
That’s good for us. That’s good for the union. Because we don’t want it 
top-heavy. And my members want leadership opportunities. And they want 
opportunities to make money, too, doing that.
The Program Director discussed similar goals for the program to result in larger 
systemic changes in the district. He wanted the human capital perspectives that had 
informed performance pay in Hill ISD to be integrated into other district practices to 
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create more coherence between instructional programs, human resources, and other 
district functions. He commented,
[Performance pay] can’t stand on its own feet. It needs to be connected 
with all of our efforts to bring in high-quality teachers and administrators 
and support them to be successful and to give them the tools to be 
successful. So the linkages that are starting to occur across the district, I 
think, tell me that we’re finally starting to understand some of these 
human capital notions that have existed and are becoming more apparent 
to all urban districts, or just school districts in general. So that sense of 
connectedness is, I’m excited to see that.
Program Theory of Action.
As with the purposes and goals of the program, the three respondents expressed 
different perspectives on how performance incentives could achieve those goals. The 
first, expressed by the Business Representative, was that of performance pay as a direct 
way of changing behavior and increasing teacher effectiveness. The second, expressed by 
both the Teachers Association President and the district Program Director, was that of 
performance pay as a means to obtain resources for instructional support programs. These 
differing perspectives led to different expectations for program outcomes and somewhat 
opposing ideas about what constituted appropriate and effective program activities.
 The Business Representative had worked within incentive pay structures 
throughout his career in banking, and believed monetary awards tied to performance 
objectives could lead to behavioral changes that might not come about otherwise. His 
beliefs about the value of incentives reflected the economic theory of action of 
performance pay, which links monetary awards directly to behaviors. He commented, 
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Incentive pay is getting people to do what they otherwise wouldn’t do…
Incentives, no matter what teachers will tell you, do drive behaviors. 
Everybody has the pressures of car repair, if not the next car, of college 
educations, of vacations, of… Everybody, their behavior can be channeled 
by the extent to which rewards are part of the system. 
The Teachers Association President’s responses indicated that, while he valued 
compensating teachers, he believed that the most effective means of improving 
instruction and student outcomes was to support teachers and give them more 
professional authority in the classroom. He noted,
There are two schools of thought around teacher quality. There’s the ‘sort 
and separate’ model. And then there’s ‘support and build capacity,’ and 
we’re definitely on the ‘support and build’ side. I believe it’s that 
investment, being in the classrooms, supporting teachers, giving them 
data, training them. That’s what will lead to better outcomes.
At the same time, he did not discount the importance of compensation. Rather, he 
believed, unlike the Business Representative, that monetary incentives alone were 
inadequate to fundamentally change behavior. As he explained,
Teachers are already working hard. Believe me, they’re working hard. 
They’re working long hours. They’re doing everything they can figure out 
how to do to get kids where they need to be. It isn’t a matter of getting 
them to work harder. So just putting more money out there… It’s got to be 
coupled with the support. I’m not saying there are no lazy teachers or no 
people who go home early. I’m saying that, in the main, they need more 
time. They need better working conditions. They need better training. And 
they need an administration whose orientation is [that] the classroom is 
where it’s happening, [and asks], ‘How do we support you?’
The Program Director agreed with the Teachers Association President, and was 
perhaps even more focused on instructional supports as the levers for behavioral changes. 
He stated, “This has to work as a teaching and learning initiative. It can’t just be an extra 
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pay initiative.” He discussed the way his perspective had changed during his work on the 
program from being focused on incentives to emphasizing instructional improvement. 
These changes resulted not only from directly engaging with performance pay, but also 
from studying theories of human capital and examining the experiences of Hill ISD and 
other districts. He explained,
As we began to look at research into [human capital] questions, it was 
clear that this needed to be grounded in the teaching and learning 
environment that existed both in our district and on our campuses, and we 
were going to think about work that affected practice… As we looked at 
our own exit surveys about why teachers left or the data from around the 
country, it’s a complex interplay between working conditions, such as the 
quality of a principal, the amount of support I receive, the class load I 
have. All those kinds of things are as important, if not more important, 
than what I actually get paid. But what I get paid matters too.
 What was clear from the comments of the Program Director and the Teachers 
Association President was that they saw compensation and support as “inextricably 
linked and mutually reinforcing.” However, they both viewed support as the more 
important factor in producing changes in instruction and teachers’ behaviors. They tended 
to cast incentives as “recognition,” awards intended to commend, but not necessarily 
induce, high performance. This perspective on the roles of incentives and supports is 
evident in the program’s model of “hypothesized effects on school outcomes” (or theory 
of action), shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Note. Figure derived from document retrieved from Hill ISD website.
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This model was published in an internal evaluation report on implementation and 
outcomes in the program’s second year. It was developed by Hill ISD internal evaluators 
for the report, in collaboration with program staff. Program staff reviewed the evaluators’ 
model and proposed changes to it to reflect their views of the program’s structure and 
goals. The evaluation report was also reviewed and approved by other district staff before 
release. Thus, while the model was not created wholly by the program office, it can 
nonetheless be interpreted as an accurate representation of the office’s, and the district’s, 
working theory of action for the program. 
The model illustrates how the incentive components of the program are 
hypothesized to lead to the outcomes of improved school performance and improved staff 
recruitment and retention. In the model, each component is linked to one of these 
outcomes through behavioral changes (data use, professional learning communities, 
reflective practice) or affective changes (self efficacy, attachment, job satisfaction). There 
are two notable features. First, the components are decoupled from their associated 
monetary awards, except in the case of recruitment and retention stipends. The student 
learning objectives component is hypothesized to affect student growth and improved 
campus performance by encouraging particular instructional practices (data use, 
professional learning communities, and reflective practice), not by motivating teachers to 
perform better in order to receive monetary awards. Second, the awards themselves are 
linked not with the outcome of improved school performance, but with staff recognition, 
which is linked indirectly with improved school performance. Awards are similarly 
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described as demonstrations of the district administration’s support for high-quality 
teaching, not as direct inducements for behaviors.
 This model contrasts with the economic model of performance pay described in 
Chapter 3. In that model, motivation to earn financial incentives is the driver of 
behavioral changes and professional decision-making. Hill ISD’s model presents a more 
complex view of change, with financial incentives taking on a less direct, more affective 
role in bringing about desired outcomes. It is consistent with the perspectives of the 
Teachers Association President and the Program Director, but differs markedly from the 
views expressed by the Business Representative. 
Because he believed in a more direct relationship between incentive pay and 
behavioral changes, there were some parts of the program that he thought were 
inappropriate as part of a performance pay system. One of these was the mentoring 
component. He described it as something that “just should be part and parcel” of 
teachers’ first three years in the classroom, but that did not fit within the definition of 
incentive pay. The Program Director and Teachers Association President did not make 
this distinction, viewing that type of teacher support as naturally and inextricably 
connected to compensation.
The Business Representative noted that he sometimes felt marginalized in the 
committee’s work, which could help explain his frustrations. While his participation on 
the Steering Committee was voluntary and took place outside of his business 
commitments, others were able to devote more time and attention to developing and 
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overseeing the program. The Program Director, of course, worked full time on the 
program. The participation of the Teachers Association President was likewise directly 
related to his full-time job. One way in which these differences in attention were relevant 
was in attendance at monthly committee meetings. The Business Representative was not 
always able to attend, and sometimes returned to find that decisions had been made in his 
absence that he did not fully support. He described one example of such an occurrence 
and his opinion that the committee needed more “outside” perspectives,
There [are] not enough outside eyes like mine on the Steering Committee. 
There’s not enough balance. There were initially three [of us] (including 
the parent representative). One has not attended much, barely at all. Then 
me who attended initially all the time and then I got involved in business 
and I couldn’t attend. Any culture change should have people on the 
committee who are familiar with it. So there should be three times as 
many outsiders as there are. That’s a weakness that’s cost us. One time I 
didn’t go to a meeting and I went to the next meeting and I found out that 
counselors are now in the incentive plan. What? I missed a meeting. How 
did we get counselors? What is that? Well, their thinking is, ‘We 
contribute to student achievement like teachers do.’ Well, I understand 
that. To which I would say, from the outside, ‘Why don’t you go back in 
the classroom?’ You were probably promoted because you were a good 
teacher. And we promoted you out of the classroom! That’s backward. 
Why don’t you go back and then you can be part of the incentive 
program? But no, I wasn’t there, and so …
These comments reflect some misunderstandings about how school counselors are 
trained and placed. More importantly, though, they illuminate the ways in which the 
structure of the Steering Committee and its operations enabled the perspectives of the 
Program Director and the Teachers Association President to take on dominant roles in the 
design and implementation of the program. Through their regular attendance and 
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consistent level of involvement, they were able to shape the program to fit their interests 
and perspectives. Others who were not able to be as highly involved were at a 
disadvantage in doing so.
 Program Successes and Challenges.
The three Steering Committee respondents were more consistent in their 
discussions of the program’s successes and challenges. They all commented that the 
mentoring component had been particularly well-received by teachers and that they 
anticipated it would have positive effects on instruction and student outcomes. They also 
all noted that the collaboration among stakeholders to develop and guide the program had 
many positive effects both within and outside the program. The Steering Committee was 
considered a model for policymaking that they would all like to see replicated in other 
district initiatives.
In terms of challenges, they all mentioned program funding as a concern (the 
Business Representative, a former banking executive, was especially emphatic about his 
concerns in this area). The allotment that had been approved by the Board of Trustees did 
not provide enough funds to expand the program much beyond the 15 schools 
participating. The district was preparing to apply for a federal Teacher Incentive Fund 
grant to expand the program to more schools in its fourth year. Without these funds, 
expansion would not be possible. They were also currently relying on grants from the 
DATE and Beginning Teacher Induction programs, whose funds were determined by the 
Texas Legislature. The vulnerability of their funding was quite apparent to them. As the 
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Business Representative noted, “We’re spending a lot of time trying to figure out if we 
don’t get funding, do we proceed? The school board has never said, ‘Continue.’ So we’re 
waiting to hear.” 
 The interviewees also understood that they needed to be able to demonstrate 
positive and substantial effects on student outcomes to gain further commitments from 
the Board of Trustees and to ultimately propose a tax increase to voters to provide more 
permanent funding. To that end, they all spoke about the difficulty of measuring program 
outcomes, whether it was separating program effects from other factors or measuring 
student growth adequately for each component. As the Teachers Association President 
commented,
I think after four years, there’ll be some hard conversations about is this 
working? How do we know it’s working? Does it work? It’s hard to 
separate out factors within schools. What contributed to this? It’s going to 
be hard to say unequivocally, ‘Yes! This is a wonderful thing.” But if we 
see over a three or four year period the arrows are pointing in the right 
direction, then it’s a matter of is it enough of a gain? Is it significant 
enough that we want to keep doing this? What [else] could we be doing 
with this money?
There were some differences between respondents, namely in the challenges they 
discussed. The Program Director and the Teachers Association President both discussed 
challenges in aligning program activities with other district programs. In particular, they 
saw the benchmark assessments used by the district to measure progress toward passing 
TAKS as lacking in relevance to student learning objectives. This issue was not raised by 
the Business Representative. Such differences in emphasis may have been related to the 
roles each respondent held within the program and outside the Steering Committee. 
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Assessment issues, for example, often came up among the Program Director’s staff in the 
course of approving learning objectives. He and the Teachers Association President had 
also recently been placed on a districtwide committee to examine the district’s assessment 
system, so they were engaging in discussions about the adequacy of assessments in 
venues outside the program. The Business Representative, on the other hand, did not have 
these experiences and did not work in or with the district where he would have other 
opportunities to think about such issues.
Discussion
Although the Steering Committee was designed to reflect diverse stakeholders in 
the performance pay program (teachers, principals, district administration, the teachers 
association, and business interests), three distinct perspectives gained prominence 
through its work. The first was that of district administration, which was ultimately 
responsible for implementing and maintaining the program. The second was that of the 
teachers association, which was the consultation agent for all teachers in the district. The 
third was that of the business community, which had taken an active interest in 
compensation reform in Hill ISD. 
These three groups made up most of the membership on the Steering Committee. 
However, they did not all hold equal sway over the program’s design and 
implementation. Instead, the perspectives of education professionals, namely the district 
administration and the teachers association, were most evident in the committee’s 
decision-making. Given that the only other constituency represented on the Steering 
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Committee was parents (which had only one member), this is perhaps not surprising. 
However, the extent of agreement between the Program Director, representing the district 
administration, and the Teachers Association President was somewhat surprising given 
the often adversarial relationships between district administrations and teachers unions, 
particularly on the issue of performance pay. These two members expressed a view of the 
performance pay program that emphasized providing supports for teachers and cast 
monetary incentives as more of a form of recognition than a motivating factor. 
 Business interests had not been strongly represented on the Task Force on 
Teacher Support and Compensation that originally formulated the program’s structure. 
They had become more involved upon the creation of the Steering Committee, which 
fleshed out the program’s structure and implemented it. Yet, they were still a minority on 
the committee and were not always able to commit the time attention to it that district 
administrators and teachers association representative were. In that light, the perspective 
of the education professionals had clearly come to dominate the program’s design and 
execution. While the Business Representative preferred a program design that was more 
focused on performance, the actual design of the program incorporated supports that he 
considered outside the scope of incentive pay. Its theory of action was similarly centered 
on instructional improvement rather than on teacher motivation.
It was unclear how well these perspectives were understood by program 
participants outside the Steering Committee. As a unit, the committee engaged in little 
direct communication with teachers or school administrators. In fact, none of the teachers 
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I interviewed seemed to know that the Steering Committee even existed. However, the 
teachers association communicated regularly with their members and with teachers in 
program schools through site visits and newsletters to all school in the district. These 
communications emphasized the supports included in the program. The Program Director 
and his central office staff also engaged directly with teachers on a regular basis through 
in-school trainings on student learning objectives and managing the mentoring and Take 
One!® components. Thus, they had many opportunities to relay their perspectives on the 
program’s purpose, goals, and theory of action to principals and teachers implementing 
the components in classrooms. Business interests on the committee had few such 
opportunities, although they may have had the ear of other business and political 
stakeholders with an interest in the program. 
As a result, the Steering Committee relayed mixed messages and unclear 
intentions to those implementing the program. Informational brochures and videos 
provided to teachers and school administrators described the program as a “teaching and 
learning” initiative designed to “support and reward” teachers and administrators. 
However, the bonuses and stipends within the program itself communicated different 
messages about the use of incentives to motivate behavior and the relative value of 
different aspects of teachers’ work. Program goals were also communicated in broad 
terms that left ample room for interpretation (e.g., “ensuring a quality teacher in every 
classroom,” and “improving student learning at all schools and for all students.”). The 
multiple incentives and components included presented a muddied message as well about 
127
the program’s focus. Teachers, school administrators, and district administrators were 
thus left largely to make their own determinations about the program’s specific goals and 
purpose. As described in the following chapters, their interpretations were influenced by 
their experiences with the program and by the contexts in which they implemented it.
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Chapter 6: Sensemaking and Sensegiving in the District Central Office
The district performance pay program office was responsible for managing 
program operations, including distribution of stipends and awards, providing training and 
assistance to teachers and principals in developing student learning objectives, evaluating 
learning objectives, and managing the mentoring and Take One!® components. The 
office, with eight full-time staff members including the Program Director, provided the 
most direct means of communication between the Steering Committee and schools about 
the program. As such, they were important mediators between policymakers and policy 
implementers (and were also policy implementers at the district level themselves). 
The program staff held understandings about Hill ISD’s performance pay program 
that were similar to those of the Program Director and the Teachers Association 
President. They viewed the program as a means of supporting teachers and promoting 
instructional improvement. They were united in this perspective, and were more emphatic 
about using the program to improve instruction than anyone on the Steering Committee. 
Furthermore, they deemphasized the role of financial incentives in the program, casting 
them as somewhat superficial motivations. The program staff were able to communicate 
these perspectives to teachers and school administrators through their direct work with 
them. However, those views did not fully align with the structure of the program itself, 
which was based on financial incentives and included multiple outcomes and practices. 
Therefore, despite the support provided from the program office, school practitioners 
129
were still receiving messages about the program’s purpose and goals that were unclear 
and offered little guidance about the changes that were being expected of them.
History and Overview
The district program office in support of Hill ISD’s performance pay program was 
created in 2007 just before the first year of program implementation. The Steering 
Committee determined early that year that a support team was needed to train teachers in 
the student learning objectives system and to manage the mentoring and professional 
development components (see note 10). Three staff members, known as the core team, 
were hired that summer; two to provide learning objectives support and one to manage 
mentoring and Take One!®. A third learning objectives administrator was added after the 
first year. 
In their first year, the core team members were embedded in different departments 
in the district, although their positions were funded through the performance pay 
program. The learning objectives administrators were housed in the curriculum and 
instruction department, while the mentoring and Take One!® manager was housed in a 
professional development department. They reported to the directors of those 
departments, although their work was overseen by the performance pay Program 
Director. The intention behind this arrangement was to integrate the program into existing 
district operations and to help program staff avoid challenges that could arise from 
insufficient knowledge of other district programs and practices. However, supervising 
program staff and coordinating their work proved difficult (see note 10). In 2008, a 
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formal office for the performance pay program was created and all staff were housed 
together under the supervision of the Program Director. 
In the program’s first year, the core team also met weekly with a District 
Operations Team (DOT), composed of staff from other district departments whose 
functions related to the program (e.g., management information systems, human 
resources). The purpose of the DOT was to manage implementation issues that pertained 
to other departments, for example, challenges experienced by teachers in working with 
the district’s student data warehousing system. The DOT was considered ineffective 
because its membership did not adequately address program needs. For instance, no one 
from the payroll department was represented to facilitate distribution of stipends and 
awards (see note 10). The DOT was discontinued in 2008. 
At that point, program staff began to work largely independently within the 
district. They formally coordinated their efforts with other departments by participating 
on existing districtwide committees and working groups, such as monthly curriculum 
meetings, and by requesting assistance as needs arose. Central office staff reported 
requesting assistance in identifying appropriate assessments and developing learning 
objectives for unique content areas (e.g., fine arts, physical education) and unique 
program participants (e.g., counselors and librarians). However, they did not identify any 
ongoing or regular collaboration with other departments in the central office.
From its inception, the program office provided a service delivery model that was 
unique in the district. Whereas most departments that provided training or professional 
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development typically “brought teachers to them” by setting up workshops or seminars 
for teachers to attend off campus, the performance pay program office “went to the 
teachers” by conducting training sessions at each pilot school. Staff members referred to 
these visits as “traveling,” which provides a sense of the degree to which this was an 
unusual practice in the district. The staff members, Program Director, and Teachers 
Association President, as well as several teachers and school administrators interviewed, 
all lauded this practice as a model for service delivery and an aspect of the program that 
was particularly effective. As one staff member commented,
I think that's one of the most powerful things that we've done. That idea of 
embedded [professional development] where we go to you. You don't 
come to us. I think that makes a huge difference, having that individual 
attention where I can sit down with you and look at your kids and your 
data and say you need to move them this far or [ask] what you see 
happening. Having those conversations, I think that makes a huge 
difference in how teachers look at their kids and their data. I mean, it 
makes it a lot more personal in a lot of ways.
The staff viewed this practice as effective in communicating their expectations as 
well as providing assistance directly to teachers. However, it was time-consuming and 
demanding on learning objectives staff. They spent the first two months of each school 
year visiting schools before reviewing the learning objectives teachers submitted. They 
then spent about another month at the beginning of the spring semester visiting schools to 
assist teachers in revising their objectives before the final submission deadline in 
February. Finally, they conducted school visits at the end of the school year to assist 
teachers in submitting posttest data related to their objectives. In all, the staff spent four 
to five months of each year out of the office visiting schools. The mentoring and Take 
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One!® manager also spent extensive time at schools training and evaluating mentors and 
providing support to teachers working on National Board portfolios.
As the school year during which data was collected for this study began, the 
program office was expanded to become responsible for a broader array of programs and 
policies related to educator quality. These included professional development and teacher 
and administrator evaluation. The Program Director was also named as the chair of a 
districtwide committee of central office administrators and external stakeholders 
(including the Teachers Association President) to examine and revise the district’s system 
of benchmark student assessments. The expansion of the office’s role and reach into other 
district programs indicated that the program was beginning to influence other district 
programs and practices.
Sensemaking in the Program Office
The respondents for this case included four staff members and the Program 
Director (who was also included in the Steering Committee case). Staff members 
included the manager of the mentoring and Take One!® programs and the three 
administrators responsible for learning objectives support and evaluation. All of them had 
experience as classroom teachers. One had also been a school administrator, and another 
had also been an instructional coach. Two had also been mentor teachers. Thus, they all, 
including the Program Director, came from teaching backgrounds and most also had 
experience supervising or training teachers.
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The nature of the administrators’ work was quite heavily focused on instruction 
through their roles as support providers and as evaluators of teachers’ learning objectives 
and mentoring work. Combined with their backgrounds in teaching and in working with 
teachers, it was not surprising that their discussion of the program centered on its effects 
on instruction and the challenges they faced in changing teaching practices in the pilot 
schools. Here, I describe three areas of their sensemaking that emerged in their 
interviews, their perceptions of the program’s purpose and goals, challenges they 
perceived in implementing the program, and their dual roles as support providers and 
evaluators.
Program Purposes and Goals.
Like the Steering Committee members, the program staff distinguished two 
aspects of the program, incentives and instructional supports. The Program Director, as 
described in Chapter 5, noted that both aspects were “mutually reinforcing” and carried 
somewhat equal weight. As he said, “[W]hat we’re trying to do is [move] the system 
through a combination of supports and rewards to better lead to high-quality instruction 
at all of our schools in all of our classrooms.” The program staff, though, were clearly 
more attuned to the support side of the program and defined it almost exclusively as an 
instructional improvement initiative. As these comments from two different 
administrators exemplify, they tended to downplay the role of the program’s financial 
awards.
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We want this to be about teaching and learning. Although we pay you … I 
mean, it is a little bit of pay for performance, but it should be about 
student achievement.
It isn't just about the money; it's a system where there is support. You 
know, people come out and they help you and we figure things out and we 
improve when you don't get things right. So it isn't just about the money. It  
should be about the kids and it should be about the support and the 
money's nice.
As seen in these comments, the tone of these discussions about the financial 
incentives was mildly derisive. At one point, teachers’ and principals’ interest in 
incentives was described as “superficial.” In this vein, like the Program Director, they 
described the primary program goal as improving student achievement by improving 
instruction. In these discussions, they described a vision of instruction that incorporated 
diagnostic, goal-oriented approaches based on examination of assessment data and 
reflection on practice. As they described,
Administrator 115: [W]e're working on goal setting, and there's a lot that 
goes into that from looking at the data and determining 
those areas of need, to writing the assessment and 
making an appropriate goal and, even going further, 
progress monitoring towards that goal.
Administrator 2: And examining your practice as a teacher is super 
important in between.
Administrator 1: Absolutely.
This vision of instruction was shared by the Steering Committee members, who 
similarly discussed goal-setting based on examination of data as instructional practices 
they would like to promote through the program. 
135
One of the notable features of the program staff’s discussions of instructional 
improvement was the expectations for change they had developed around these goals for 
teachers’ practice. For them, the student learning objectives were intended to focus 
teachers throughout the school year on the topics and students included in them. They 
were not merely performance indicators or outcomes, but planning tools and yardsticks to 
be referred to on an ongoing basis. One student learning objectives administrator 
described the goal of their work with teachers as “[making] sure that [teachers are] 
spiraling [goals] throughout the year and thinking about it throughout the year and 
incorporating it into everything [they] do. If you’ve identified it as a need, we want to 
make sure that you’re addressing the need throughout the entire year.” Similarly, the 
Program Director described the goal of creating fundamental changes in instructional 
practice as one of the main challenges his staff were facing and as a missing element in 
the program.
[E]ven if [teachers are] into it, and they set those objectives, what happens 
after that? If these are bookends, pre- and posttest, what happens in 
between? There has to be more that takes that baton of diagnostic thinking 
and helps it spiral throughout the year. I think there was the sense, ‘well, 
then the principals and teachers will just run with it. They’ll seek better 
[professional development]. They’ll do this, this, and this.’ It’s just not 
happening naturally. So the question is, what other pieces of our program 
could we put in place that would take some of the power that we think is 
in those conversations, those habits of mind of thinking more 
diagnostically and actually embed them in the work throughout the year?
 These high expectations for change carried over into their expectations for 
performance. The program staff and Program Director were clear that they saw the 
program’s financial incentives as directed toward above average performance. Whereas 
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they wanted all teachers to fully engage in the program’s instructional support activities, 
they expected awards to be reserved for those who had performed especially well. In one 
exchange, the administrators commented,
Administrator 1: I think ultimately we want to recruit and retain and 
recognize and reward teachers for good work.
Administrator 2: Better than good.
Administrator 3: Exceptional.
Administrator 4: Excellent work.
Likewise, in discussing the retention stipends, the Program Director noted that, 
“Having high retention rates in and of itself is not a good thing. Are you recruiting and 
retaining the right people who are [providing high-quality instruction]?” 
Implementation Challenges.
Holding such ambitious expectations often led to frustration for the program staff, 
particularly the administrators who worked with teachers on learning objectives. Where 
they perceived the program as not penetrating teaching practice to the degree they would 
have liked, they attributed much of the problem to teachers’ and principals’ lack of the 
capacity for the kind of instructional change for which they were striving. Unlike the 
business representative’s discussions of teachers’ capacity, their comments did not center 
on innate abilities, attitudes, or motivation. Rather, they emphasized inadequate skills and 
knowledge. They commented on teachers’ lack of skills in using the technologies used to 
submit learning objectives and assessment data. They noted that many teachers had little 
understanding of how to use formative assessments regularly in their instruction. They 
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discussed some teachers’ lack of understanding about setting goals and following them 
through an entire school year. The Program Director also commented that the staff had 
had to do more training than expected on analyzing and using student assessment data. 
These issues presented more than just unexpected challenges for them. They felt that they 
often lost valuable time discussing substantive instructional issues with teachers while 
they were building knowledge and skills in more basic areas.
Another challenge discussed by the program staff was in working with school 
principals, specifically those that were seen as unsupportive of the program. The staff 
viewed principals as important mediators between themselves and teachers, given their 
roles as campus leaders. As one student learning objectives administrator explained, “The 
principal plays a huge role in…how the campus perceives the program and how they 
receive it in many ways because they set the tone for that campus.” Another elaborated,
Frankly, we have more success at some campuses than at others. And in 
my humble opinion, I think that's largely to do with how the administrator, 
like campus administrators, in particular a principal, how they discuss it, 
how they make it part of their meetings, part of the campus discussion, 
basically.
Staff members described several ways that they perceived some principals 
undermining or limiting the potential effectiveness of the program among teachers. One 
was by not integrating the program components into other initiatives at the school. This 
was seen as resulting in symbolic compliance wherein the principals were following the 
letter, but not necessarily the spirit of the program. The Program Director explained,
We have some principals who don’t do a whole lot with our student 
learning objectives. Even though you’d think it’s an amazing opportunity 
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to embed their expectations into the day to day work of teachers, we’re not 
seeing a lot of evidence that that has actually occurred. Now, why is that? 
You would think [if] the incentive is for schools to improve, principals 
would jump on that. And yet without a lot of additional training and 
context, it’s not happening by itself. So a big question for us is, how do we 
work with principals so that we’re preparing them to use some of these 
tools in a way that actually affects practice? Because if it’s simply 
compliance - they’re signing off on things and they’re not using it without 
putting their own stamp on it - we’re finding the tools themselves don’t 
create the outcomes we have in mind. It’s how the tools get used in 
context, particularly by the principals, the principals with teachers, that 
makes all the difference in the world.
Again, the concern among program staff was the degree to which the program 
was creating substantive changes in instructional practice. Note that the Program 
Director’s solution to this problem was to provide more training for principals under the 
assumption that principals wanted to make better use of the student learning objectives, 
but did not know how to do so effectively. This type of solution was proposed by 
program staff to most issues arising from a lack of fit between their expectations of 
practice and the practices they observed. Most such differences were attributed to 
inadequate knowledge or skills, making additional training and support a viable and 
logical solution.
Another action by principals that frustrated program staff was behaving in ways 
that demonstrated, to them, a lack of support for the program. This was particularly 
problematic when principals were seen as passing unsupportive attitudes on to teachers, 
which was viewed as undermining teachers’ support. One staff member explained, 
“When the principal says one thing to the campus and says another thing to us, it makes it 
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really hard for teachers to get on board.” Another added, “When we see a lack of buy in 
from the principals, we will also see a lack of buy in from the teachers.”
Staff were also frustrated by principals they thought were communicating with 
teachers inaccurately about the program. A particularly frustrating misrepresentation 
attributed to both teachers and principals was that the program did not require teachers to 
change their practices to earn financial rewards. One program administrator noted, 
Some principals have definitely sold this program as “Oh, you do that 
already!” And that isn't necessarily the case, and there is a lot of push back 
on those campuses where that was their pitch.
In the staff’s opinion, of course, participation in the program entailed significant 
changes to instructional practice. The attitude that it would require little to no change for 
teachers was thus especially vexing to them.
The mentoring component manager expressed concerns about some principals as 
well regarding their use of mentors assigned to their schools. She described how some 
principals too often used mentor teachers to take on administrative duties not related to 
their mentoring work or to fill in for absent teachers. She also described how some 
principals requested information from mentors about specific teachers even though 
mentors are required to keep individualized information confidential. Confidentiality was 
considered to be more of a problem in elementary schools, perhaps because of their 
smaller size with often very small groups of beginning teachers assigned to mentors.
In discussing their challenges with some principals, the program staff (though not 
the Program Director) commented on the stipends that are given to principals without 
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performance requirements. The stipends are ostensibly to reward principals’ efforts in 
working with teachers on student learning objectives and recognize their contribution to 
student performance as instructional leaders. However, in the staff’s opinion, some of 
them were not earning those rewards. They explained,
Administrator 1: Ideally, [principals are] supposed to meet individually 
with teachers and have this really fantastic conversation 
about what's happening in their classrooms, but they 
don't necessarily do that.
Administrator 2: The reality of it is it happens on some campuses. Some 
campuses, it's phenomenal what has happened with that 
process, and then on other campuses, you know it's not 
happening. You know because when the teachers say, 
“I'm supposed to meet with [my principal]? Really? I 
didn't meet with him.” Okay. 
Administrator 3: Mmm hmm. And we look and [that teacher’s] learning 
objectives have been approved [by the principal].
As this exchange indicated, there seemed to be some resentment toward principals 
who did not follow program requirements and protocols yet earned significant financial 
stipends for their participation in the program. During this exchange, they commented on 
their desire for greater accountability for principals in the program. They noted that it was 
often left to them to discuss noncompliance issues with the principals, which they thought 
should not be their responsibility.
Role as Support Providers.
 As discussed earlier, it was clear throughout my interviews with the Program 
Director and staff that they identified more strongly with the support aspect of the 
program than with the incentive or performance evaluation components of it. When asked 
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directly about the duality of their roles as support providers and evaluators, all program 
staff members were quick to reply that they related more to their support role and 
considered that to be the most important and rewarding part of their work. They 
responded with this exchange,
Administrator 1: I see ourselves more on the [professional development] 
end, on the support end. I think the checks and balances 
are sort of a necessary part of the program to make sure 
that when we're paying people, we're paying them for the 
right things, but I don't think that drives our discussions 
when we're on campus. When we're on campus, it's about  
the work. It's about supporting [teachers] in their work.
Administrator 2: I would agree with that. I mean, we all would prefer to be 
doing PD rather than reading [student learning 
objectives]. 
Administrator 3: And auditing. I think that the support part is what makes 
our jobs worthwhile.
 Their evaluative role was something they considered tedious, but also a necessary 
part of the program. It was also a useful reflective tool that they used to improve their 
support work. As they explained,
Administrator 1: You know, it's good to step back and get a perspective for 
what teachers have done. So in that sense the [learning 
objective evaluation] process kind of gives us a picture of 
what everyone did, and it helps us understand what we 
need to do differently. 
Administrator 2: It's a nice evaluative tool for us.”
The Program Director similarly emphasized the support work of the program as 
its most important instigator of change. He noted that improving instruction was the most 
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critical strategy for improving student achievement and was thus the most important 
aspect of the program. He explained,
The program needs to continue to be refined to get to the point where it’s 
providing high-quality instruction everyday for all of those kids at all of 
our campuses. Because we know at the end of the day, it’s high-quality 
instruction that’s going to close achievement gaps, that’s going to make all 
kids college ready, workplace ready in the future.
Drawing on his expanding role in the district, he further commented on his hopes 
for the program to result in changes in other district programs. He particularly wanted the 
district to emphasize school working conditions in their approaches to improving 
underperforming schools. He explained,
I’m also hoping that our knowledge base that we’re developing, not just 
about what good teaching looks like, but what are the conditions that 
support good teaching on a campus in terms of how teachers are assigned 
students; what [teachers’] course load looks like; how [teachers] operate 
with, communicate, and interact with their principals; how much time 
[teachers] have to work with each other. All those working conditions that 
we know impact success, those things need to also drive [district] policies 
and practices because our interventions, especially for low-performing 
schools, ought to be to look at what are the conditions in place that are 
impeding success. Because we know often there are good teachers at 
schools that are [Academically Unacceptable]. Imagine how great those 
schools could be if those systems could begin to change. Those teachers 
could begin to fully leverage their knowledge and skills. The current 
systems may actually be impeding those things.
Program staff echoed these aspirations, but their comments were more focused on 
classroom instruction and professional development. They commented that they wanted 
instruction to be less centered on TAKS passing standards, and that the learning 
objectives provided a means to achieve that. They also noted that their program, 
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especially the mentoring component, provided teachers with a safe space to experiment 
and acknowledge failures that largely did not exist within the accountability system.
Discussion
These ambitions for the program to change not just teacher compensation, but 
also larger systems of school and teacher supports were similarly expressed on the 
Steering Committee by the Teachers Association President and, of course, the Program 
Director. As discussed in Chapter 5, these members held goals for the program to provide 
instructional resources to teachers and to increase their professional authority. Program 
staff were similarly focused on teachers’ work, and offered a specific model of teaching 
to work toward as well. 
In examining the perspectives of the program staff and the “support and build” 
contingency of the Steering Committee (the Program Director and the Teachers 
Association President), a picture of the program emerged that revolved around teachers’ 
working conditions, instruction, and student learning. From this perspective, student 
learning is improved by altering instructional practices, which is supported by increased 
professional authority, emphasis on student learning goals, continued reflection on 
progress toward those goals, and collaboration between teachers and principals on goals 
and instructional strategies. 
This perspective, though, was not universally supported to the same extent on the 
Steering Committee. Notably, the business representative on the Steering Committee 
spoke little about instruction. He agreed that he hoped to see more goal-oriented teaching. 
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However, his assessment of the lack of such teaching in most schools centered on 
teachers’ motivation and abilities to set and follow goals, as well as school cultures that 
do not emphasize goal attainment. For him, the value of the program lied more in sorting 
teachers according to their motivation and abilities, and then separating the strong from 
the weak through shifts in expectations and demands for performance.
The program structure itself also did not explicitly call for fundamental changes to 
instruction. Of all the practices promoted by the program staff, only goal-setting was 
specifically called for in the design of Hill ISD’s performance pay program. The 
remainder were practices that were brought in as means to achieve broader goals. The 
recruitment and retention components, which were most closely tied to financial awards 
and less directly connected to instruction, were largely ignored in the discussions of the 
program staff. They all noted the importance of these components, but for reasons related 
more to achieving their instructional goals. The Program Director, for example, discussed 
the need to recruit teachers whose practices fit with the instructional model he wanted to 
promote. The program staff commented briefly on the value of retaining teachers in 
fostering collaboration in schools.
These differences in goals among policymakers and the expansion of the 
program’s goals by the program staff created a complex program with an array of 
objectives for principals and teachers to implement in schools and classrooms. The 
program represented different contingencies that held different expectations, which were 
not always overtly communicated or consistent. Informational materials provided to 
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teachers and school administrators emphasized the procedures and requirements for 
developing student learning objectives, for example, but did not provide comprehensive 
models of instruction or professional development strategies. The most explicit 
communication of instructional models was done through the Take One!® and mentoring 
components. However, these activities were largely carried out by entities outside the 
district.16 Additionally, only about 40 teachers participated in Take One!® in 2009-2010, 
and 23 teachers served as mentors. Those mentor teachers also served only teachers in 
their first three years of teaching. Thus, the proportion of teachers receiving explicit and 
direct information about teaching strategies was quite small. To understand the 
instructional vision of the program staff, most had to rely on the learning objectives 
process, which provided indirect information at best. Additionally, the program was 
layered on top of a range of other initiatives, past and present, along with a high-stakes 
accountability system. In this environment, principals and teachers were not always able 
to understand policymakers’ goals and, instead, crafted their own understandings about 
the program. I now turn to this sensemaking within schools in Chapter 7.
146
Chapter 7: Sensemaking in the Schools
Teachers, administrators, and other instructional staff in schools represented the 
ground-level implementers of Hill ISD’s performance pay program. They were 
responsible for acting on the program’s incentives and support components in their day to 
day work with students. Teachers’ interactions with the program’s designers and district-
level implementers were limited to working with central office staff on student learning 
objectives. This happened only once or twice a year at each school, although teachers 
could also communicate directly with program staff by email or phone if they chose to do 
so. Those who were serving as mentors and participating in Take One!® had more 
interactions with staff, but relatively few teachers participated in those components. 
Monthly meetings with central office staff were held for principals to update them on 
program requirements, deadlines, and changes. These meetings also provided 
opportunities for principals to discuss their experiences and questions with each other.
Because of their limited interactions with program staff and the incoherent 
messages they received from the Steering Committee, the program staff, and the 
program’s structure, teachers and school administrators were largely left to determine the 
program’s purpose and goals for themselves. They did so within the contexts of their 
students, their existing practices, and their internal goals. Most of this guidance at both 
schools came from the principals, who devised ways to fit the program, particularly the 
student learning objectives, into their school-wide goals. In some ways, their participation 
led to the types of changes in instruction envisioned by the program staff, but at times 
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teachers set aside program objectives to focus on more pressing goals, particularly 
accountability goals. 
Without a strong sense of the program’s purpose, teachers were also easily 
disillusioned by negative experiences. They came to understand ways in which they could 
be disadvantaged in earning performance awards by school- and student-level factors that 
were largely outside their control. Even teachers at Thompson, who had yet to experience 
the outcomes of their student learning objectives, were beginning to see how such 
problems could emerge. These aspects of teachers’ and school administrators’ 
implementation of the program were little understood by staff in the central office. They 
instead attributed what they viewed as limited changes to a lack of motivation or to 
incompetence. 
This chapter describes sensemaking among teachers and administrators primarily 
about the two program components that emerged as most relevant for them, the student 
learning objectives and retention stipends.17 The chapter also describes other key aspects 
of teachers’ and administrators’ experiences with the program, including their 
introductions to the program and decisions to participate, reported changes in their 
instructional practices, and specific challenges cited in by them implementing the 
program. 
McCoy Elementary  
McCoy Elementary lied within a small incorporated town that was surrounded on 
all sides by Hill ISD’s main city. The town maintained a number of inter-local agreements 
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with the city for public services and its one school, McCoy, was within Hill ISD, but it 
remained an independent town. It had a very small population of less than 1,000 
residents, and its 1.4 square miles were mostly residential with a few commercial 
properties. In the Hill ISD metro area, the town was known primarily for a vibrant and 
popular weekend farmers market, and an athletic complex owned by Hill ISD that 
included a football and track stadium, gymnasium, baseball fields, and soccer fields that 
were used by youth sports clubs as well as the school district.
McCoy’s principal had been at the school for ten years. She described it as “a 
great school” with a “warm feel.” Teachers’ comments about the school focused as well 
on the climate, particularly teachers’ relationships with one another. They described a 
collegial atmosphere in which teachers are supportive and work together often. 
The school had also had minimal teacher turnover. Additionally, as described in 
Chapter 3, McCoy had a high proportion of veteran teachers. This proportion had grown 
steadily over the previous ten years, likely due to the lack of turnover. In 1999-2000, 32% 
of teachers had more than 20 years of experience. By 2008-2009, this percentage had 
grown to 42%. The school’s proportion of teachers with 11-20 years of experience 
hovered around 30% from 1999-2000 to 2008-2009, making the proportion of teachers 
with 11 years or more experience over 60% (and up to 76%) in each year (see Appendix 
H for demographic tables). 
Due perhaps to the minimal turnover at McCoy, its supportive atmosphere 
remained despite the school’s changing student demographics. When the principal came 
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to McCoy in 1999-2000, 51% of students were economically disadvantaged. In 
2008-2009, 79% of students were classified as such. Following district demographic 
trends, McCoy’s percentages of English language learner (ELL) and Hispanic students 
also increased, although at rates greater than the district. Its percentage of ELL students 
grew from 25% in 1999-2000 to 52% in 2008-2009; its percentage of Hispanic students 
grew from 53% to 80.6%. During the same period, its percentage of white students fell 
from 40% to 13%. 
Given the stability of the staff, these demographic changes presented considerable 
changes and challenges to McCoy’s teachers. As the principal explained,
[I]t’s a difficult shift when you’ve taught one group of kids, and then 
you’re in the same building, and you’re now teaching a different group. 
But we have worked on adjusting and I think we’ve done a good job. It 
took us some years, but I think we’re doing better now.
The teaching staff was described as a coherent group that planned instruction 
together and supported one another. Teachers described this environment as an important 
consideration in their decisions to work at McCoy. A third grade teacher who had begun 
her teaching career at McCoy five years earlier explained,
Since I’ve been here, we’ve always worked as a team… Which kind of 
appealed to me in the first place. I saw that firsthand and I [thought], ‘I 
want to work like that.’ We get along personality-wise. We don’t always 
agree, but we can disagree and not hate each other. Some people can’t do 
that.
The principal was also described as being supportive of teachers while also 
holding high expectations for student achievement. The low turnover in the school was 
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cited by more than one teacher as an indicator of the strong relationships among teachers 
and the positive climate in the school.
McCoy’s Introduction to the Hill ISD Performance Pay Program.
Hill ISD’s performance pay program was introduced to McCoy Elementary in 
2007. In the spring of that year, the principal had been contacted by the district core team 
about participating in the program. She was initially hesitant because the school had been 
participating in a professional development project with a local university and was not 
sure they would have time or energy for another initiative. She explained that other 
schools seemed more enthusiastic about participating, so she initially considered trying to 
participate in a later year. However, when she returned to her school before the start of 
the 2007-2008 school year, she was contacted again by the district core team and was 
asked to consider participating. Her understanding was that the district considered 
McCoy’s student population and stable staff a good fit for the program. At that point, she 
sent a group of her teachers to an information session about the program. They had a 
positive response, so she agreed to have district representatives make a presentation to the 
entire teaching staff. Prior to that presentation, she and the teachers who had attended the 
information session met with the rest of the teaching staff to discuss the program. The 
principal told the teachers that, based on what she had learned about the program and the 
response of the teacher representative, she was enthusiastic but that the decision was 
ultimately up to them. 
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The district presentation occurred the week before the school year began and took 
place at the school. The program director and other members of the core team presented 
information about the components of the program, the district’s goals, and how the 
program compared to other performance pay initiatives in the state and the country. 
Afterward, teachers voted on whether to participate. McCoy’s official vote tabulation 
included one vote against, but the principal explained that that vote was from a teacher 
who had forgotten to submit her ballot (ballots not submitted were counted as votes 
against participation). Thus, all teachers voted in favor of participating.
The principal and teachers at McCoy mentioned several reasons why they were 
interested in participating in the program. The principal saw its requirements and 
processes, particularly the student learning objectives, as fitting with the kinds of 
professional practices she was seeking to instill in her staff, such as goal-setting based on 
student data and collaboration. However, she wanted to ensure that the program did not 
interfere with other professional development work or cause her and her staff to lose 
focus on the goals of that work. She explained, “I wanted to be sure that this was going to 
help us bring everything together that we’d already been working so hard to build, and 
was going to help us hone in on those skills rather than scatter us. But it seemed to fit 
with what it was that we were doing.”
For their part, the teachers also cited fit with ongoing initiatives as a concern they 
had had about the program. They also had concerns about the time that would be required 
of them. Yet, they commented on a number of features of the program that appealed to 
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them. When asked what they hoped to gain from participating in the program, all the 
teachers responded straight away that the financial awards were an important, if not the 
most important, element. Two teachers also mentioned being intrigued by the challenge 
of setting specified instructional goals for themselves. As one of them noted, “I think a lot 
of us saw dollar signs and said, ‘Yes, definitely, we want to try it out. Not that that was all 
of it. A lot of us thought, ‘If I set a goal for myself, I’d be curious to see if I’d meet that 
goal.’ If I do meet that goal, then bonus. I get money for that.” 
They also mentioned that they understood the pilot period to be only two years, 
which seemed brief and manageable (the program was implemented as a four-year pilot). 
In terms of the program components themselves, they liked that incentives were not tied 
solely to TAKS and could include teacher-made assessments, that the student learning 
objectives measured gains rather than absolute passing rates, that teachers in non-TAKS 
grade levels (prekindergarten through second grade) were included, and that the 
incentives were structured as bonuses and did not alter their base pay. One teacher, who 
was an active teachers association member, commented that she appreciated that the 
district collaborated with the association in developing the program.
In all, the principal and teachers saw the program as presenting minimal 
disruptions and few challenges. The emphasis on student gains and inclusion of measures 
other than TAKS seemed a refreshing change of pace from the norm of the accountability 
system. At the same time, it gave them the opportunity to earn additional compensation 
and bring in helpful instructional resources and supports.
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Changes in Professional Decisions and Instructional Practices.
At the time the participants at McCoy Elementary were interviewed, they had 
been participating in the program for two and a half years (all the participants had been at 
the school for the entire period). They reported several ways the program had affected 
them professionally during this period, although they did not always directly attribute 
their practices to the program or acknowledge that their practices had changed 
significantly.
Teacher Retention.
One notable impact of the program that teachers mentioned was the effect of the 
retention stipend on their decisions to remain at the school. These stipends were new to 
McCoy in 2009-2010. Teachers and administrators who had been at the school for two 
years or more could receive $1,500 each year they remained. For their first two years in 
the program, the school had been classified as non-high needs and teachers were not 
eligible for retention stipends. The Steering Committee then created the category of 
Higher Needs schools based on the same student demographic variables as Highest Needs 
schools (but at lower school-wide percentages). McCoy was reclassified into this 
category, and teachers became eligible for the mentoring and retention components 
beginning in the fall of 2009 (when retention stipends are distributed).18
All but one teacher claimed that the retention stipend had already or would make 
them “think twice” about transferring to another school, given the choice. Two teachers 
had been considering transferring within the district the year before, but had decided to 
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stay, in part, to receive the stipend. However, these teachers had been considering 
transferring not because they were unhappy at McCoy, but because they were seeking 
different types of assignments (e.g., changing grade levels or student populations). One 
was a prekindergarten teacher who was team-teaching in an inclusion classroom. She had 
considered transferring to be assigned to a self-contained classroom with no partners. The 
other was a special education teacher with a background in teaching adolescents. She had 
considered transferring to a secondary school. They indicated, as did the other teachers, 
that the retention stipend alone would not be sufficient to retain them if they were 
dissatisfied with their leadership, their colleagues, or the school’s climate.
Instruction.
Under the principal’s direction, the teachers at McCoy were aligning their student 
learning objectives to the school-wide objective of increasing their accountability rating 
from Academically Acceptable to Recognized (and later Exemplary; see Appendix H for 
a description of the requirements for ratings in the Texas accountability system). This 
required increases in overall passing rates on TAKS, so teachers were directed to use 
TAKS as a performance measure, where possible, and to set performance targets so that 
each teacher’s would achieve passing rates that would aggregate to the school-wide 
passing rates needed for the Recognized rating (set at 75% for the 2007-2008 and 
2008-2009 school years; increased to 80% for 2009-2010). Since TAKS goals were 
established by grade level, not by individual teacher or class, teachers collaborated in 
establishing their student learning objectives with their grade-level colleagues. Teachers 
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whose responsibilities spanned grade levels (such as special education teachers) 
established their learning objectives on their own, but still under the principal’s approval 
and guidance.
All but one teacher claimed that the program had not influenced their teaching. 
Some said that they were more focused on preparing their students for TAKS than on 
meeting learning objectives, while others said that the goal-setting and tracking of student 
progress promoted by the program was not an influence because “this is what I do 
anyway.” One teacher and the principal explained that the work the staff had been doing 
with an outside professional development provider incorporated many of the same 
elements of the student learning objectives process (e.g., examining student work and 
collaborating on common lessons).
After some discussion and probing (i.e., asking for examples to explain 
comments), though, some teachers illuminated ways that the focus of their instruction had 
changed. Specifically, the learning objectives had prompted them to pay more attention to 
the skills and concepts to which those goals pertained. For example, one prekindergarten 
teacher commented,
I do think of [the learning objective], especially with the syllables [goal], 
because we didn’t really assess that before until we made it our [learning 
objective] goal. So then, you know, it did make you think “Oh yeah, we 
need to do that again. Run through it again every time you’re doing the 
alphabet, and the letter of the week kind of stuff to bring it up again.” So I 
guess, you know, you’ve got it in the back of your mind, yes, I’m going to 
be assessing my kids on that.
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The same teacher also discussed not meeting one of her learning objectives in the 
first year because of one student who “was really low and then didn’t make any gains.” 
The following year, she said that she paid more attention to the lowest-performing 
students in her class. She explained, 
It probably did make me think, ‘Okay, maybe I do need to work on that 
[student] a little bit more. And I think that’s probably why [the district] 
wanted to do this. You know, get those struggling kids.
Another second grade teacher commented that the learning objectives had 
encouraged her to focus on more complex skill sets, which she found gratifying. She 
commented,
Last year, I liked it a lot because we pushed ourselves with word problems 
that incorporated all the skills. I knew it was going to be hard, but I knew 
it was the right thing. Professionally, I was happy with what I had done. I 
was happy that I had sent the kids [to third grade] knowing, most of them 
knowing, all the [skills] they were supposed to learn and not just one 
[skill].
At the same time, teachers who taught TAKS-tested grade levels (grades 3 
through 5) noted that their primary instructional focus was always preparation for the 
state tests that would be administered to their students at the end of the year and whose 
results constituted the bulk of their school’s accountability rating. Given that priority, 
they sometimes found themselves being forced to choose between working toward their 
learning objective goals and the skills their students needed to master for TAKS. A third 
grade teacher described this dilemma in her classroom,
My math [learning objective] is on measurement. I can’t realistically teach 
measurement all the time throughout the year to get these kids expert on 
measurement. I have to teach multiplication, division, rounding, 
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estimating, you know, all these other concepts and skills that kind of leave 
me to think of [the performance pay program] as being on the back burner.
They also saw the learning objectives as part of the analysis they would have done 
otherwise on students’ readiness for TAKS. A special education teacher, who worked with 
teachers in grades 3 through 5, explained,
There is so much pressure to pass the TAKS. I don’t really think that this 
is changing how [regular classroom teachers] teach. We already, every 
time [students] take a [middle-of-year benchmark test], every time they 
take a [beginning-of-year benchmark test], we go through and look at 
items they missed and specific data and details. That is all TAKS-driven. 
So… we’d be doing the same thing. The goals that we pick, we’re told 
they have to be something we’re weak in anyway. You have to have proof 
of what you’re low in to pick that goal. Well, of course, if you’re low on [a 
skill] on the [middle-of-year benchmark test], then that’s what you’re 
going to be focusing on.
In this comment, this teacher was describing the ways that teachers at McCoy 
would have been examining student data and setting goals based on weaknesses 
demonstrated by that data regardless of the program’s learning objectives, due to the 
emphasis on TAKS at the school. Their learning objectives were also being set to be 
aligned with weaknesses in preparation for TAKS. So, there was little differentiation 
between TAKS goals and learning objectives goals, which may have diluted the 
perceived influence of the program on their goal-setting practices. When learning 
objective goals did differ from TAKS goals, as with the third grade teacher’s comments, 
teachers could feel forced to set aside those learning objectives, and the incentive awards 
that accompanied them, in service of preparation for TAKS. Teachers in non-TAKS 
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grades (prekindergarten through second grade), on the other hand, had less pressure to 
prepare students for state tests and were more able to focus on their learning objectives.
The principal understood these motivational distinctions between grade levels, 
and had come to use the learning objectives as a tool to incentivize teachers in lower 
grade levels to focus more on student readiness for higher grade levels and TAKS. One 
way she was accomplishing this was to require those teachers to use district assessments 
aligned to state standards in their learning objectives. Those objectives, with financial 
awards attached, could then be used as a pressure on teachers that had not existed before.
It’s not a requirement of the program for the teachers to have to use the 
reading assessments that are given in the primary grades, but I make it a 
requirement on this campus because it helps. I’ve seen that one piece 
really help the teachers really push it because, hey, we want kids reading 
on [grade] level by the time… they leave that grade level. And yes, it’s 
[always been] an expectation, but what happens if it doesn’t happen? Well, 
now what happens if it doesn’t happen [is] you don’t get your money.
By using the learning objectives to focus teachers in primary grades on TAKS 
readiness, the principal was better able to rally the whole faculty around her school-wide 
goals of attaining an Exemplary rating for McCoy. Accordingly, she required all teachers 
to incorporate TAKS passing rates of 80% for all students into their learning objectives. 
This was an increase from the 75% passing rate she had required the year before, and was 
in line with the rates required for Exemplary and Recognized ratings, respectively. 
Challenges in Setting Learning Objective Goals.
One of the greatest challenges teachers at McCoy faced in implementing the 
performance pay program was in setting appropriate goals for their learning objectives. 
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Having gone through several rounds of setting, submitting, and revising learning 
objectives, and then seeing their subsequent results, they had come to pay a great deal of 
attention to the ways those goals were constructed to ensure fairness and fit with other 
requirements and initiatives.
Setting Achievable Objectives.
One important consideration was achievability. After witnessing colleagues, and 
themselves, failing to meet goals by small margins or because of factors beyond their 
control (such as students transferring into and out of their classrooms), they had begun to 
structure their objectives carefully to account for such situations. For example, they had 
begun to use tiered objectives (in which different performance thresholds apply to 
different subgroups of students in the class) and to word objectives in ways that gave 
them some flexibility in terms of the students to which goals applied. The principal 
explained what she had learned in this regard,
In the first year, it wasn’t real clear as far as how to word [learning 
objectives]. And so, if you said 18 out of 20 [students will pass] and then 
some of those kids moved, you still had to have 18 [students passing]. So, 
we had to learn about not wording so specifically, but really more globally 
so that all of your kids are included by that snapshot date, that that’s all we 
have to count. It [doesn’t include] the kids that left, you know. I had 
teachers wanting to go, “Oh, I know what school they’re going to. Can I 
go there and ask if I can test them?” No! So, it really gets to that.
 The learning objectives had also illuminated tensions between focusing on 
growth and focusing on passing rates. Learning objectives were to be structured around 
growth, with goals stated as expected gains between pretest and posttest scores or 
proficiency levels. However, the teachers and principal at McCoy had centered their 
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instruction around TAKS and accountability ratings, which were measured as passing 
rates. At times, these goals conflicted, as when students met growth goals but did not pass 
TAKS or vice versa. These situations created confusion and were disheartening to 
teachers. The principal described how some teachers in the first year did not meet 
learning objectives based on growth even though their students passed TAKS.
We wanted those kids that were lowest to make a 40 point gain. That’s 
super. And [with some teachers] we even did it at 44. So, we’re gonna 
make a 44 point gain. So, here’s this kid who’s at 50, and he’s supposed to 
score a 94. So, [that teacher’s] not getting credit [for the learning 
objective] even though she has all of her kids passing. So, that was a little 
heartbreaking. It’s not saying that we’re gonna lowball [objectives] at all, 
but you have to be reasonable, too. To get a kid from a 50 to a 94 is just… 
Yeah, you want to get that kid from a 30 to a 70 because you want them at 
least passing, but to 94 from a 50, that’s a little different.
 As this story illustrates, the learning objectives set by teachers at McCoy often 
required students who performed at very low levels on pretests to make tremendous 
gains. The program staff were not necessarily requiring teachers to establish especially 
ambitious goals, but the principal had required teachers to set their objectives at levels 
that would enable the school to meet TAKS passing thresholds to achieve a Recognized 
(later an Exemplary) rating. Thus, some students who performed poorly on benchmark 
pretests would be required to make tremendous gains. Some teachers with such students 
complained that these high performance targets put them at a disadvantage, and claimed 
that they probably would not meet their learning objectives as a result. These problems 
were abated somewhat in the second and third years by using tiered objectives in which 
different performance targets could be applied to different groups of students. That 
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enabled teachers to set goals at more achievable levels for all of their students. However, 
the principal continued to press for objectives that would enable the school to increase its 
accountability ratings each year.
Experiences with D2 Assessments.
As discussed in Chapter 4, during the program’s second year, the Steering 
Committee briefly required core subject teachers in grades 3 through 11 to use a uniform 
assessment system for at least one of their learning objectives. Teachers at McCoy were 
required to use this system. Like teachers in other participating schools, they experienced 
a number of difficulties with it. The principal and several teachers noted that the 
assessments were not well aligned to the TEKS. They also found the assessments quite 
difficult and time-consuming for students. A third grade teacher described them,
[It] was a very flawed and messed up and unfair system. The tests that we 
gave were just, the reading test, for example, was just poorly worded, 
convoluted questions, questions that covered fourth grade skills. It was an 
extremely difficult test. My team members and I, we were trying to answer 
the questions. There was a question where I thought the answer was C, 
another thought the answer was B, this teacher thought the answer was A. 
I thought, ‘That's bad when the teacher can't…’. And we all had good 
reasons why each answer made sense.
The third grade teachers, like most teachers at McCoy, collaborated on their 
student learning objectives. They set the same objectives using the same assessments. In 
responding to the requirement to the D2 mandate, they used the assessments for both 
learning objectives, one on reading and one on mathematics. They did not examine the 
assessments before administering them as pretests to students. Thus, they had little 
understanding of their content prior to including them in their learning objectives. As the 
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same third grade teacher explained, “Our principal said, ‘Treat this like a benchmark or a 
TAKS test. You don't look at the test. You don't prep the kids for the pre-assessment.’ So 
we didn't look at the test. We had no idea that this test was so ridiculously unfair and 
difficult, and at that point, it was too late.” However, this teacher contacted the program 
office after the learning objectives had been established, and was told that they should 
have examined the D2 assessments before using them. This only added to her frustration, 
as she clearly agreed with her principal about the appropriate use of the assessment.
At the end of the year, a number of teachers using the D2 assessments (including 
the one quoted above) did not meet their learning objectives despite having met them in 
the previous year. This was obviously disappointing for many because they did not 
receive their awards because of a requirement they viewed as unfair. As the same third 
grade teacher said, “I just feel like I was duped. I used this really bad test, unfair test 
[and] I really didn't stand a chance of making my goal.” She was also unhappy about the 
effect the assessments had had on her students, who were very challenged by them. 
In the following year (the one during which data for this study were collected), 
the requirement to use the D2 assessments was eliminated and teachers were able to use 
assessments of their choosing again. For the principal, this was an opportunity to refocus 
on TAKS goals by aligning them with student learning objectives. She explained, 
The teachers are making their own tests that are more aligned with what 
they’re already doing in the classroom as well as with the Benchmarks and 
the TAKS. They’re taking passages that are related to the objectives that 
we did the poorest on last year. And then, it’s not foreign to the kids; it’s 
not foreign to the teachers. The teachers aren’t having to look at the test to 
figure out how to teach the skill. It’s more closely aligned and connected.
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Perceptions of Fairness.
The D2 assessments, along with other experiences with the performance pay 
program, brought out a number of issues related to fairness among teachers at McCoy.  
The teachers I spoke to had varied experiences in meeting their learning objectives. One 
met both objectives in both years the school had participated; two met only one goal in 
one year and then both the next; another met both goals in one year, and then neither the 
next. Yet, they all noted ways in which the objectives could be unfair to some teachers.
One issue they commented on was the way objectives were set between teachers. 
The third grade teacher noted that, during the second year, teachers in grades 
Prekindergarten through 2 had more time during the school year to meet their objectives 
than teachers at her grade level. Recall that teachers in grades 3 through 11 had been 
required to base at least one of their learning objectives on a TAKS objective, and the 
teachers at McCoy had set both objectives this way. Although their students were 
assessed for the learning objectives using the D2 assessments, the objectives were related 
to TAKS and so that test became, in essence, the assessment for which they were 
preparing their students. TAKS tests are administered in April of each year. While the D2 
assessments were not required to be administered until mid-May, this teacher felt that her 
students needed to be prepared for it by April when they took the TAKS. Teachers in 
lower grades could administer their posttests as late as mid-May, giving them an 
additional four to six weeks of instructional time. 
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Setting objectives among teachers within grade levels, as well as across grade 
levels, also became a point of comparison. In the first year of participation, according to 
program guidelines, teachers’ objectives were set largely individually, based on their 
student data from the prior year. In the second year, though, teachers began to collaborate 
more within grade levels on setting learning objectives so that each of their objectives 
were identical. The principal encouraged this to focus teachers more on school-wide 
goals, but teachers also took it upon themselves to do so out of concerns about fairness. 
Their actions are illustrated in this vignette from a second grade teacher.
The first year, I didn't get any compensation because my learning 
objective, the percentage, we made a mistake. [Compared to] all the 
second grade teachers, my percentage was too high. It was like 85% of the 
students will go up by 45 points, and everybody else had like 40 [points], 
and then I didn't look. It was clearly a mistake that I had [made]. When I 
met with [the program staff], that was my percentage that he was giving 
according to my data, but then I didn't talk with the other second grade 
teachers. We just left it, okay, we met individually [with the program staff] 
and then we left it. 
At the end of the year, when I looked at the other percentages, they were 
much lower than mine. We have pretty much the same scores, so my 
question was, if we pretty much have the same results, why was my 
[target] percentage much higher than theirs? And so I talked to [the 
program staff] and I said, ‘There's clearly a mistake. You can see it. It's 
tangible. It's concrete. It was my mistake, I clearly understand.’ When they  
ask you to review your SLO and see if you want to change something, I 
didn't review anything. ‘It should be fine,’ I said. What could change? My 
students numbers have not changed. It's still the same objective. It didn't 
occur to me that I had to look at the numbers compared to the other 
teachers to see if they were the same. I didn't understand what kind of 
changes they were asking me to make. But it's good. I learned. This year, 
we all met and we compared just to be sure we were all on the same page, 
that we had the same numbers according to what we got [on the pretest]. 
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See, it wouldn't be fair to have me at a lesser [standard]. It wouldn't be fair 
for the other teachers. Or vice versa.
This kind of story was repeated by other teachers at McCoy, who seemed to all set 
their learning objectives as grade levels, not as individuals. This was not seen by them as 
an attempt to “game” the system by creating artificially low expectations. Rather, it was 
seen an issue of fairness and equality. Another teacher commented about her grade-level 
team, “We’ve always thought of our third graders as our third graders, not your third 
graders and her third graders.” In other words, these teachers made little distinction 
between their students and those of their grade-level colleagues. In that context, it seemed 
only fair to them to set their goals equally as teams in spite of differences between them 
in their students’ prior performance.
These concerns about fairness illustrate that teachers at McCoy engaged in 
comparisons between one another based on meeting learning objectives. Indeed, some 
teachers noted that they experienced a sense of embarrassment at not meeting their 
objectives. A prekindergarten teacher described her experience in this regard,
The first year, I met one of my goals but I didn’t meet the other one. And 
then when you hear some other teachers talk about, ‘Oh, well, I met both 
of mine,’ you think in your mind, ‘Well, they probably think I’m a horrible 
teacher.’ That’s not what they’re thinking, but you just have that thought.
Another teacher described the resentment that could arise from such comparisons 
among teachers. She explained, 
There are very good teachers that don't get anything and its very 
unfortunate. I think all it could do is create resentment. You know, you got 
your money. I didn't get my money. However, you got your money, but are 
you a better teacher than me? No. We all want everyone else around us to 
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make our goals, but between the ones that do and the ones that don't, there 
is a little, not hate. I don't hate someone that made their goal, but I don't… 
It's nice that they made their goal, but I still don't think the effectiveness of 
[those] teachers has anything to do with this money.
It is important to note that comparisons between teachers may have been 
heightened when the local newspaper published the names and schools of teachers who 
received learning objective stipends, along with the amount of money each received. This 
took teachers off guard, as they were not aware that this would happen until midway 
through the first year of the program.19
Teachers also grew skeptical of other aspects of the program. Two teachers 
pointed to the School-Wide TAKS Growth component as confusing and unfair. These 
teachers and the principal commented that the faculty had made an effort to meet that 
goal the previous year, but had not done so. As described in Chapter 4, this component is 
based on a state measure derived from comparing school-level changes in TAKS passing 
rates in reading/English language arts and mathematics to those of schools with similar 
student demographics. In discussing this component, the teachers commented that the 
comparison schools seemed unfairly selected because they were located in different 
districts and some were middle schools. They were also confused at not meeting the goal 
because the school had improved its passing rates from the previous year and had earned 
a Recognized rating. As one of the teachers said, “To me, it’s just this random money that 
falls from the sky. There was no rhyme or reason [to it].”
Finally, one teacher was critical of a second round of learning objective stipends 
that were awarded to teachers who had met their objectives in the second year, when the 
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D2 assessments were used. This arose from Hill ISD’s receipt of funds from the DATE 
program, which required them to distribute any remaining performance award funds at 
the end of the grant cycle to teachers who had met their learning objectives.20 Teachers at 
McCoy were informed of the second round of stipends midway through the third year, 
after awards for performance in the second year had already been distributed. The third 
grade teacher described her reaction,
They’re getting paid for last year’s goals, which they were already 
compensated for. So now you’re bringing up bad things with the teachers 
[who] didn’t make their goals, the TAKS grade teachers. Because we were 
the ones most affected in a negative way… You know, on the one hand, 
I’m happy for the teachers [who] made their goals last year, but should 
they get paid again? No.
She noted that, in the faculty meeting in which this was discussed, some teachers 
who were to receive additional awards claimed that they did not want them or would 
rather they be given to the school. However, this was not an option (although individual 
teachers could certainly use their awards independently for school benefit). The district 
opted to return remaining funds in their application for continued DATE funding for the 
next year. 
Discussion.
McCoy Elementary represented a unique environment in which to examine 
teachers’ responses to performance pay. While its staff had long been characterized by 
stability, its student population was becoming increasingly challenging. In this context, 
Hill ISD’s performance pay program could have been subsumed by the largely veteran 
faculty’s traditions, or it could have been used to adjust to changing student needs. 
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It appears that, to some extent, both occurred. While the program did not appear 
to have a tremendous influence on instructional practices, the principal learned to use it to 
advance school-wide goals. Teachers also adapted the program by using it as a vehicle for 
grade-level collaboration instead of establishing goals on an entirely individual basis. 
Most of these changes occurred gradually, as teachers and the principal gained experience 
with the program and developed ways to use it to meet their needs. However, the 
instructional changes that did occur were difficult to sustain in the face of more pressing 
instructional priorities. This was especially true for TAKS grade teachers, who could feel 
pressed to set their incentive goals aside to focus on preparing their students for the state 
tests that were so critical to McCoy’s accountability rating.
Over time, some teachers also became more skeptical of the program, questioning 
the credibility of its performance components. Their experiences with the D2 assessments 
created some disillusion and frustration, which was compounded by confusion over the 
TAKS Growth component, and DATE funding requirements. This is not to say that 
McCoy teachers’ experiences and perceptions of the program were entirely negative. To 
the contrary, they all described positive experiences and expressed positive perceptions of 
the program’s purposes and goals. Their views did appear to have altered over time, 
though, and were focused on how best to achieve program objectives. There was little 
evidence that they had made the types of changes to their instruction sought by program 
staff. This may not always have been the case. As the experiences of the teachers and 
administrators at Thompson Elementary will show, McCoy teachers may have made 
169
more changes to their practices early in their participation, even though they may not 
have been able to sustain them.
Thompson Elementary  
Thompson, which had prior experience with performance pay as a participant in 
the TEEG program in 2007 and 2008, was a high poverty school with high proportions of 
economically disadvantaged and English language learner students. The school had had 
high turnover among teachers in the past, but that problem was beginning at abate at the 
time they became involved in the Hill ISD performance pay program. In this section, I 
first discuss context and history of the school and their prior experiences with 
performance pay. Then I discuss their experiences with the Hill ISD program. As I will 
show, teachers at Thompson saw the main purpose of the program as retaining teachers, 
which was an important concern at the school. As happened at McCoy, the principal 
framed the program around school-wide goals. In response, teachers reported some 
changes to their instruction that could have resulted in significant changes across content 
areas and grade levels if sustained and expanded. As was also the case at McCoy, though, 
these changes were difficult to sustain considering demands emanating from the 
accountability system.
Background and History.
Thompson Elementary was located on the East side of Hill ISD’s main city. This 
area of the city was historically African American and Hispanic, and predominately low-
income, in contrast to the city’s wealthier, and whiter, West side. For decades, schools in 
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this part of the city were officially segregated and designated for African American and 
Hispanic students, particularly those learning English (who were not allowed to enroll in 
other schools until they were deemed fluent). These schools were typically funded at 
lower levels than other schools and had larger classes. As a result, African American and 
Hispanic students in the city had lower rates of literacy and higher dropout rates than 
their white counterparts in wealthier neighborhoods. While such segregation was 
devastating morally, physically, and economically to African Americans and Hispanics, it 
also lead to the development of close knit communities and networks of community-
based organizations on the East side that still exist today and remain active in local 
education politics .
After de jure segregation was abolished by Brown v. Board of Education, Hill 
ISD began to reluctantly dismantle its segregation policies. By 1968, however, the U.S. 
Department of Justice sued the district for continuing segregation. By 1979, a Consent 
Order was put in place by a federal district court after being negotiated by the district, the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund 
(MALDEF). It provided for new schools on the East side, affirmative action policies in 
district hiring, bilingual programs, and busing of students to and from East side schools. 
Under these policies, which were often accompanied by community resistance and 
conflict, segregation in East side schools was abated. In 1986, however, the district was 
released from the order and ended busing for desegregation.
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After the end of desegregation, Hill ISD began implementing reform initiatives to 
improve resegregated low-income schools without deliberately changing enrollment 
patterns. These included magnet programs, additional resources, training for principals 
and teachers, curriculum reforms, and whole school reforms. They were accompanied by 
myriad reforms and policy initiatives emanating from state and federal agencies. 
Thompson Elementary was involved in many of these efforts, including being designated 
a district Blueprint School in 2002. Under the initiative, Thompson had received 
instructional coaches, training, and technology support, but was also subject to new 
curricular and instructional requirements. The middle school and high school in its feeder 
pattern were also among those threatened with closure from the state for poor academic 
performance in 2009.
 Thompson is a large school with a challenging student population. In 2009, it 
enrolled 710 students in grades prekindergarten through 5. Between 2000 and 2009, the 
composition of the student population began to shift toward high proportions of Hispanic 
students, English language learners (Spanish was the predominant first language), and 
economically disadvantaged students. In 2000, 75% of Thompson students were 
Hispanic. That proportion increased steadily to 86% by 2009. Their proportion of 
economically disadvantaged students also increased from 84% to 97%. The most marked 
change, though, was in the proportion of English language learners. In 2000, 53% of 
students received this designation; by 2009, that proportion had increased to 73% (see 
Appendix I for full student and teacher demographic tables). Many of these students were 
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from immigrant families, and moved into and out of the school year-round. Its mobility 
rate in 2009 was 26.5%.21 The principal noted that, although most of their Spanish-
speaking students were from Mexico, they had been enrolling an increasing number of 
students from Central America. They also had had an influx of refugee students from Iraq 
who spoke neither Spanish nor English. 
The current principal came to the school as an assistant principal in 2003, during 
Thompson’s participation in the Blueprint initiative. She became principal three years 
later. She had herself come from a low-income, migrant family. She held high 
expectations for her teachers, and had worked to reduce teacher turnover. When 
Thompson became a Blueprint school, new administrators were brought in (including the 
current principal) and teachers were required to reapply for their positions, competing 
with other teachers in the district. At that point, a number of new teachers entered the 
school. The proportion of beginning teachers (i.e., those in their first year of teaching) 
declined from 14% to 10%. The proportion of veteran teachers (with more than 20 years 
experience) simultaneously rose from 5% to 12%. The experience of the faculty varied 
considerably between 2000 and 2009, when 6.5% of teachers were beginners, 11% were 
veterans, 54% had one to five years of experience, and 24% had six to ten years of 
experience. 
The principal described the staff as committed and focused on the goal of raising 
student achievement. She held high expectations for teachers, and had tried to build a 
culture of personal accountability and focus on results. She saw her role as not only 
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establishing goals and expectations, but also providing resources needed to meet them. 
She commented,
We've built a very strong environment where we have a lot of commitment to 
each other. I tried to establish a school that's supportive, but very realistic [about] 
why we're here. Yet, I try to be understanding about [teachers’] work and their 
challenges. I try to be resourceful to get them the supports that they need, and to 
manage our money very well and our budget very well so we can make sure that 
the instructional materials are there and the support staff is there to make their 
jobs a little bit easier.
Similarly, her priority was maintaining teachers’ focus on student achievement 
results. She expected a high level of dedication toward that end. As she noted,
We start with very clear expectations about [a teacher’s] job. These are your 
students, your commitments. Think of support and interventions and small group 
pullouts as the bonus and the extras to support you. But at the end of the day and 
the last day of school, we're going to look at your roster and your scores. So that 
accountability piece … that's really the bottom line.
Teachers also described the staff as dedicated, and noted the high expectations and 
unique challenges they faced given Thompson’s student population. They frequently 
mentioned student issues that arose on a daily basis emanating from language barriers, 
limited prior academic knowledge, and student mobility. They commented that these 
issues affected not only instruction and learning, but also students’ relationships with one 
another and the overall school climate. They also noted some of the challenges within the 
staff itself. The school had had a history of high turnover, which had improved in recent 
years. Teachers also reported that they were frequently reassigned to different grade 
levels and classrooms within the school, which could also be disruptive. While the 
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reasons for this were not entirely clear, frequent changes in student enrollment due to 
their high mobility levels appeared to be a factor.
In 2006, when the current principal assumed leadership of Thompson, the school 
received its first ever Recognized rating under the state accountability system. That same 
year, Hill ISD’s Blueprint initiative began to shift to a focus on high school redesign. 
Resources had been gradually shifting toward secondary schools since 2004, when the 
Blueprint program was expanded to include middle and high schools. By 2006, most 
school improvement resources in the district were being dedicated to the new High 
School Redesign project being funded by the Gates Foundation.
Previous Experience with Performance Pay.
Along with their participation in the district’s Blueprint initiative, Thompson 
received Texas Educator Excellence Grants (TEEG) funding from the state in 2007 and 
2008, $100,000 in 2007 and $120,000 in 2008. The following year, they entered the Hill 
ISD performance pay program. Their participation in TEEG provided a framework for 
Thompson teachers to make sense of performance pay as enacted in Hill ISD. 
Under this program, Thompson faculty and staff created their own performance 
pay program, following state guidelines, which was approved by the district. They elected 
to provide performance awards to teachers at all grade levels who attained goals in 
reading and mathematics, as well as for attending faculty meetings and participating in 
campus professional development (Thompson’s TEEG plans are included in Appendix J). 
In the first year, goals were set as whole-class passing rates on TAKS for grades 3-5 and 
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on local benchmarks or other literacy assessments for grades prekindergarten through 2. 
Goal passing rates for prekindergarten through second grade were differentiated by grade 
level, but were identical at each grade for grades 3-5. Special education teachers were 
also eligible for awards based on the SDAA (State Developed Alternative Assessment for 
students with disabilities) in the first year and individualized education plans in the 
second. Award amounts were between $2,000 and $2,500 (the highest being for teachers 
in grades 3-5, who taught TAKS tested grades, and were considered as more directly 
responsible for the school’s overall performance ratings). In the second year, the 
incentive plan remained essentially the same, except that teachers in grades 3-5 were 
given the option of meeting a percentage increase in passing rates for their classes instead 
of only a whole-class passing rate (e.g., 82% passing or 75% gain in number passing). As 
part of their plan in each year, the school had to specify a “contingency plan” for 
redistributing any funds that were not awarded to teachers who did not meet goals. In 
both years, Thompson opted to divide any excess funds evenly among teachers who did 
meet goals.22 
The Thompson teachers interviewed reported dissatisfaction with their 
participation in TEEG. Several teachers commented that the whole-class passing rates 
were difficult to achieve at all grades and with the school’s high proportion of English 
language learners. A second grade teacher explained, “A hard thing with the TEEG grant 
was that it had a quantifiable growth [objective], and with primary grade levels, kids will 
kind of blossom at different times. You might have someone in first grade [who] doesn’t 
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[make] a great reading jump until they hit second grade.” A TAKS grade teacher also 
noted, “I was teaching a transition class, so I had only four kids who had been in English 
before. Previously, they’d all been in a class that had been taught in Spanish. So to get a 
big percentage of your class to pass an English test, when they’ve never had that 
language before, written down, was pretty tough.”
Another aspect of TEEG they commented on was the potential for competition to 
develop among teachers due to the contingency plan. In the first year, some teachers did 
not meet performance goals, and those funds were redistributed to teachers who did. At 
this point, teachers realized that individual awards could be increased for teachers 
meeting goals if some teachers did not meet their goals. Although the teachers noted that 
there few conflicts on this issue, they were wary of its ramifications. A third grade teacher 
commented, “There was a pot of money that all the teachers were going to split. The 
more teachers that got it, the less money everyone got. And the only thing that kind of 
scared me with that is that there’s incentive to not give your partner something. [If] they 
don’t get it, I might get more money.” 
Introduction to Hill ISD’s Performance Pay Program.
As the TEEG program ended in 2009, Thompson began participating in Hill ISD’s 
performance pay program the following year. The school had been considered by the 
Steering Committee for participation in the program’s first year. The principal had 
attended informational meetings in the spring of 2007, along with administrators from 17 
other schools. At that point, the school was not invited to participate per se, but was under 
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consideration by the committee for participation. She was later informed that Thompson 
was an “alternate,” and could be invited to participate in the event one of the invited 
schools declined. There were other alternates as well, so the school was not invited until 
the program’s third year.
As happened at McCoy, staff from the program office introduced the program to 
teachers through a presentation and discussion session at the school just before the 
2009-2010 school year began. Program staff returned to the school soon afterward for a 
second meeting in which teachers voted to participate. Only two teachers voted not to 
participate. According to the principal and assistant principal, these teachers had concerns 
that the incentives would disrupt teachers’ collaboration and that the program would be 
too time-consuming. Because the program differed in important ways from the TEEG 
program, the principal was confident that her teachers would support the program. She 
commented,
I knew that it would be accepted well. I knew that the perspective would be [that] 
we're already working so hard. The financial incentives and the different 
components of the program were just really aligned to what we believed in. My 
push was for just having that incentive for teachers, a financial incentive to be 
rewarded for their successes.
For her part, the principal and assistant principal viewed the program as fitting 
into their goals and teachers’ existing practices in planning instruction collaboratively 
within grade levels. The assistant principal commented that, “My first thought was that 
everything that they’re asking us to do, we do it anyway. So, why not participate?” She 
also thought that the program could help to bolster their efforts to raise student 
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achievement. She said, “It was a set framework for getting teachers, especially teachers 
who may not be as strong as we would want them to be, to get the students where they 
needed to be.” The principal also felt that the program, especially the student learning 
objectives component, could enable teachers to pursue goals beyond those demanded by 
TAKS. As she explained,
What I was hoping to gain was that teachers focus on their best practices, and 
focus on their class, and be able to identify the goals that they have for their class. 
I think we're driven by TAKS so much, we're driven by district assessments so 
much, it seems to be the focus. So the idea of teachers developing their own 
objectives for their class and being able to narrow down a little bit [on] what they 
felt their class really needed to be successful, and pull down from just the test. I 
think I felt was getting more into depth about what students really needed to learn. 
And so it boiled down to the [student learning] objectives.
The teachers interviewed commented that, after their experiences with TEEG, 
they were intrigued by aspects of the Hill ISD performance pay program that were 
different from that program. One important feature was the recruitment and retention 
stipends, which were not part of their TEEG plan. One teacher noted that those stipends 
were her “favorite part of it.” Explaining the value of these stipends to them, another 
elaborated, 
The retention stipend was a big thing because, it’s like, we are here. We’re putting 
in the time. Whether you’re making great gains or maybe your gains aren’t as 
strong as others, the fact that you are here, and you’re committed, and you’re 
showing up every day, and you are here for the kiddos, that felt good to get that 
pat on the back. Because the last two times around with the other grant, I didn’t 
receive those.
The teachers also pointed to differences in the performance objectives included in 
their TEEG plan and the Hill ISD program. In particular, the student learning objectives 
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were attractive to them because it rendered the program “not just all TAKS-based.” The 
learning objectives also provided opportunities for them to, in their words, “customize” 
the program to their own goals, interests, and students’ needs and capabilities. 
Finally, like the teachers at McCoy, the teachers at Thompson were motivated to 
participate, in part, by the prospect of earning additional compensation. In contrast to 
their TEEG plan, in which the maximum amount a teacher could earn was $3,500, the 
Hill ISD program offered the opportunity to earn up to $9,400 (depending on experience, 
tenure at the school, and participation in Take One!®). All the teachers interviewed noted 
that this was a significant amount of money. As one commented, “It’s significant enough 
to where you can go [to] a very nice, very far place during the summer with the people 
that you care about.”
Perceptions of Program Purposes and Goals.
The teachers and administrators interviewed at Thompson articulated a number of 
ideas about the performance pay program’s purpose, theory of action, and goals. The 
principal and assistant principal honed in on the goals of teacher retention and improving 
student achievement. The principal was uncertain about the specific ways in which the 
program could achieve these goals. She communicated a “wait and see” attitude toward 
it. The assistant principal communicated more clearly about the program’s theory of 
action. She saw it as “a tool that I think is excellent in motivating teachers [to do] what 
they know how to do best, and providing teachers with support.” She also viewed it, in 
contrast to TEEG, as not “… as competitive. It’s more of a team building type tool to 
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help campuses be more successful as a professional learning community, versus Ms. 
Smith competing against Ms. Jones to get the money.”
The teachers, by contrast, appeared unclear about the program’s purpose and 
goals. They voiced many possibilities, and almost seemed to be developing a consensus 
during the focus group, as evidenced by this exchange:
Interviewer: How would you describe what the district’s goals for the program 
are?
Teacher: To raise your [student learning objective]. Have our students improve.
Teacher: Yeah students’ success, I would say.
Teacher: Students’ success.
[Agreement from others]
Teacher: Raise our TAKS scores.
Teacher: I think it’s teacher retention.
[Agreement from others]
Teacher: It’s a focus on the low socioeconomic schools.
Teacher: Retention, I think, is related with students’ success and I think if there’s 
teacher retention, teachers stay here longer, and that’s going to 
contribute to student success.
[Agreement from others]
Teacher: But the focus is really on the socioeconomic status of the schools that 
they’re hitting.
Teacher: Like they’re not targeting, you know, [West side schools] or anything.
Teacher: It’s kids who have deficiencies already. How can we get the teachers to 
be [incentivized] to get those kids?
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Teacher: I think that what they’re doing the most is that… I don’t really like the 
whole incentive, that’s kind of weird to me. But I think that schools at 
high risk, low socioeconomic problem areas should definitely get paid a 
little bit more.
Teacher: It’s combat pay. 
Later in the interview, this line of discussion continued as a teacher remarked, “So 
maybe they did it so they could keep teachers within the district. That’s what I think they 
did.” To which another responded, “I think it is just purely teacher retention.”
Examining these exchanges, the teachers seemed to assign purposes to the 
program that fit with their individual attitudes about the issues it should address. They 
did, however, eventually coalesce around the issue of teacher retention as a particularly 
important problem. The utility of retaining teachers was, for them, an issue more of 
resources and organizational dynamics than of assuring teacher quality by keeping high-
performing teachers and eliminating low-performing ones. They saw recruiting and 
training new teachers (including experienced teachers new to a school) as an expensive 
and time-consuming endeavor that was best avoided. They also spoke about the benefits 
to staff cohesion and commitment of maintaining a team of teachers. As a second grade 
teacher noted,
If you can keep a cohesive team, a core team there, you’re going to have greater 
success because you’re going to have more of a commitment to one another. 
You’re going to build that team. You’re going to have that pride within what 
you’re doing. I’m looking at all these people, I’m saying I’m not going to let them 
down, and as a result, well, how best can I not let them down? You know, really 
focus in on my kids because I know they’re going to go off to these other [grade 
levels].
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Retention seemed especially important to these teachers given the high turnover 
the school had experienced in the recent past and the level of commitment demanded of 
them. On several occasions, they commented negatively on teachers who might view a 
position at Thompson as a “stepping stone” to schools with higher pay or more privileged 
students. In this respect, they saw the retention stipends as a valuable tool for limiting 
attrition to schools and districts with more resources. As a fifth grade teacher said,
It’s so difficult. In [a nearby wealthy suburban district], every teacher has an 
ELMO (document camera and projection system). Every teacher has a SMART 
BoardTM (interactive whiteboard). Every teacher has an assistant. Every teacher 
has I don’t know what. And I have a shower board. I just made my own video 
camera ELMO in my classroom. I mean, there’s such a difference between 
schools. Once you gain the experience, you could easily quit this school. And go 
somewhere else where teaching would be much easier. So the retention [stipend] 
is huge.
Changes in Professional Decisions and Instructional Practices.
 While the teachers at Thompson saw retention as the most important purpose of 
the program, their activities in implementing it centered on instruction by establishing 
and working toward student learning objectives. They did not enter into the program 
expecting it to lead to significant changes in instructional practices. Yet, in the process of 
creating student learning objectives, they came to view the program as having more 
instructional value. Although Thompson was only midway through its first year in the 
program at the time of data collection, the teachers and administrators interviewed noted 
a number of ways in which it had already begun to influence their practices. Unlike most 
of the McCoy teachers interviewed, these teachers were not reluctant to point out these 
changes or to attribute them to the program. At the same time, they noted challenges 
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emanating from other pressures in the school that made it difficult to sustain those 
changes.
Teacher Retention.
As discussed earlier, the teachers uniformly perceived the retention goal of the 
program to be important. As a Highest Needs school, Thompson teachers with four or 
more years at the school could receive $3,000 each year. Teachers in their first three years 
at the school could receive $1,000 each year. Like the McCoy teachers, they noted that, 
while the retention stipends would make remaining at Thompson more attractive, it 
would not deter them from leaving if they were unhappy there. One commented, 
It’s not enough money that it’s going to make you say, ‘I’m going to stay here 
instead of going somewhere else, like maybe [a nearby wealthy suburban 
district].’ But it’s enough where you’re kind of like, I like the people I work with 
and these kids. You get connected to these kids. [The stipend is] like getting that 
extra scoop of ice cream.
They further commented that the retention stipends were particularly important 
for schools with Thompson’ student population. As one teacher noted, “With this school, 
there’s a lot of stress. Knowing that you’re going to come back and at least get $1,000 
just for coming back kind of helps you from deciding to reapply to other places.” 
Instruction.
Like the teachers and principal at McCoy, the administrators and teachers at 
Thompson noted that the student learning objectives component had had the most impact 
on their instructional practices. Specifically, they focused their attention on more 
meaningful goals and promoted more alignment of instruction across grade levels. 
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However, they also noted ways in which these changes were difficult to sustain. They 
commented that the School-Wide TAKS Growth component had little influence on them 
because there was already enormous pressure in the school to increase performance on 
TAKS. 
The principal was using the student learning objectives to focus teachers’ attention 
on science achievement. She required all teachers to use a science content topic for one of 
their two objectives. For the second objective, she directed teachers to focus on reading, 
unless their students’ reading performance was already high (as measured by TAKS or 
another assessment). Teachers with satisfactory reading achievement could select another 
content area. As at McCoy, teachers collaborated within each grade level to establish their 
objectives within parameters established by the principals (at McCoy, setting 
performance targets aligned with TAKS goals; here, focusing on certain content areas). 
Teachers in each grade-level team set the same objective in science. Some teams set 
identical second objectives as well. On other teams, teachers varied the specific topic 
within the content area their team had chosen. For example, the third grade team selected 
reading as the content area for their second objective. One teacher set her objective on 
fluency, while another set hers on vocabulary.
For the principal, these requirements were a way to maintain a focus on school-
wide weaknesses within the structure of learning objectives that were set individually by 
teacher. She explained,
I wasn't sure how that was going to work because we're so focused on TAKS that 
[I thought the program] was going to pull away [from that]. What helped me was 
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that, overall, I knew our work at different grade levels. Primary [grades] has to be 
reading, it has to be a focus on reading. So, it gave me an opportunity to have 
input into where our campus has the needs. The other objective, very easily, was 
science. Science is one of our big, big challenges as well. The only reason we're 
not Recognized is because our science [performance] has been a challenge. So, I 
knew that, across the board, we have to start science at [prekindergarten]. We can't  
expect fifth grade science TAKS to be taught by just fifth grade teachers and 
[have students] pass. So for me the [student learning objectives], that component 
of it, was critical because now the focus is on reading and science.
She also commented on the opportunity the learning objectives provided her to 
focus instructional support staff on school-wide goals. Recall that librarians, counselors, 
instructional coaches, and assistant principals had been made eligible for the program. 
They also created student learning objectives and received stipends for meeting them. 
The principal recognized that this was a way to align their work with that of teachers. She 
explained,
The big eye opener was that now I've got my library, my P.E. teachers, my 
coaches, my counselor, my AP really looking at instruction. So now my librarian 
is saying, ‘Oh, I need to be in fourth grade classrooms because my target group is 
fourth grade students.’ The librarian wants to do her library thing and she doesn't 
have the pressure of TAKS like the teachers do or the academics in any grade. So 
this really pulled her in there to help and support, and become part of the big team 
too.
The assistant principal agreed that she herself had become more involved with 
instruction. She commented that doing so had given her greater insight into teachers’ 
instruction,
My goals are integrated into what the teachers are doing. I’m focusing on one of 
our weak areas, which is kindergarten and first grade DRA (reading assessment) 
levels. So, I have specifically made that a priority insomuch as I even pull a small 
group of students once a week. I hadn’t been doing that. I’d been going into the 
classroom, but not necessarily working with students. So, I’ve gotten more 
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involved in the instruction piece. That gives me a close-up look at what kind of 
instruction is going on in the classroom as well.
The teachers interviewed highlighted several ways in which their instructional 
practices had changed in response to the student learning objectives and the 
administrators’ efforts to focus those objectives on school-wide improvement goals. The 
teachers in TAKS grades (grades 3-5) had, at the principal’s direction, set their objectives 
to align with their TAKS goals. For example, the fifth grade teachers focused on earth 
science because that was an area of weakness in the prior year’s TAKS results. Part of the 
required process of developing the learning objectives was to identify specific elements 
from the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills (the curriculum standards on which the 
TAKS is based) that formed the basis for the performance goal. Most of the teachers 
interviewed commented that doing this had prompted them to examine and consider the 
standards in their instruction more than they had done in the past. For one third teacher, 
this was a refreshing change,
[I]t made me really look at the TEKS (Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills, the 
state curriculum standards) a lot more. I really stopped and [thought], ‘Okay, what 
do [my students] really need to know to meet this TEK?’ Where before, you 
know, you sort of looked at the basal, you were looking at the IPG’s, which is the 
district’s recommended lesson plans. It was kind of hard to tell what you were 
supposed to be doing. The main focus was pass the TAKS. So you look at old 
TAKS tests and, you know, just look at an old test. Can they pass the old test? 
And you’re just, you’re basically putting them on training wheels so they can pass 
a test. You’re not really teaching what the TEK is. You’re looking at a test and 
trying to teach that test to them.
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A kindergarten teacher agreed and contrasted the usefulness of the learning 
objectives in this process as opposed to the performance objectives contained in 
Thompson’s TEEG plan,
When we did the TEEG, it was, you want to show this much growth per TPRI or 
DRA. With this, there was a component within the TPRI that we had to attack 
instead of just trying to push these kids onto a reading level. You’re breaking it 
down and doing more of its components, instead of just attacking the overall test.
The same teacher also commented on the way focusing more on the standards had 
helped her to look more deeply at her students’ skill levels,
It’s kind of opened the campus’s eyes a little more on how much depth can go into 
simple phrases. ‘Your child needs to recognize up to the number 10.’ What does 
that mean? Well, that doesn’t just mean he can count on his fingers to 10. He can 
recognize a group of 10. He can count and stop at 10 and recognize that is 10. 
There’s a lot more than just a simple sentence there. I know people that have been 
doing TEKS are kind of finding out there’s just a lot more involved [to them] than 
what we’ve thought previously.
The teachers also discussed how the school-wide objective-setting on science had 
prompted them to think more about aligning their learning objectives, as well as other 
aspects of their instruction, both within and across grades. As a third grade teacher noted, 
“We’ve never really had a science test. So, that was kind of cool that we all got together, 
we all gave that same test. Now we’re teaching, you know, teaching that vocabulary, 
which is going to, you know, it’ll help the scores go up.” Another teacher commented on 
the vertical alignment that had begun to come about in science,
It’s really brought us together because we’re having to [think about] how this is 
going to have an impact on [the next grade]. How can it benefit where [the 
students are] going to? Because I’m not just going to throw out some random 
objective. I’ve got to figure out what’s going to be the most benefit to them.
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Although the program, specifically the student learning objectives, appeared to be 
bringing out many changes to instructional practices that were perceived positively, the 
extent to which these changes were altering instruction across content areas and grade 
levels was unclear. The principal noted, for example, that although the student learning 
objectives had brought new content to her work with teachers, the actual processes 
through which she worked with them remained unchanged. In other words, she was 
meeting with and observing teachers in the same way, but they were now talking about 
their learning objectives. Additionally, even though all the teachers interviewed agreed 
that they were more focused on standards and skills, they indicated that they were not 
doing so consistently, as evidenced by this exchange, 
Teacher: I think that a lot of people put science [on] the back burner sometimes 
and thought, ‘Why should we if we were busy?’
Teacher: Well, it’s all about math, math and reading.
Teacher: Yeah, math and reading [are] so important, especially in third grade, 
their first year of TAKS. But we’re more focused on science this year. 
We do [science] with students every day.
Teacher: [The student learning objective] forces you to implement it.
Teacher: It forces you into that schedule to teach it.
Teacher: Honestly, since we did the [learning objectives], even though I’ve been 
more focused, I forgot about it for a while. Even though I’m still 
teaching science, and it got me directed into the right area, and helped 
me look at things more closely, I stopped thinking about the money. It 
was like, ‘Oh right! I need to teach to this test.’ Or, I need to try to get 
them to pass this [test].
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From this exchange, it seemed that some teachers in the school were putting their 
science objectives “on the back burner” to focus on preparing their students for TAKS. 
Only fifth grade teachers’ students took the science TAKS. At least some teachers in other 
grades did not seem to be able to maintain their focus on science consistently given the 
pressures they were under to meet accountability goals in other subject areas.
Challenges in Implementing the Program.
Many of the difficulties mentioned by the Thompson teachers and administrators 
interviewed had to do with being new to the program. The requirements for the student 
learning objectives and the process of submission and approval seemed overwhelming for 
the teachers, who commented that they had expected and wanted more support from the 
program office. They noted that the program staff visited the school in September and 
October of 2009 (before learning objectives were submitted), and then again in January 
of 2010 (before student rosters for learning objectives were submitted). They described 
meeting with program staff in groups during their planning periods and after school, 
which they described as rushed. For the most part, the teachers described the quality of 
support as high; they simply wanted more of it. They also recognized that their confusion 
about program processes and requirements would likely fade as they became more 
familiar with it. As one teacher noted, “I think that, as time goes by and we become more 
familiar with the program, we won’t need as much support once we figure out what we 
need to write.”
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The principal and assistant principal, for their part, were happy with the support 
they received from the program office. The assistant principal noted, in addition, that the 
program staff had become useful contacts for the school to the district central office as a 
whole. She explained, 
This program [is] kind of the liaison between central office and the campus so that 
if we don’t have these resources, we can now call and say, ‘You know, we really 
want to do this, but do you know of any departments or of anyone that we could 
call to make that happen?’ And so, I think that type of contact or connection, so to 
speak, is going to be very helpful.
There was some evidence of more substantive challenges faced in working with 
the program staff arising from differences of opinion about relevant content and rigor. A 
second grade teacher described a conflict that occurred over the assessment her grade 
level had selected for their science learning objective,
Teacher: They told us that our science test wasn’t rigorous enough. I [thought], 
‘Really? What do you know about the second grade? Where are you 
getting this information from?’ Because the only other second grade test 
I saw in science was a vocabulary test. For us, that’s like a reading test. 
If your kids can’t read, they’re not going to be able to pass that test. And 
there’s a lot of second graders who are just not there yet. [Agreement 
from others] But can they point from a flower to the word that says 
flower? Yes. To show that they know that that’s a flower and this is 
where the water comes from. They use graphics, and that’s what [our 
test] was. We did it all in graphics versus just a vocabulary word and the 
definition, which is what they were expecting. We [thought] that’s not 
grade level work.
Teacher: Was it accepted?
Teacher: Yeah, it eventually was accepted.
It was not clear how this issue was resolved, but it demonstrated that program 
staff actively negotiated student learning objectives with the second grade teachers at 
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Thompson. Notably, the difference of opinion stemmed, in part, from the Thompson 
teachers’ assessment of their students’ capabilities versus those of the program staff. For 
the teachers, a vocabulary test would have been unfairly difficult because many of their 
students could not read or did not read well. The assistant principal also mentioned that, 
in some cases, program staff had suggested that objectives lacked rigor. According to her, 
however, they typically suggested different approaches, such as using tiered performance 
targets, that were acceptable to teachers. 
The teachers interviewed at Thompson also mentioned concerns about the fairness 
of student learning objectives that were similar to those discussed by the McCoy teachers 
and principal. In particular, they discussed the ways in which assignment of students to 
teachers and classrooms could affect their success in meeting their learning objectives. 
The distribution of English language learners was a particular concern. These students at 
Thompson were placed in either bilingual or transitional classrooms. Students who spoke 
little or no English were placed in bilingual classes. As they gained proficiency in 
English, they were moved into transitional classes in which most of their instruction was 
in English. The teachers categorized students in both types of classes as being strong 
performers (“high”) or low performers (“low”). Their concern, regarding student learning 
objectives, was having a disproportionate number of low students. This exchange 
between two teachers illustrated their concerns,
Teacher: Some of the classes are transitional so, if you’re a transitional class, then 
you tend to get most of the high Spanish speakers that are transitioning 
to English. So, sometimes other classrooms aren’t getting those high 
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kids. So, then it’s kind of tough for you to meet some of these 
requirements if you’re grouping certain kids based on language.
Teacher: But that’s the standard. That’s how you do it.
Teacher: Right, but I’m saying that affects scores. When they do that, your scores 
are not going to be as high. I mean, when I taught transition, I was 
looking towards the end of the year [and thinking], ‘This child is still 
spelling everything phonetically in Spanish. And I can’t, there’s no way 
they’re going to pass a writing test in English so now what am I going to 
do? Now I have to move them back to Spanish.’ You know, after you’ve 
been trying to teach them English and it’s, it’s a pretty tight rope.
What was notable about this exchange was that these teachers seemed to be 
working through a possible conflict, rather than reporting on one that had already 
occurred. The same dynamic repeated when the teachers discussed the impact that student 
mobility and teacher turnover could have on meeting their learning objectives,
Teacher: We got a new teacher and all of a sudden a bunch of my kids left. All my 
high kids went to another teacher. It was pretty close to the middle of the 
year. 
Teacher: But, [the program staff] keep telling you, ‘You can revamp [your student 
roster for your learning objective]. They keep telling you [not to] worry 
about it because you can change it later. 
Teacher: Now that you mention that, I’m [thinking], ‘Oh, I’ve got a new kid.’ I 
have to test that person.
Teacher: I got two.
Because they were in their first year of participation, and had not experienced 
failure to meet learning objectives, they described these scenarios in hypothetical terms. 
Interestingly, though, it appeared that they were beginning to surmise some of the 
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problems that could arise, some of which the teachers at McCoy had already experienced 
firsthand.
Discussion
As Thompson Elementary was in its first year in the program, teachers and 
administrators did not yet have a great deal of experiences to draw on in their discussions 
of it. Yet, they had already begun to develop understandings of it that were shaping their 
responses to it. The most important lens through which they viewed the program was 
their student population, which presented myriad challenges. With a high student 
mobility rate and a large number of English language learners, they faced uncertainties 
and disruptions in their classrooms on a regular basis. In this context, it was difficult to 
establish objectives that were both rigorous and achievable.
  Despite these challenges, the teachers and administrators at Thompson seemed to 
welcome the change in focus that were introduced by the student learning objectives, 
although they were already beginning to note ways in which implementation of those 
objectives could become difficult. With their high-poverty student population, they were 
highly focused on improving achievement on TAKS. The student learning objectives 
allowed them to attend to other goals, often ones that were more substantive in nature. 
Both teachers and administrators at the school embraced this opportunity, even though 
they expressed concerns that it could cause them to fail to meet accountability demands. 
In such cases, they seemed to be willing to set their program goals and incentives aside in 
favor of meeting student testing goals. 
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Experiences in Both Schools.
The experiences of teachers and administrators at McCoy Elementary and 
Thompson Elementary with Hill ISD’s performance pay program were similar in many 
ways. Principals at both schools were pursuing school-wide student achievement goals (at  
McCoy, increasing overall passing rates on TAKS, and at Thompson, improving science 
achievement). They subsequently used the program to advance these goals, guiding 
teachers’ program activities (specifically establishing student learning objectives) to fit 
within those frameworks. As was shown at McCoy (and beginning to emerge at 
Thompson), this combining of program and accountability goals sometimes created 
confusion for teachers when the two conflicted. In these situations, teachers put their 
student learning objectives “on the back burner” to work toward accountability goals. 
Along with the retention stipends, teachers and principals at both McCoy 
Elementary and Thompson Elementary focused on the student learning objectives in their 
discussions of the program. This components was clearly the most salient and relevant 
aspect of the program for them and presented the greatest change to routine instructional 
practices. Teachers at both schools reported developing their learning objectives in 
collaboration with their grade-level colleagues, in contrast to the program’s guidelines, 
which were based on evaluation of individual teachers’ student data to identify goals. At 
McCoy this practice developed after their first year in the program, when teachers began 
to compare their student learning objectives, and the outcomes of them, with those of 
their colleagues. This was encouraged by the principal and fit with existing collaborative 
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planning practices. At Thompson, which was in its first year in the program, teachers 
collaborate on their learning objectives immediately at the direction of the principal. In 
both cases, though, teachers developed norms of setting identical student learning 
objectives within grade levels.
At times, teachers effectively lowered their objectives to match those of other 
teachers in their grade-level teams. This was done not to make it easier to meet their goals 
and earn awards, but out of a sense of fairness. They believed that, since they were 
teaching the same content to students at the same grade, they should all be held to the 
same expectations. These concerns about fairness were more frequently discussed by 
teachers and the principal at McCoy than by those at Thompson, perhaps because 
Thompson was new to the program and had not yet experienced such issues. Thompson 
teachers mentioned several ways in which factors beyond their control, particularly 
student assignments to teachers and student mobility, could affect the outcomes of their 
learning objectives, though, indicating that even in the first year of participation, these 
concerns were beginning to emerge. 
Both teachers and administrators assigned numerous purposes and goals to the 
program, including improving low-performing schools, addressing weaknesses in student 
achievement, and retaining teachers. None, however, saw the program as being created 
chiefly to act as an instructional improvement initiative, as did the program staff and 
interviewees from the Steering Committee. Indeed, the most fundamental purpose for the 
program they perceived was increased teacher retention at high-poverty schools, 
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something not mentioned as an important outcome by program staff or Steering 
Committee members. Ironically, though, all the teachers interviewed commented that the 
program’s retention stipends, while appreciated, would not alone induce them to remain 
at their schools.
Overall, teachers at McCoy and Thompson entered into the program with little 
knowledge about it or guidance from the program office or the Steering Committee in 
understanding it. Their interactions with program staff were limited and they had no 
direct communication with the Steering Committee (as noted in Chapter 5, most did not 
even know that the committee existed). In this context, the principals provided 
frameworks for acting on the program within their schools. They fit the program into 
their existing school-wide improvement goals and priorities, directing their teachers’ 
student learning objectives toward those goals. As teachers developed and pursued 
student learning objectives, they changed their instruction in ways that were sometimes 
significant and sometimes marginal. For teachers in TAKS grades, these changes were 
difficult to sustain in the face of accountability demands that were more seen as a higher 
priority. At the same time, their experiences brought up numerous concerns about 
fairness, which affected their perceptions of the program and the credence they assigned 
to it. All of these experiences have important implications for our understanding of 
performance pay policies and their implementation in schools, which are discussed 
further in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
This study was designed to examine the meanings actors at multiple levels of the 
school system, teachers, school administrators, district administrators, and policymakers 
construct about performance-based compensation policies and to better understand how 
those meanings influence their interpretation of it. To that end, I conducted a qualitative 
study of two schools implementing a performance pay pilot program in an urban school 
district in Texas. As my research questions were focused on implementation and 
interpretations of performance pay, I used a sensemaking framework to guide data 
collection and analysis. In this chapter, I first summarize findings across cases - the 
Steering Committee, the district program office, McCoy Elementary, and Thompson 
Elementary. I then discuss these findings with regard to sensemaking and sensegiving. 
Finally, I discuss implications for theories of policy implementation, performance pay 
policies, and research. 
Summary of Findings
For this study, I interviewed teachers, school administrators, district central office 
staff, and district policymakers about their understandings of and experiences with a pilot 
performance-based compensation program. Findings across the respondents and cases 
can be organized broadly into their understandings of the program’s purposes and goals, 
and the impact of the program on practices in schools. Two other broad themes emerged 
across respondents and cases that warranted particular attention. One was the impact of 
the state accountability system on teachers’ and school administrators’ implementation of 
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the program. The other was the ways in which fairness came to be defined by teachers 
and the effects of those definitions on program implementation.
Understanding of Program Purpose and Goals.
The Steering Committee designed and oversaw Hill ISD’s performance pay 
program. Messages about its purposes, goals, and theory of action emanated from this 
group. The messages themselves were often conflicting and unclear, reflecting the 
contested meanings within the committee. The members brought different intentions and 
goals for the performance pay program. Business interests emphasized the purpose of 
using compensation to directly change behavior and transform the teacher workforce. The 
district program director and the president of the teachers association, on the other hand, 
saw it as a means to improve instruction and teachers’ working conditions. In part as a 
result of the higher representation of educators on the committee, this latter perspective 
dominated the program’s implementation. The Steering Committee’s lack of consensus 
about the program’s purpose and goals was later reflected in the program’s 
implementation in the schools and the central office. At each level, implementers created 
different understandings of the program’s focus and vision, using it to further existing 
agendas and initiatives.
The program office viewed the program almost exclusively as an instructional 
reform initiative, consistent with the dominant views on the Steering Committee. For 
them, the program’s financial incentives were an almost secondary consideration. They 
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saw the instructional supports they provided as the key to creating change and improving 
instruction. 
The teachers and principals interviewed at McCoy Elementary and Thompson 
Elementary, as a result, received messages from the central office and the Steering 
Committee about the program’s intentions and objectives that contained little clarity. On 
the one hand, the program staff deemphasized the program’s financial rewards and 
encouraged teachers to concentrate on making instructional improvements and setting 
high expectations for student learning. On the other hand, the performance-based 
incentives, by their nature, suggested that teachers should focus on earning rewards. With 
few clear and consistent messages from policymakers or policy intermediaries, teachers 
and school administrators interpreted the program according to their own ideas about 
important outcomes, and then shaped it to fit their situations. 
Impact on School Practices.
Policymakers and policy intermediaries had limited understanding about how the 
program was being implemented in schools to guide their decision making about the 
program’s direction. The Steering Committee had little direct communication with 
teachers, and contested meanings within the Steering Committee were sometimes 
negotiated through experimentation with the program’s structure. While some teachers 
understood this to be the nature of pilot programs, others became disillusioned when new 
requirements or processes affected them negatively.
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Program staff were more attentive to school-level issues, and had direct (though 
still rather limited) communication with teachers. However, they failed to realize that 
school administrators and teachers would adapt the program to fit their needs. Instead, 
they expected fundamental changes in practice. Yet, the vision of instruction promoted 
within the program was rather narrowly focused on goal-setting, as opposed to broader 
changes in practices or teachers’ knowledge that could lead to further improvements in 
other areas of instruction (Elmore, 2004). Their expectations for changes to instructional 
practices that would lead to significant improvements in school-wide student 
achievement seemed somewhat unrealistic given the highly specified nature and limited 
number of student learning objectives each teacher established and pursued. While 
program staff encouraged teachers and school administrators to use the student learning 
objectives as a vehicle for analyzing student data, monitoring progress, and developing 
professional learning communities, there was little in the structure of the program itself to 
ensure such practices. They also failed to acknowledge the other messages communicated 
by the program (namely, the focus on financial rewards) and the reality that the program 
would be integrated into, rather than replace, existing practices. As a result, the program 
staff were frustrated with the pace and scope of change, and assumed it was the result of a 
lack of competence or motivation on the part of school administrators and teachers. 
Teachers and school administrators appeared to be making few sustained changes 
to significant aspects of instructional or organizational practices in response to the 
program. Having developed their own understandings of the program’s purposes and 
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goals, the principals at McCoy and Thompson used it to advance school-wide goals. 
Teachers incorporated the student learning objectives into their existing norms, setting 
goals collaboratively within grade levels, rather than individually, as espoused by the 
program’s structure and guidelines. In a sense, the student learning objectives became 
team, rather than individual goals. While many teachers interviewed described ways that 
the learning objectives had influenced their instructional practices, they were typically 
reluctant to attribute these changes to the program. In some cases, the changes they 
described were relatively minor (e.g., reviewing syllables once a week). In other cases, 
they had the potential to lead to changes that could have a greater impact on students’ 
learning (e.g., dedicating more instructional time to science), but were difficult to 
maintain throughout the year considering other instructional pressures.
The one area in which the program appeared to have been more influential was on 
teachers’ retention decisions. Several of the teachers interviewed described having 
considered leaving their schools, but had decided against it, in part, because of the 
retention stipends they received by staying. Others indicated that the stipends might make 
them “think twice” about leaving their schools. At the same time, they uniformly 
responded that retention stipends alone would be inadequate if they were dissatisfied with 
their working conditions (i.e., school leadership, relationships with colleagues). They 
appeared to view retention stipends as recognition for their efforts and commitment, 
rather than as enticements.
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Pressures from the Accountability System.
Although program designers and intermediaries expected fundamental shifts in 
instruction and motivation, teachers in TAKS grades reported finding it difficult to 
prioritize their student learning objectives over accountability goals, which carried higher 
stakes for their students and schools. The principals at McCoy and Thompson directed 
teachers to set their student learning objectives in particular ways in order to meet school-
wide performance goals. At McCoy, the principal wanted the school to achieve higher 
accountability ratings, which entailed higher TAKS passing rates for each teacher. 
Teachers were thus directed to set performance targets at levels that would be difficult for 
all of their students to meet. In the case of Thompson, the principal had teachers at all 
grades focus on science to improve science achievement throughout the school. For third 
and fourth grade teachers, these objectives were not directly relevant to the content on 
which their students would be tested. Teachers seemed to understand and support these 
goals, but some reported setting their learning objectives, and the accompanying financial 
awards, aside in favor of preparing students for TAKS.   
Within the context of Texas and Hill ISD, the state accountability system seemed 
particularly difficult to compete with for teachers’ attention. Especially for teachers in 
grades 3 through 5, preparing students to pass the TAKS exams was their primary 
instructional objective. The design of the performance pay program did not obviously 
undermine or compete with the accountability system. In fact, it was intended to 
complement it in many ways (i.e., through the inclusion of awards for school-wide 
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growth on TAKS, the requirement that teachers in TAKS-tested grades have at least one 
student learning objective based on TAKS, and the requirement that learning objectives 
be aligned with TEKS). Yet even when teachers’ learning objectives did not directly 
conflict with TAKS goals, adapting them to school-wide accountability goals sometimes 
heightened, rather than lessened, their confusion over the goals to which they should 
attend. This was the case at McCoy when student learning objectives were aligned with 
school-wide TAKS goals, but resulted in demands on them to increase the performance of 
low-achieving students by very high margins. In these situations, teachers felt pressured 
not only by the demands of the accountability system, but also by the possibility of not 
earning performance incentives.
Fairness.
What was apparent in the experiences of these teachers and school administrators 
with Hill ISD’s performance pay program was that there were a number of issues that 
could interfere with their success in meeting their performance goals. At McCoy, teachers 
pointed to students’ differing pretest levels as an impediment to meeting test passing rate 
goals. Teachers there had also experienced, either themselves or as witnesses to their 
colleagues, instances in which student transfers or program requirements had rendered 
them unable to meet their objectives. At Thompson, teachers had yet to experience such 
conflicts firsthand, but were already able to identify potential complications that could 
arise due to their high student mobility and large proportion of English language learners, 
all of whom varied in the knowledge and skills with which they entered their classrooms.
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Partly as a result of these types of issues, teachers at McCoy (which had 
participated in the program two years longer than Thompson) had begun to develop a 
common definition of fairness in their practices around student learning objectives. 
Collaborating on those objectives represented not only continuity with their existing 
practices, but also a forum for establishing equity within grade-level teams. Teachers set 
identical objectives out of a sense of shared responsibility for all the students at their 
grade level. They thought of themselves as teams in which everyone shared the same 
responsibilities, and so should be held to the same expectations. Within that context, 
lowering performance targets from levels suggested by one’s student data was not 
thought of an attempt to “game the system” to earn rewards for oneself. It was thought of, 
instead, as a way to equalize opportunities across the team so that everyone could earn 
them.
Sensemaking and Sensegiving about Performance Pay in Hill ISD
The sensemaking framework used here was helpful in bringing to light differences 
between these groups of actors, and in understanding how the different views of these 
groups interacted in implementation of the program across levels of the system. Actors at 
each level - school, central office, and the Steering Committee - engaged in both 
sensemaking and sensegiving in their enactment of Hill ISD’s performance pay program. 
These processes were examined from both the “bottom up” and the “top down” to create 
a narrative of sensemaking throughout the system.
205
 This study of the implementation of performance pay at multiple levels of a 
district system was informed by and structured around theories of sensemaking. 
Sensemaking is the development of accounts of disruptive events that enable people to 
explain these events in coherent ways. When applied to policy implementation, it 
involves collaborative meaning construction based on familiar frameworks, gatekeeping 
to select certain policy messages in and leave others out, and the negotiation of technical 
and practical details so that constructed meanings of policies are translated into concrete 
actions (Coburn, 2001a). 
Sensegiving, the corollary to sensemaking, is the process of attempting to 
influence sensemaking toward a particular interpretation of an event (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991). It involves not only crafting and transmitting messages about an event 
(in this case, a pilot program), but also engaging in such activities as storytelling to 
communicate a vision, and structuring activities to guide behavior (Maitlis, 2006). 
In situations of complex change within institutions, these two processes, 
sensemaking and sensegiving, occur simultaneously as events unfold (Gioia, Thomas, 
Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994). In Hill ISD, policymakers were continually making sense of 
the program as they experimented with different requirements, but they were also 
responsible for communicating their vision to administrators and teachers in schools. 
School practitioners had to construct understandings of the program that fit within their 
practices and environments. Principals also played an especially important role as 
sensegivers to teachers.
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Both sensemaking and sensegiving about Hill ISD’s performance pay program 
began with the Steering Committee, which designed and oversaw the program. They 
viewed the program through the lens of broad systemic and cultural changes in education. 
These respondents framed the program with regard to their own backgrounds and 
interests, and focused on parts of the program that best fit those interpretations. Members 
held sometimes opposing views, though, about the program’s purposes and goals, 
resulting in different, and sometimes conflicting, expectations for its effects on teachers 
and teaching. They came to a weak consensus around instructional support, but the 
program they crafted addressed this narrowly and included other types of incentives as 
well. 
The program staff were also well placed to communicate their vision of the 
program. For their part, program staff understood the program almost entirely as an 
instructional support initiative, and de-emphasized the role of its financial incentives. 
Central office administrators were largely influenced by their direct work with teachers 
and school administrators and their goals of improving instructional practice throughout 
the district. 
The visions of these policymakers were communicated to teachers chiefly through 
the structure of the program itself - its components, incentives, and requirements - which 
reflected multiple goals and purposes. It subsequently relayed a somewhat incoherent 
message to teachers and school administrators about where their attention and efforts 
should be focused. Other than enacting the policy, the Steering Committee and the 
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program office engaged in little active sensegiving about the program. That is, they 
provided a great deal of information to principals and teachers, and strove to make 
themselves available to them. Yet, they did little to actively shape principals’ and 
teachers’ understandings of the program’s purposes and of their vision for changing 
instruction, focusing instead on providing information about program processes, 
requirements, and activities. 
The Steering Committee communicated with teachers only through formal means, 
such as brochures and web sites. Their most direct and extensive communication was 
with the Board of Trustees and other district stakeholders (such as the Chamber of 
Commerce Task Force on Compensation). For the most part, they relied on the program 
office to communicate messages to teachers and school administrators, who engaged in 
more frequent direct communication with teachers and school administrators. However, 
the program staff’s vision of broad instructional change was somewhat covert. 
Discussions of changing instructional practice or cultures of teaching were not visible in 
any materials provided to teachers, and no teacher or principal described the district’s 
goals for the program in terms similar to those used by the program staff and the Steering 
Committee.
In this context, principals emerged as key sensegivers for teachers. There were no 
other districtwide performance pay initiatives, and only a few similar differentiated 
compensation practices (such as bonuses for advanced degrees and National Board 
certification) to frame teachers’ interpretations of the program. The principals of both 
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schools framed the program around the school-wide goals they were already advancing. 
For the principal of McCoy, it was to increase the school’s accountability rating. The 
Thompson principal’s goal was to improve science achievement (as a means of increasing 
overall performance in the accountability system). The two principals crafted directives 
on implementing learning objectives (at McCoy, basing them on TAKS passing rates 
needed for higher ratings; at Thompson, setting one objective in science at all grade 
levels) to tailor the program to those school-wide goals. 
In this way, the principals were not only sensemakers in implementing the 
program, they also emerged as important sensegivers shaping teachers’ understandings of 
it. They were able to guide teachers’ activities in connection with the program, and could 
actively monitor their progress. As instructional leaders, they also had high degrees of 
perceived expertise and credibility among their teachers, characteristics necessary for 
effective sensegivers (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). Program staff, on the other hand, were 
not always perceived as credible experts by teachers, who sometimes questioned their 
guidance. 
 Teachers received all of these messages, to varying degrees, and engaged in their 
own sensemaking about what the program meant for their practices and their classrooms. 
Following the processes Coburn (2001a) described, they constructed meanings about the 
program based on existing school-wide goals, existing norms of collaboration, and the 
unique needs and characteristics of their students. 
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Teachers engaged in gatekeeping by focusing almost exclusively on the student 
learning objectives component. This component entailed the most direct engagement 
from teachers throughout the schools. Other parts of the program were simply not 
noticeable enough to be bracketed as distinct events that required interpretation (Weick, 
1995). These included both components with which few teachers engaged or were 
affected by (mentoring, Take One!®), and those that were so similar to existing priorities 
and norms that there was little to distinguish them (school-wide TAKS growth). The 
retention stipends occupied an interesting middle ground. These incentives were 
noticeable, but they largely validated preexisting values (that retaining teachers is 
important), and did not appear to dramatically shift teachers’ existing reasons for 
remaining at their schools (which were based primarily on working conditions). 
Finally, teachers negotiated technical and practical details by creating norms for 
developing student learning objectives. They also developed internal guidelines for 
specifying objectives that accounted for potential obstacles they identified based on their 
own experiences and contexts.
Fragmented Sensemaking in Hill ISD.
The result throughout the system was what Maitlis (2006) characterized as 
fragmented sensemaking, in which sensegiving is characterized by low animation but 
high control, and sensemaking is characterized by the production of multiple, narrow 
accounts of events. Recall that sensegiving is not about dissemination of messages, but 
about shaping and influencing sensemaking. Thus, animation refers to a continuous, 
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intense flow of information about how implementers should interpret and understand 
events. Control refers to communication from sensegivers that is organized, systematic, 
and private (i.e., takes place in private settings rather than in open forums). 
The Steering Committee held a key sensegiving position as the lead policymaking 
group overseeing the program. They communicated their vision most directly to the 
program office, and engaged in little direct communication with teachers and school 
administrators. At the same time, they provided little thorough information to program 
staff about program goals and intentions. The program staff similarly held a potentially 
important sensegiving role as intermediaries between the Steering Committee and the 
schools. Yet, perhaps because of their own limited understanding of the program’s 
complex goals, they also engaged in little active shaping of school administrators’ and 
teachers’ sensemaking about the program. Most of the information they provided to 
teachers and school administrators dealt with procedural and regulatory information. 
They expressed frustration that school practitioners did not seem to fully understand the 
instructional changes they were seeking, but they also engaged in little animated 
sensegiving to this effect.
Thus, the program’s structure, requirements, and processes came to constitute the 
primary means of sensegiving to teachers. Teachers focused on the aspects of the 
program that were most relevant for them given their contexts, producing multiple 
accounts of the program’s purpose and goals. These accounts tended to be loosely defined 
(“improving low-performing schools”) and included narrow descriptions of the processes 
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through which the program would achieve its goals. Teachers also became highly reactive 
to the program’s structure and changes in program requirements. The Steering 
Committee’s experimentation with the D2 assessments, for example, relayed messages 
about program intentions that may have been unintended, but resulted in negative 
perceptions of the program among some teachers.
Implications for Policy Implementation
 Fragmented sensemaking frequently leads to inconsistent implementation since 
actions are based not on a coherent, collective understanding of a policy’s vision, but on 
“idiosyncratic interpretations of events,” (Maitlis 2006 p. 39). In this case, the principals 
at McCoy and Thompson developed their own understandings of Hill ISD’s performance 
pay program and adapted it to the needs and interests of their schools. Such adaptations 
of policies to school contexts may be problematic from the perspective of policymakers, 
especially those enacting reforms meant to transform school cultures and practices. For 
schools, though, adaptation is not only beneficial with regard to making new policies and 
programs relevant and effective for their unique contexts (McLaughlin, 1987), but is 
necessary to maintain coherence (Honig & Hatch, 2004).
Sensemaking of new policies and programs undergirds policy adaptation by 
providing the means for school practitioners to create their own understandings of them 
that guide the ways in which they act on and integrate new policies and programs into 
their contexts. Yet, the findings from this study suggest the reverse, that policy adaptation 
also guides sensemaking. The principals and teachers at McCoy and Thompson had very 
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little time (about a week) to decide to participate in the performance pay program and to 
begin implementation of it. They had to begin acting on the program before they were 
able to construct thorough understandings of it. They instead constructed meanings about 
the program “on the fly,” as they quickly developed ways to integrate it into their existing 
practices. These meanings, as well as the ways they worked with the program, changed 
somewhat as they gained experience with it and had opportunities to reflect on it. 
Such time constraints can be an important factor in policy implementation, as 
school practitioners (as well as state and district administrators, in the case of federal and 
state policies) often must act on new initiatives very quickly to meet funding deadlines 
and requirements. In such cases, implementers have limited time to study new programs 
and develop understandings of them to guide their implementation. Instead, they turn to 
familiar frameworks and similar practices that enable them to respond rapidly. The risk in 
requiring such rapid responses is that school practitioners will focus on the superficial, 
easily understood aspects of a policy that can be quickly incorporated into existing 
practices rather than taking time to understand the core principals that underlie the policy 
(Cohen, 1990; Spillane, et al., 2002). 
The findings here also suggest that sensemaking, and the implementation of 
policy that accompanies it, are influenced by the amount of attention implementers are 
able to devote to it. Teachers’ attention to Hill ISD’s performance pay program was 
driven not only by the salience and visibility of the program, but also by the number of 
other initiatives and pressures demanding their attention. Where the sensemaking of 
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teachers and principals about the program seemed to differ most from that of program 
staff and the Steering Committee respondents was in the extent to which each group was 
able to engage with the program. That is, the program staff and Program Director worked 
full time on the program. The Teachers Association President was highly invested in the 
success of the program. All of these actors had both the time and the wherewithal to 
devote significant time and attention to the program, much more so than teachers and 
school administrators, who had many other priorities and demands for their attention. 
Thus, they developed interpretations of the program’s purpose and theory of action that 
were more sophisticated than those of the teachers and school administrators. They were 
able to do so, in part, because the program was their top priority rather than just one of 
many. Insofar as policy implementation is a process of learning that is developed through 
ongoing participation and negotiation of meanings (Coburn & Stein, 2006; Spillane, et 
al., 2006), the differences in time and attention that actors at different levels of the system 
are able to dedicate to that process will result in different understandings and expectations 
of new policy initiatives.
 Co-Construction of Policy.
The findings here demonstrate as well that it is not only school practitioners who 
adapt policies. At each level, individuals make sense of policies based on their roles in 
implementation and the contexts in which they work. All of these meanings come into 
play as policymakers, intermediaries, and school practitioners incorporate policies into 
their own goals and practices. This was clearly seen in the multiple goals for performance 
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pay that were voiced by members of the Steering Committee and the district central 
office. 
Datnow (2006) describes this kind of policy interpretation at different levels of 
the system as multidirectional, with multiple interpretations of policies taking place at 
different levels in the system simultaneously. When levels are tightly connected, the 
different ways of interpreting and acting on a policy, and the different expectations that 
are developed at each level, can lead to more comprehensive and nuanced understandings 
of the policy. However, when levels are loosely connected, they can also result in mixed 
messages, covert intentions, and lack of clarity about the policy’s vision. 
With little guidance to their sensemaking about Hill ISD’s performance pay 
program, teachers at McCoy, like those at Thompson, were initially enthusiastic about the 
program, but their enthusiasm waned somewhat as they experienced outcomes and 
situations they perceived as unfair. Program staff, who viewed the program across 
schools rather than in connection with any particular school or classroom context, were 
frustrated by what they perceived as a lack of commitment and capacity among teachers 
and school administrators. They demonstrated little inclination to alter program 
components, requirements, or processes in response to schools’ adaptations, focusing 
instead on providing more support to principals and teachers to enable them to implement 
the program with greater fidelity.
The Steering Committee, surprisingly, was more responsive to the frustrations of 
school practitioners, even though they communicated this in a somewhat removed way. 
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Since the program was being implemented as a pilot, they had the flexibility to introduce 
and eliminate activities as they wished. When the D2 assessments were met with 
opposition from teachers, for example, the committee eliminated them after only one 
year. However, their reasoning for implementing the assessments in the first place was 
not understood and confused some teachers. Likewise, their elimination was appreciated, 
but was not understood, creating even more confusion and even suspicion.
In loosely coupled school systems, such conflicts over meaning and confusion 
about intentions is endemic (Weick, 1976). In this environment, policymakers could 
benefit from engaging in what Maitlis (2006) referred to as guided sensemaking. In this 
form of sensemaking, sensegiving is animated and controlled. Policymakers actively 
engage diverse stakeholders in an organized, systematic manner to lead stakeholders in 
developing accounts of problems, policies, or events that are unitary and rich. This type 
of sensemaking leads to emergent series of actions that are consistent over time, rather 
than inconsistent, episodic actions. On its face, it appeared that the Steering Committee 
and the Task Force on Teacher Compensation and Support engaged in this type of 
sensegiving. They included different groups of stakeholders, including teachers. They 
engaged in extensive deliberation before and after implementing the program. However, 
their activities were restricted, and included few stakeholders other than those on each of 
the committees. Furthermore, there was little change in the individuals sitting on the 
committees over time. While this undoubtedly led to internal consistency in their own 
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sensemaking, it afforded them few opportunities to incorporate new perspectives into 
their decision making or to build knowledge of the program outside of these committees.
 Policymakers could also be well served to tighten connections with principals.  
While it may not always be realistic for policymakers to expect to be able to completely 
control policy implementation in schools through sensegiving, principals are well 
positioned to do so. They serve an important gatekeeping function, providing 
interpretations of new demands to teachers and bridging or buffering their students and 
staff from external demands (Honig & Hatch, 2004). Insofar as policymakers can engage 
principals and help them craft understandings of new programs and policies that are 
consistent with their visions, they may be able to build more consistent implementation 
across schools. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that even though 
adaptation may make initiatives difficult to manage beyond the school level, 
sustainability of improvements depends on their integration into school-wide practices 
and structures (Coburn, 2003; Elmore, 1996).
 Implications for Performance Pay Policies
The experiences of the teachers, school administrators, district administrators, and 
policymakers studied here suggest a number of implications for the implementation and 
design of performance pay policies. First, performance pay policies are not unique in the 
way they are received and implemented in schools. The financial incentives on which 
performance pay hinges and its emphasis on human capital strategies distinguish it from 
other reforms that emphasize structural and organizational changes within schools and 
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school systems. It is also a relatively new idea for teachers, principals, and district 
administrators to understand. However, the findings from this study suggest that it is 
received by school practitioners in much the same way as other school-wide reforms have 
been. That is, performance pay programs can be expected to be adapted, co-opted, and 
selectively attended to in order to fit within the contexts in which they are implemented. 
Such outcomes have been found with a variety of initiatives, from standards-based 
accountability systems (Louis, et al., 2005), to whole school reforms (Berends, et al., 
2005; Corcoran & Christman, 2002; Amanda Datnow, 2006) to curricular reforms 
(Coburn, 2001a; Cohen & Hill, 2000; A. Datnow, Borman, & Stringfield, 2000). 
Comprehensive performance-based compensation programs such as Hill ISD’s are 
premised on similar types of incentives and supports, so we can expect to encounter the 
same types of implementation behaviors. 
Second, performance pay is but one of many influences on teachers’ and school 
administrators’ time and attention. School practitioners contend with a multitude of 
demands and priorities on a daily basis, from student needs, to curriculum requirements, 
to instructional planning (not to mention instructing students). New initiatives must be 
highly noticeable to break through the noise in schools (Amanda Datnow, 2006) The 
extent to which performance pay is able to become salient in teachers’ minds on a regular 
basis may dictate how much of an influence it will have on practice and how much 
change it will ultimately initiate. Thus, performance pay policies must compete with 
other initiatives and demands for teachers’ and school administrators’ attention.
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It is especially difficult for new initiatives to compete with accountability 
demands (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Amanda Datnow, 2006). It was not always clear to 
policymakers in Hill ISD when there may have been a conflict of interest between the 
new performance pay initiative and an accountability system that was so embedded in 
practice that it was almost taken for granted. Given the enormous influence held by 
TAKS and the state accountability system on nearly every aspect of public schooling in 
Texas (and the school sanctions that accompanied poor accountability ratings), it was 
understandable that teachers would make it a top priority. Yet, the willingness of some 
teachers to set aside goals for which they would be directly financially rewarded in favor 
of meeting accountability demands that offered no financial rewards for them was 
noteworthy. 
Third, the findings from Hill ISD suggest that, as has been found in other 
research, financial incentives alone may not be sufficient to change teachers’ instructional 
practices or improve student outcomes (Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010). Although all the 
teachers interviewed commented that they hoped to gain financial rewards from 
participating in the program, they reported few significant changes to their instruction as 
a result of it. The changes they did report were either limited in scope (e.g., devoting 
more instructional time to a topic), or were set aside when accountability pressures forced 
their attention away from content not directly relevant to TAKS. Teachers had a similar 
relationship to the program’s incentives for retention, which were viewed as “pats on the 
back,” and not as drivers of their behaviors. 
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These findings contrast somewhat with the economic model of performance pay 
(see Figure 3.1), which suggests that financial rewards are directly connected to 
behaviors. While the program’s financial rewards did influence teachers’ instruction in 
some ways, those responses were attenuated by existing practices in their schools and 
other demands. The rewards themselves also provided little guidance as to how they 
should alter their behaviors, even as they provided more guidance about outcomes for 
which they should strive. Thus, the tight connections between incentives and behaviors 
posited in the model are actually more akin to a set of loose couplings that can be 
mediated by a number of sources.
The findings do not suggest, though, that teachers’ seemingly indifferent 
responses to the program’s incentives resulted from resistance to performance pay. To the 
contrary, all the teachers interviewed were enthusiastic about the program, at least 
initially, and only two commented that they did not support the idea of performance-
based compensation. They also do not indicate that teachers were incapable of setting and 
following through with goals, as one of the program administrators suggested. Teachers 
seemed to understand how their performance pay goals fit in with their instructional 
programs. Those goals, though, simply were not powerful enough to provoke substantial 
changes to their instruction, and there were too many other priorities that were deemed 
more important for the changes that did occur to be sustained. 
In contrast to the assumptions of the program staff and the Business 
Representative about teachers’ abilities to follow goals, the teachers’ behaviors suggested 
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that they were quite rational and deliberate in their decision making. Given goals that 
prompted limited responses and faced with more pressing demands, they chose to 
prioritize accountability goals and other instructional needs over the performance pay 
program. It is likewise important to note that teachers’ lukewarm responses to the 
retention incentives were not a result of disinterest in compensation. In focus groups, 
teachers demonstrated that they understood and attended to the intricacies of 
compensation structures in Hill ISD and its surrounding districts. Money mattered to 
them. It just was not the only, or even the most important, consideration. 
Lastly, the concern that individualized incentives will undermine teacher 
collaboration was unsupported by the study. These data demonstrated exactly the 
opposite: individualized incentives were subsumed by collaboration among teachers. The 
student learning objectives were, in practice, team awards, as teachers at each grade-level 
set identical objectives. They were also, less directly, school awards since the principals 
made sure that every teacher’s learning objectives aligned with school-wide goals. This 
enhanced coherence at the school level, but undermined the program’s intention of 
individualizing compensation. 
An important caveat to these findings should be noted here. Hill ISD’s program 
was operating as a pilot. Schools were selected to participate, in part, based on having 
strong leadership to shepherd the program. It is likely that these schools had more 
structures and norms in place that promoted instructional coherence and staff cohesion 
(Bryk, et al., 2010; Newmann, Smith, Allensworth, & Bryk, 2001). This seemed to be the 
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case at both McCoy and Thompson, where collaboration was a norm. Teachers in schools 
with less cohesion and fewer collaborative practices could very well respond differently 
to individualized incentives.
Implications for the Design of Performance Pay Policies.
Performance pay plans such as the one implemented in Hill ISD contain 
numerous components that combine incentives and rewards for performance with 
supports. The Hill ISD program included mentoring and professional development along 
with incentives for performance (both individual and school-wide) and recruitment and 
retention in high-needs schools. These types of plans draw on theories of human capital 
that promote comprehensive approaches to compensation that are aligned with systems 
for recruiting, retaining, and developing talent (Milanowski, 2008b). 
This study indicates that a potential downfall of these types of programs is that 
they can become “blank slates” onto which everyone involved can assign their own goals 
and purposes. This can result in incoherence if resources and attention are not managed 
and focused well. Policymakers can mitigate this by developing clear ideas of how each 
component of a performance pay program addresses its larger goals and by making sure 
that each component is powerful enough to affect the changes they seek. In Hill ISD’s 
program, the student learning objectives did not appear powerful enough to induce 
significant instructional improvements. Likewise, so few teachers participated in the Take 
One!® professional development component that it had little significance in these schools. 
It was also not clear how this particular component aligned with the other components in 
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the program. It was not tied to the mentoring component, and was not aligned with either 
of the performance incentives. It seemed to be operating largely independent of the rest of 
the program, which likely contributed to its diluted effect.
Human capital theories also suggest that strategies to build and sustain strong 
teacher workforces should be embedded throughout school systems (Milanowski, 2008b). 
The Hill ISD program, however, functioned independently from other human resource, 
instructional, and professional development programs in the district. As a pilot, it was 
being developed and tested for potential use throughout the district. The extent to which 
other related functions in the district, such as teacher recruitment and base compensation, 
could be changed to fit the program, though, was unclear. Layering this type of 
performance pay program on top of other practices that may or may not be aligned with it 
could lessen its potential to create change. On the other hand, greater alignment with 
other compensation and teacher development functions in the district could make Hill 
ISD’s program more powerful and influential to teachers’ work.
As discussed earlier, the individualized incentives in the Hill ISD performance 
pay program were subsumed by cultures of teacher collaboration. Considering the 
emphasis on, and encouragement of, whole school collaboration in many school 
improvement initiatives and its association with improved school performance (Bryk, et 
al., 2010), it may be more effective to build on collaborative professional communities in 
place in schools by using team-based incentives and awards. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, school-based performance awards have been implemented with mixed results on 
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teachers’ practices. Team-based awards that apply to grade levels, departments, or other 
organizational subgroups have been used less. The findings from this study, as well as 
other research (e.g., Little, 1995), indicate that these subgroups may hold greater meaning 
and relevance for teachers than schools as a whole or their individual classrooms. 
Building on this culture could enable performance incentives to carry greater meaning for 
teachers while also enabling school administrators to use them to address grade-level 
weaknesses and needs.
This study also suggests that designers of performance pay policies should pay 
close attention to ways in which incentives and activities within these programs may be 
perceived as unfair. Most of the concerns about fairness voiced by the teachers in this 
study arose not from the attachment of financial rewards to performance or perceptions 
that teachers were being rewarded unjustly. Instead, they emanated from the details of 
how performance objectives were created and performance evaluated. The student 
learning objectives, which were meant to empower teachers to develop and pursue goals 
meaningful to their instruction, were, in practice, rife with possibilities for teachers to fail 
due to factors seemingly beyond their control. Teachers complained that being assigned 
too many “low” students, or too many students with language barriers could interfere 
with their ability to meet expectations. They also came to realize that student mobility 
could be a hindrance if they received new students midyear who they would have less 
time to prepare, or if high-performing students left their classrooms. All of these 
situations could (and did) cause teachers to fail to meet their goals by small margins. 
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While it may seem that these teachers should have disregarded these issues and 
focused instead on improving their instruction, such a suggestion ignores the validity and 
implications of their concerns. The highly specified and narrowly tailored nature of the 
student learning objectives made them relevant to only small parts of teachers’ 
instruction, rather than the broader goals of the schools. Yet, they were prompting 
teachers at McCoy and Thompson to pay more attention to student assignments and 
mobility because those factors could impede their attainment of those rewards. In this 
way, their attention was being diverted from the larger goals of the program, improved 
instruction and student learning, to the performance measure of meeting the specific 
instructional goal. Baker (2002) notes that this diversion of attention away from “true 
objectives” leads to goal distortion, focusing on objectives that have little influence on an 
organization’s primary goals and mission. To the extent that the goals incentivized by 
performance pay policies have, or are perceived to have, limited relevance for school-
wide and systemic goals, they can divert teachers’ attention away from those more 
important aims of education. 
Goal distortion could also result in teachers seeking to avoid teaching students 
who could make it difficult for them to achieve their performance goals. Teachers at both 
McCoy and Thompson described ways in which the students assigned to them could 
prevent them from earning financial rewards. This was especially notable at Thompson, 
where teachers had yet to complete their first year in the program and begin earning 
rewards. They were already beginning to note these kinds of conflicts. Even more notable 
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was the fact that the students they referred to were those with language barriers, low prior 
achievement, and high mobility. Given that improving schools serving these very types of 
students was a focus of Hill ISD’s performance pay program, policymakers should pay 
close attention to this possibility.
 Finally, policymakers should attend to issues of competition, even though 
surveys of teachers suggest that this is not a problem in many performance pay plans 
(Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010; Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, 
Gronberg, Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Patterson, et al., 2008). This study suggests that even 
performance pay programs in which incentives are available to everyone can result in 
comparisons, if not outright competition, among teachers. Resentment or competition did 
not appear to be a problem in either school. However, a few teachers at McCoy noted that 
they felt some embarrassment when they did not meet their goals. The receipt of 
performance rewards seemed to them to label teachers who received them as “good 
teachers,” while those who did meet their goals were, by default labeled “bad teachers.” 
Such labeling, even if unspoken, could lead to resentment if those labels come to be 
viewed as inaccurate or lose their credibility. While this finding was not a prominent 
feature of either school’s experience with Hill ISD’s performance pay program, it is 




The findings from this research have implications for research on both policy 
implementation broadly, and implementation of performance pay policies specifically. 
For policy implementation, they bring to light several ways in which research could be 
expanded and refined. First, this study illuminates the need for more cross-level research 
on the implementation of policies. Policy implementation studies, particularly those 
utilizing cognitive frameworks, often focus intensely on the experiences of one group, 
such as teachers (e.g., Ingram, et al., 2004; e.g., Louis, et al., 2005), or the interactions 
between two closely connected groups, such as teachers and various non-system actors 
(e.g., Coburn, 2005), in order to deeply examine the complex processes of meaning 
making that transpire. 
However, the creation and enactment of policies more typically occur between 
multiple groups of actors across system levels. The actions taken at one level can often 
greatly influence those that occur at others (Amanda Datnow, 2006; Honig, 2006a). 
Policymakers, of course, are influential actors as instigators, designers, and enactors of 
policies. Yet, their role as active participants in the implementation of policy, particularly 
in connection with the actions of school-level practitioners, is not well understood. 
Often, policymakers have little interaction with practitioners, which leads to 
assumptions embedded in many implementation research designs that policies follow 
along pathways, from policymaker down to the practitioner (McLaughlin, 2006). This 
leads policymakers to be viewed as mere providers of policies or treated as context to the 
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implementation actions of others. However, they can play active roles as sensegivers in 
shaping the sensemaking of actors at multiple levels. Their meaning making about 
policies is also critical to understanding how policies are designed and introduced into 
school systems, which, as this study demonstrates, can be a powerful mechanism for 
sensegiving itself.
Second, the findings from this study similarly demonstrate the need for 
researchers to pay closer attention to the unique roles principals play in policy 
implementation. Principals often act as key intermediaries between teachers and 
policymakers enacting reforms by focusing attention and resources on new initiatives, as 
well as buffering their schools from initiatives that could interfere with existing practices 
(Bryk, et al., 2010; Honig & Hatch, 2004). The findings here expand on this research by 
clarifying that principals further act as critical sensegivers for teachers by providing them 
with frameworks for understanding and acting on ambiguous policies. They are 
particularly well positioned for this role, having credibility, authority, and intimate 
knowledge of teachers’ practices and immediate instructional environments (Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007).
Regarding research on performance pay, these findings point to the value of 
implementation studies that focus on the processes of implementation itself, rather than 
viewing it primarily as a means to explain findings on outcomes. As cognitive theories of 
policy implementation suggest, implementation is a complex process of organizational 
and group learning that varies over time and across contexts (Coburn & Stein, 2006; 
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Honig, 2006a). Viewed from this perspective, performance pay is not simply a new 
variable introduced into schools, but becomes part of the context in which teachers work. 
Because performance pay does not (typically) directly affect teaching practices, as do 
curricular initiatives or instructional programs, it is especially difficult to disentangle it 
from the myriad peripheral influences on teachers’ work. Understanding the ways in 
which teachers respond to and act on this kind of indirect policy tool can give 
policymakers a more thorough picture of how these initiatives might be received in 
different environments, as well as what kinds of outcomes they might reasonably expect 
from them. 
Finally, in order to develop rich understandings of how performance pay policies 
might influence teachers and change their practices, researchers and policymakers need 
rich data on their implementation. Many studies of performance pay have included 
implementation data derived from surveys of teachers that are intended to be used 
primarily to identify variables associated with successful outcomes (e.g., Jacob & 
Springer, 2008; e.g., Springer, Podgursky, Lewis, Ehlert, Ghosh-Dastidar, Gronberg, 
Hamilton, Jansen, Lopez, Patterson, et al., 2008). Unfortunately, these data are not always 
successful in explaining surprising or counterintuitive findings because they are unable to 
illuminate complex processes that result in unexpected behaviors. While generalizable 
data may continue to be necessary in research on performance pay as policymakers and 
researchers evaluate its effects and potential to induce significant and lasting changes in 
education, qualitative and historical data that are less generalizable, but perhaps better 
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suited to uncovering complex processes of implementation should play a greater role in 
this research as well.
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Appendix A: Interview and Focus Group Protocols
Teacher Focus Group Protocol
Teachers were asked to complete the Teacher Focus Group Information 
Questionnaire prior to the focus group.  
I’d like to start by talking about how your school started participating in the [program 
name] program. 
• What do you remember about how the teachers here first learned about the program?
• What processes did you go through to decide to participate? (if needed, probe about 
meetings, votes, presentations by district)
• What did teachers in this school hope to gain by participating in [program name]? 
The [program name] program has several components (name if necessary). What are the 
most relevant components or activities for this school? Why?
How have you learned about the activities and requirements involved with [program 
name]? (Ask for an example.)
• What have been the most valuable sources of information?
What ways, if any, do teachers here work together that didn’t happen before the program 
began? (E.g., looking at student data together, doing professional development work 
together)
How would you describe the district’s goals for the [program name] program?
• How do you think the program is supposed to achieve those goals?
• How do those goals fit with the goals you have as a school?
For respondents in veteran schools:
• What changes, if any, have you noticed in the goals you set as a school since you 
started participating in [program name]?
What do you like best about [program name]? What do you like least?
What would you change about [program name]?
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Teacher Focus Group Information Questionnaire
How long have you been a teacher?




□ More than 20 years
How long have you been a teacher in Austin ISD?




□ More than 20 years
How long have you been a teacher in this school?




□ More than 20 years
Do you have other formal role(s) in this school or in the district other than classroom 
teacher? (E.g., instructional specialist, mentor teacher)
□ No
□ Yes – Please describe: 
          
What student populations do you teach this year?
□ Special education
□ English language learners
□ Gifted and talented
□ General instruction
What grade(s) do you teach this year?      
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Teacher Interview Protocol
I’d like to start by talking about your background in teaching. 
• How did you get into teaching? (What made you decide to become a teacher?)
Now I’d like to talk about your school. How would you describe this school?
• What was it about this school that made you want to teach here?
I’d like to talk about your work as a teacher. 
• What is most important to you about your work as a teacher?
• When do you feel most effective as a teacher?
 
Now I’d like to talk about your experiences with the [program name] program. 
• What about the program is most relevant to you, personally?
For respondents in veteran schools:
• Let me ask you to think about any changes you’ve made as a result of participating 
in [program name]. What, if anything, do you do now, in terms of your teaching 
and your professional activities, that you didn’t do before the program began?
• How, if at all, have you changed the goals you have for your students since starting 
participation in [program name]
For respondents in new schools:
• Your school is just beginning participation in [program name] this year, so I 
understand that the program is still new. But what, if anything, have you started 
doing differently in terms of your teaching and your professional activities, that you 
didn’t do before this year?
• How, if at all, have you started to think differently about the goals you have for 
your students this year?
What else has influenced those changes, or the way you teach?
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Now I’d like to talk about your career plans. When you first started teaching, how long 
did you expect to be in the classroom? (If new teacher: As of now, how long do you plan 
on teaching?)
(Probe on other career plans, if mentioned.)
When you first came to this school, how long did you expect to be here? (If new to 
school: As of now, how long do you plan on teaching at this school?)
(Probe on other school plans, if mentioned.)
How have those plans changed, if at all, since you started participating in [program 
name]?




I’d like to start by talking about your background. 
• How long have you been a principal? 
• How long did you teach before becoming a principal? 
• What fields have you worked in other than education?
Now I’d like to talk about your school. 
• How would you describe this school?
• What was it about this school that made you want to be the principal here?
I’d like to start by talking about how your school started participating in the [program 
name] program. 
• What do you remember about how you first learned about the program?
• What interested you about [program name]?
• How did you go about introducing the idea of participating in [program name] to your 
teachers?
• What did you hope to gain for the school by participating in [program name]?
The [program name] program has several components. What are the most relevant 
components or activities for this school? Why?
How have you learned about the activities and requirements involved with [program 
name]? (Ask for an example.)
• What have been the most valuable sources of information?
How has the way you work with teachers changed, if at all, since starting participation in 
[program name]? 
How would you describe the district’s goals for the [program name] program?
How do you think the program is supposed to achieve those goals?
How do those goals fit with the goals you have as a school?
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For respondents in veteran schools: What changes, if any, have you noticed in the goals 
you set as a school since you started participating in [program name]?
For respondents in new schools: How, if at all, have you started to think differently about 
school goals?
What have been the biggest benefits to participating in [program name]?
What have been the biggest challenges to participating in [program name]?
Is there anything else about your school’s experiences with [program name] that you’d 
like to add?
237
Steering Committee Member Interview Protocol
I’d like to start by talking about your background. Tell me about what you do.
• For business representative: How did you get involved in education?
• How did you get involved with the Steering Committee?
I’d like to talk some about the background of the Steering Committee. 
• How did the steering committee get started?
• What are the main responsibilities, currently, of the Steering Committee?
• How has the role of the Steering Committee changed since it was created?
Now I’d like to talk about the program itself. 
• How would you describe the goals of the program? (If not yet addressed, ask how the 
program got started.)
• How have those goals changed, if at all?
• How do those goals fit in with other goals in the district?
• What, in your opinion, does the district hope to gain with [program name]?
• What does your organization hope to gain?
Now I’d like to talk about implementation of the program. How would you characterize 
teachers’ experiences with [program name]?
How does your organization communicate with teachers, if at all, about [program name]? 
(May not be applicable to business representative.)
• What messages do you hope to convey to teachers about the program?
What would you say have been some of the greatest successes so far?
What would you say have been some of the biggest challenges so far?
How would you like to see [program name] develop in the future?
Is there anything else about your experiences with [program name] that you’d like to 
add?
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District Central Office Staff Focus Group Protocol
I’d like to start by talking about the work you do here. How would you describe that?
• What are your main responsibilities?
• What do you know about how your positions in this office came about? 
Now I’d like to talk about the pilot schools you work with on implementing [program 
name]. 
• How would you characterize teachers’ experiences with [program name]?
• What are some of the differences you’ve seen in the way schools are engaged in the 
program? What do attribute those differences to?
• What are some of the biggest challenges schools have faced in implementing [program 
name]?
What has been helpful to schools in working with the program?
What are some of the biggest challenges you’ve faced in working with pilot schools?
What has been helpful to you in working with pilot schools?
What are the most important messages you try to convey to teachers as you work with 
them?
What kinds of feedback have you gotten from teachers about the program?
Now I’d like to talk about the big picture of the program. 
• How would you describe the goals of [program name]?
• What, in your opinion, does the district hope to gain with [program name]?
What do you see as some of the biggest successes of the program?
What would you change about [program name]?
Is there anything else about your school’s experiences with [program name] that you’d 
like to add?
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Appendix B: Interview Coding Scheme with Frequencies by Case














Alignment with Other 
Programs 0 2 1 0 3
Conflict with 
Accountability Goals 0 2 4 4 10
Fairness 0 0 7 3 10
Fit with Current School 
Culture 0 0 0 2 2
Measuring Program 
Outcomes 3 0 0 0 3
Principal Buy In and 
Support 0 2 0 0 2
Principal Capacity to 
Implement 0 2 0 0 2
Program Funding 2 0 0 0 2
Setting Achievable Goals 0 0 3 2 5
Setting Student Sample 0 0 2 0 2
Student Backgrounds 0 0 2 3 5
Systemic Capacity to 
Implement 0 2 0 0 2
Teacher Buy-In and 
Support 3 2 0 0 5
Teacher Capacity to 
Implement 1 1 0 0 2
Time 0 0 2 1 3
Writing and Entering 
Goals 1 0 0 1 2
Total 10 13 21 16 60
Decision to Transfer 0 0 2 1 3
Instructional Practice 0 0 3 6 9
Total 0 0 5 7 12
Communication 1 2 1 4 8
Competition 0 0 2 4 6
Focus on Student 
Achievement 0 0 0 0 0
Gaming 0 2 1 0 3
Recognition 1 0 1 0 2
Teacher Turnover 0 0 1 1 2
Total 1 2 5 5 13
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Award for Effort 0 0 0 1 1
Combat Pay 0 0 1 1 2
High Quality Teachers 0 0 0 1 1
Team Coherence 0 1 1 1 3
Total 0 1 2 4 7
Decision to Participate 1 0 6 1 8
Introduction to Program 0 0 5 3 8
Prior Experiences with 
Performance Pay 0 0 0 2 2
Total 1 0 11 6 18
Assessment 2 0 2 1 5
Collaboration 0 1 3 7 11
Data Use 1 0 0 1 2
Focus on Student 
Achievement 0 0 2 0 2
Goal Setting 1 3 5 7 16
Total 4 4 12 16 36
Central Office 1 1 0 0 2
District Goals 2 1 1 3 7
Outside Perceptions 2 1 0 0 3
School Context 0 2 5 6 13
Teachers Association 2 0 0 0 2
Total 7 5 6 9 27
Program History 3 3 0 0 6
Attracting High Quality 
Teachers 1 0 0 0 1
Changing Educational 
Practice 9 0 1 0 10
Improving Low Performing 
Schools 0 0 2 1 3
Improving Student 
Outcomes 1 0 2 1 4
Improving Teacher Quality 1 0 0 0 1
Increasing Teacher 
Compensation 2 0 0 0 2
Instructional Support 2 4 0 0 6
Retaining Teachers 1 0 1 3 5
Rewarding Excellence 0 3 0 0 3
Total 17 7 6 5 35
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Mentoring 2 1 4 2 9
Requirements and 
Processes 0 0 2 5 7
Steering Committee 
Purpose 3 0 0 0 3
Support 0 4 3 6 13
Take One!® 0 1 2 3 6
Total 5 5 9 13 32
Changing Instructional 
Practice 0 6 1 0 7
Retaining Teachers 0 1 1 0 2
Rewarding Effort 0 0 1 1 2
Rewarding Excellence 1 2 0 0 3
Supporting Current 
Instructional Practice 1 0 1 1 3
Team Building 0 0 0 1 1
Total 2 9 4 3 18
Financial Reward 0 2 4 5 11
Improve Achievement 0 0 2 0 2
Instructional Support 0 0 1 4 5
Support Current Practices 0 0 2 3 5
Teacher Retention 0 0 0 3 3
Total 0 2 9 15 26
51 53 91 103 298
Note. Occurrences of codes can apply to comments or exchanges of any length within an interview 
transcript. Codes were not applied to documents or data other than interviews with study participants.
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Appendix C: Hill ISD Strategic Plan Teacher Quality Priority and Strategies
Recommendation from Strategic Planning Panel on Priorities, Goals, and 
Performance Indicators to Hill ISD Superintendent
PRIORITY 4
Recruit, develop, and retain highly effective teachers and administrators.
Strategies
4.1 Develop and implement a comprehensive, long-range plan to provide greater 
supports and incentives to teachers, principals, and staff, and encourage highly 
effective teachers to continue service in our highest need schools.
4.2 Encourage continued enhancements to professional development, particularly in 
providing training that meets the specific needs, experience, and job 
descriptions of teachers and staff, and in providing internal career and 
leadership development.
4.3 Improve internal communications to ensure that all interactions between staff 
are characterized by mutual respect and dignity.
4.4  Ensure the campus reconstitution process does not result in loss of highly 
effective staff to other districts, other professions, or early retirement.
4.5 Achieve greater diversity in the district workforce through both recruitment and 
retention efforts.
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Recommendation from Hill ISD Superintendent to Hill ISD Board of Trustees (text 
included in approved Strategic Plan)
PRIORITY 4
Staff
Recruit, develop, retain, and reward highly effective teachers and administrators.
Policy Alignments
EL-4 (Staff Treatment) 
EL-5 (Staff Compensation)
4.1 Develop and implement a comprehensive, long-range plan to provide greater 
supports and incentives, including compensation, to teachers, principals, and 
staff, and encourage highly effective teachers to continue service in our highest 
need schools.
4.2  Encourage continued enhancements to professional development, particularly in 
providing training that meets the specific needs, experience, and job 
descriptions of teachers and staff, and in providing internal career and 
leadership development.
4.3  Improve internal communications to ensure that all interactions between staff 
are characterized by mutual respect and dignity.
4.4 Ensure the campus reconstitution process does not result in loss of highly 
effective staff to other districts, other professions, or early retirement.
4.5  Achieve greater diversity in the district workforce through both recruitment and 
retention efforts.
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Appendix D: Consultation Agreement between                                 
Teachers Association and Hill ISD Administration
FY 2006-2007
1. Increase salary schedules 7.5% 
2. Continue Health Insurance Funding (1.5%) ($5,900,000) 
3. Add 8 Parent Support Specialists ($347,224) 
4. Increase New Teacher Academy Daily Rate to $90.00 per day* ($160,000) 
5. Agree on Payment for Required Training Outside of Work Year Only 
6. Continue to work on Biweekly Direct Deposit proposal 
7. Withdraw Bilingual Stipends for Classified Employees proposal 
8. Withdraw Police Officer Contract proposal 
9. Dedicate remaining funds to Fund Balance in FY 2006-2007; and 
10. Support Board's authorization of available 4 cent in local M & O tax rate for 
2006-2007 which will be dedicated for enhancing Fund Balance in 2006-2007 
FY 2007-2008
(Premised on Retaining 4 cents Authorization) 
1. Increase salary schedules 3% with 1% additional for Teacher Incentive Pay/with 
contingency for 4% increase for salary schedules with 1% for Teacher Incentive Pay. 
(See #17) 
2. Health Insurance Funding (1.5%) ($5,900,000) 
3. Increase Bilingual Stipend to $2500 ($335,000) 
4. Fund Art, Music and P.E. at 7.5 staffing level (30.5 FTE/$1,442,711) 
5. Dedicate 3 cents of 4 cents to employee compensation in FY 07-08 
6. Dedicate 1 cent of 4 cents to fund (a) Teacher Compensation Plan (as recommended 
by the Teacher Compensation and Support Committee and the Administration) and 
(b) an Administrator Compensation Plan (as recommended by the Superintendent) in 
FY 07-08 
7. Support Association and the Administration collectively designing a plan with the 
Teacher Compensation and Support Committee during 2006-2007 to apply for state 
teacher incentive funding for 2007-2008; the District could receive approximately 
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$6,000,000; if the plan is approved all salary schedules will be improved to 4% with 
1% additional for Teacher Incentive Pay funded by the state. 
8. No new financial proposals will be considered during 2007-2008 
Notes:
A. Hill ISD and Association will make the above recommendations to the Board of 
Trustees for their consideration, realizing that the Board of Trustees is ultimately 
empowered to address Consultation Agreements 
B. Hill ISD is considering no M & O tax increase in FY 2007-2008. 
C. Hill ISD is considering an I & S (Bond) Referendum in November 2007. 
* Hill ISD agrees to increase New Teacher Academy daily rate to $90.00 per day for 
August 2006 training; this will require $160,000 budget amendment for FY 2005-2006 
(probably at the August 28, 2006 Board Meeting).
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Appendix E: Hill ISD Performance Pay Program Schools Selection Criteria
1.  Academic Performance: While schools currently identified as under-performing 
will be a target group for the pilot, academically higher achieving campuses will 
also be included. This will be particularly important in the area of establishing 
learning objectives and rewarding gains in student growth over time.
2.  Teacher Retention/Turnover: Currently the average district-wide attrition rate of 
teachers is 14 percent, however at some campuses, this rate is as high as 40 
percent annually. Campuses with varying turnover rates will be a particular focus 
for inclusion in the pilot.
3.  Established Campus Leadership: The average attrition rate of principals in AISD 
is currently 20 percent, with significantly higher rates at some campuses. While 
this is an indicator the Strategic Compensation Initiative is aimed at affecting, for 
the purposes of the pilot, schools with stable leadership will be sought, given the 
need for the principal to be a key facilitator in the implementation of pilot 
program elements.
4.  Student Demographics: Each year, the AISD student body becomes more racially 
and ethnically diverse while also coming from increasingly poor households. 
Campuses with large populations of English Language Learners, Special 
Education students, and students who qualify for free and reduced lunch, will be a 
particular focus of piloting in 2007-2008.
5. Additional Considerations:
• Campuses in which full implementation of pilot program elements is most 
assured;
• The number of campuses invited to participate will be determined by the 
district’s capacity to properly support and evaluate the program elements 
being piloted.
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Appendix F: Hill ISD Performance Pay Program Goals Statement
Because effective teaching and school leadership are essential to improving student 
learning; and 
Because research shows that teacher quality is the most critical school factor in 
determining the
academic success of children; and
Because the leadership that school principals provide is directly related to both teacher 
and student performance; and
Because our community depends on a highly effective school system:
The Hill Independent School District has launched a performance-based compensation 
initiative aimed at Raising student achievement by Recruiting, Retaining, and 
Recognizing outstanding classroom teachers and principals. Through this initiative, Hill 
ISD will explore how new and enhanced forms of compensation and organizational 
support can:
• Improve student learning at all schools and for all students, and eliminate the 
achievement gap;
• Recruit well-qualified teachers and principals to all Hill ISD schools; 
• Increase retention rates among Hill ISD teachers and principals; 
• Strengthen the knowledge and skills of staff.
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Appendix G: Student Learning Objectives Guidelines
Note. Figure derived from document retrieved from Hill ISD website
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Teacher Name/ID: ______________________________   Is this a revision?  ______           If yes, see Revision Form. 
Austin ISD Strategic Compensation !2007                                                                                                                             AISD Strategic Compensation Pilot v. 8 






Ongoing Teacher Needs Assessment and Strategy Plan 
Strategies to be Used  
What strategies will be implemented to accomplish the SLO? 
Teacher Professional Development to 
Support SLO 
What  learning opportunities will help you meet 
your SLO? 
Teacher Resources to 
support SLO  
What are the material or human 
capital needs? 
Criteria: 
 Aligned with TEKS 
 Aligned with Principles of Learning 
 Follow research-based best practices 
 Address content area(s) and student group(s) targeted by SLO 
 Are relevant to students 
 Include ongoing reflexive practice 
 Related to content area(s) or student 
group(s) targeted by SLO 
 
 Related to content area(s) or 
student group(s) targeted by 
SLO 
Questions to be answered: 
What strategies will you use to address the SLO? 
How and when will you monitor progress towards the SLO during the year? 
 
How and when will you involve your students, parents and community? 
What learning opportunities could support this 
SLO? (i.e., What do you need to know?) 
How can your professional learning 
community support you? 
Is there a course offered at PDC 
(https://pdaecampus.austinisd.org/login.html) 
or elsewhere? 
Have you located a specific learning 
opportunity to address your need? 
If so, is the opportunity available soon enough 
to help you meet your goal? 
What other resources would help 
you meet your SLO?  Please 
explain why/how. 
Note. Figure derived from document retrieved from Hill ISD website.
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GUIDE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STUDENT LEARNING OBJECTIVES 








What and who is targeted? 
Learning Objective 
What will students 
learn? 
Outcome Assessment 
How will you know whether 
they learned it? 
Performance Target 
What is your goal for student 
achievement? 
Criteria: 
 Campus data are 
reviewed for areas of 
strength and need (within 
subject area, within grade 
level, within student 
group, examining the 
Campus Improvement 
Plan (CIP), etc.) 
 Classroom data are 
reviewed for areas of 
strength and need (by 




 Targets specific academic 
concepts, skills, or 
behaviors based on TEKS 
 Targets the needs of the 
identified population 
 Considers demonstrated 
strengths of identified 
population, as well as 
classroom & school 
community 
 Targets year-long (or 
semester-long) concepts, 
skills, or behaviors 
 Supports goals of the 
Campus Improvement 
Plan (CIP) 
 Based on the identified 
student needs  
 Supports goals of the CIP 
 Is rigorous 
 Is a good example of 
ongoing, reflexive 
practice 
 Provides clear focus for 
instruction and 
assessment 
 Is measurable 
 Reflects strengths of 
students and school 
community 
 Aligns with the targeted 
learning content area 
 Relationship with learning 
objective is apparent 
 Has been demonstrated as 
reliable and valid for 
targeted students 
 Follows guidelines for 
appropriate assessments 
 Predicts performance 
based on past 
performance of students 
when available 
 Is a rigorous expectation 
for students 
 Is a rigorous expectation 
for teachers 
Guiding questions: 
What needs for all students 
were identified?  Based on 
what data? 
What needs for student 
group(s) were identified?  
What strengths were 
identified? 
Based on what data? 
What general content area(s) 
is/are targeted? 





What student group is 
targeted? 
What are the strengths of the 
group and school 
community?  
What is the Student 
Learning Objective? 
How is the SLO based on 
student strengths and 
needs? 




Does it support CIP goals? 
What assessment(s) will be 
used to measure whether 
students met the objective? 
What type of assessment is 
it? (standardized, district-
wide, teacher-made, etc.) 
Why is this the best 
assessment for your SLO? 
What, if any, baseline data 
do you have? 
What is the 
number/percentage of 
students who will perform at 
the target level? 
What is the performance 
target? 
How was the target for the 
learning objective 
determined? 
Student Learning Objective Examples Disseminated by District Program Office
Note. Figure derived from document retrieved from Hill ISD website.
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!   Teach and model 
“Choosing the Just Right 
Book”
!   What Really Matters Most 
for Struggling Readers
!   Guided fluency 
instruction
!   Training on creating 
reading fluent classrooms
!   Cooperative Learning !   Trade Books at student 
reading levels




!   Model proper fitness 
skills
!   Access to President’s 
Physical Fitness 
Assessments
!   Practice fitness skills !   PE Equipment
!   Play physical fitness 
games
!   Vocabulary Word Wall for 
test terms
!   Cooperative Learning
!   Model multi-step 
problem solving
!   Workshop on Science best 
practices
!   Guided science 
instruction
!   PDC: FOSS kits
!   Science practice with real 
world applications
!   Real world applications
!   Focused science warm-
ups
!   Sample lessons
!   Students create science 
test questions
!   Model multi-step 
problem solving
!   PDC: Cognitively Guided 
Instruction
!   Guided math instruction !   Real world applications 
for measurement ideas
!   Measurement practice 
with real world applications
!   Sample lessons for 
measurement










problems with a 
passing rate of 










75% of students 
will improve their 









6.8Improve Obj 4 
on math 
49% passing 









80% of  At-Risk 
students will 
improve their 
score to 75% on 




































TEKS Strategies Instructional Needs
75% of students 
will increase their 
fluency rates by 































Appendix H: Requirements for School Ratings                                 
in the Texas Accountability System
Part 1  Standard Procedures Chapter 4  The Basics: Determining a Rating 45 
 2010 Accountability Manual  
Table 6: Requirements for Each Rating Category 
 Academically Acceptable Recognized Exemplary 
Base Indicators 
TAKS (2009-10)* 
 All Students  
and each student group 
meeting minimum size: 
 African American  
 Hispanic 
 White 
 Econ. Disadvantaged 
* TAKS (Accommodated) 
included for all grades and 
subjects. 
Meets each standard: 
 Reading/ELA ...  70% 
 Writing .............  70% 
 Social Studies ..  70% 
 Mathematics ....  60% 
 Science ............  55% 
OR Meets Required 
Improvement 
OR  
Meets standard with TPM 
Meets 80% standard for 
each subject 
OR 
Meets 75% floor and 
Required Improvement 
OR  
Meets standard with 
TPM 
Meets 90% standard for 
each subject 
OR  
Meets standard with 
TPM 
Completion Rate I  
(Class of 2009)  
(if meets minimum size) 
 All Students  
 African American  
 Hispanic 
 White 
 Econ. Disadvantaged 




Meets 85.0% standard  
OR 
Meets floor of 75.0% 
and Required 
Improvement 
Meets 95.0% standard 
Annual Dropout Rate 
(2008-09) 
(if meets minimum size) 
 All Students  
 African American  
 Hispanic 
 White 
 Econ. Disadvantaged 














(See Chapter 3 for more 
details.)  
May be applied if 
district/campus would be 
Academically 
Unacceptable due to not 
meeting Academically 
Acceptable criteria. 
May be applied if 
district/campus would be 
Academically Acceptable 
due to not meeting 
Recognized criteria. 
May be applied if 
district/campus would be 
Recognized due to not 
meeting Exemplary 
criteria. 




Does not apply to 
Academically Acceptable 
districts. 
A district with a campus 
rated Academically 
Unacceptable cannot be 
rated Recognized. 
A district with a campus 
rated Academically 




Students (District only) 
Does not apply to 
Academically Acceptable 
districts. 
A district that underreports 
more than 150 students or 
more than 4.0% of its prior 
year students cannot be 
rated Recognized.  
A district that underreports 
more than 150 students or 
more than 4.0% of its prior 
year students cannot be 
rated Exemplary.  
Source: 2010 Texas Accountability Manual
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Appendix I: McCoy Elementary and Thompson Elementary                      
Student and Teacher Demographic Tables














































2 3 64.4 4.9 62.2 30.2 37.6
















3 4 75.3 3.9 78.7 15.3 45.8
435 Academically 
Acceptable
4 4 75.4 3.9 79.1 14.5 48.3
443 Recognized 4 3 79.2 2.9 80.6 13.3 51.7



































40.4 7.4 12.4 18.4 29.7 32.2 $41,152
38.6 0.0 13.8 18.1 28.5 39.6 $42,098
38.2 2.6 9.8 14.4 30.1 43.2 $44,230
39.8 2.3 7.5 20.1 27.3 42.7 $44,249
38.3 2.6 12.8 17.0 28.4 39.2 $43,647
39.2 0.0 10.2 18.4 26.8 44.6 $44,511
39.0 2.6 10.3 12.8 29.5 44.9 $43,949
36.8 5.0 8.1 13.6 28.5 44.8 $47,122
37.0 0 10.8 13.5 29.7 45.9 $48,689
38.0 5.3 15.8 7.9 28.9 42.1 $48,118
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1 1 88.1 17 77.7 4.9 58.1








2 2 96.5 19.8 76.2 2.5 59.6












2 4 96.9 11.5 86.3 1.8 73.2



































54 10.9 44.3 16.7 18.9 9.3 $34,797
56.7 13.9 42.4 17.6 20.8 5.3 $35,193
42 9.6 42.8 14.3 21.4 11.9 $37,627
44.9 4.4 47.2 15.3 19.6 13.5 $38,553
43.1 15.7 33.7 20.4 18.6 11.6 $37,339
43.4 27.6 34.5 9.2 12.5 $37,455
40.5 9.2 58.7 14.8 7.4 9.9 $37,983
45.7 10.7 49.3 19.7 8.8 11.6 $41,362
43.9 4.3 59.2 18.2 6.8 11.4 $42,478
46.0 6.5 54.3 23.9 4.3 10.9 $42,240
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Appendix J: Thompson Elementary Texas Educator                             
Excellence Grants (TEEG) Plans
Table J1. 2007-2008 TEEG Plan
$100,000 grant
45 teachers




Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test or local benchmark
K-2: end of year benchmark
PK: Class passing 
rates
K: % attaining defined 
level





Reading & Math TAKS 
combined
Passing rate
(Same rates for each 
grade)
$2,500




Attendance at faculty and 









Attendance at staff and 














Contingency Plan: Increase Part I award amounts if fewer teachers than anticipated meet 
goals. Part II contingency not specified.
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Table J2. Thompson Elementary 2008-2009 TEEG Plan
$120,000 grant
40 teachers




Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test or local benchmark
K-2: DRA
PK: Class passing 
rates
K: % attaining defined 
level





Reading & Math TAKS 
combined
Passing rate or 
increase in % passing 
from previous year
Same rates for each 
grade
$2,000: grade 3
$2,500: grades 4 
& 5
Special Ed Part I Performance:IEPs





Attendance at faculty and 








Attendance at faculty and 
grade team meetings and 
campus PD
Attendance rate










Contingency Plan: Increase Part I award amounts if fewer teachers than anticipated meet 
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2 TAP was launched five years before ProComp, but was, until recently, limited to a small number of 
schools nationwide. ProComp was the first diversified performance pay plan to be implemented in a large 
school district, and, arguably, generated much of the interest in performance pay seen today.
3 The Institute of Education Sciences (IES), for example, refers frequently to fidelity as the singular 
measure of implementation in its descriptions of research goals and requirements for grant proposals. IES 
has also offered training for grant recipients on measuring and accounting for implementation that focuses 
solely on measures of fidelity and statistical models to control for variations in fidelity. See http://
ies.ed.gov/. 
4 Another commonly used approach to qualitative inquiry is critical research. In this type of inquiry, 
educational phenomena are examined in relation to power and social and cultural reproduction (Merriam, 
1998).
5 This teacher appraisal system was replaced in 1997 by the Professional Development and Appraisal 
System (PDAS).
6 The Texas Legislature meets in regular sessions every other year, in odd-numbered years (e.g., 2007, 
2009). The Governor may call special sessions between regular sessions to address specific issues. There is 
no limit on the number of special sessions that may be called, although each is limited to 30 days. 
Committees of both houses of the Legislature meet and hold hearings during off years (known as interim 
years) to prepare recommendations on specific issues for the upcoming regular session.
7 This section is drawn from a number of publicly available sources, including state student demographic 
and performance data, evaluation reports, Board of Trustees meeting materials and minutes, the Hill ISD 
website, and a book about reforms in Hill ISD. In the interest of confidentiality and anonymity, these 
sources are not identified here.
8 Enrollment of African American students decreased by almost one-third during this same period. Between 
2000 and 2009, African American enrollment made up 12%-17% of total enrollment each year.
9 Specifically, property-rich districts must return to the state 40 cents for every dollar of tax revenue earned 
above a specified amount ($1.06 per $100 of property value) or engage in other means of reducing overall 
property revenue, such as consolidating with a neighboring property-poor district. For the 2009-2010 
school year, 208 districts (about 17% of all districts) were classified as property-rich; almost all participated 
in the recapture process. These funds are distributed among property-poor districts.
10 Texas labor laws prohibit collective bargaining by unions. However, most school districts in the state 
maintain consultation agreements with professional associations pertaining to district policy matters. 
Professional associations differ in their influence depending on their size and affiliation with state and 
national organizations. The association in Hill ISD represents teachers, school administrators and other 
school employees and is considered one of the more influential associations in the state.
11 This information was obtained from an evaluation of Hill ISD’s performance pay program published by 
the district. To maintain anonymity, this publication is not identified.
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12 Comparable Improvement is a growth-type measure included in AEIS. The Texas Growth Index (TGI) is 
calculated for each school based on TAKS Reading and Math scores. The TGI is derived by comparing 
changes in scores from one year to the next to expected changes based on student demographics and prior 
scores. TGI scores for each school are then compared to a set of 40 comparison schools with similar student 
demographics, and are presented in quartiles. Q1 is the top quartile, Q2 is the second quartile, and so on. 
Comparable Improvement is not used to rate schools for accountability purposes.
13 These were not the only processes in which teachers, school administrators, and district administrators 
engaged. The mentoring and professional development components, in particular, also carried with them 
new requirements and activities, and went through changes as the program progressed. However, these 
components did not emerge as activities that had great impact on most of the individuals interviewed for 
this study. Additionally, other changes to the program, such as the creation of Higher Needs schools, did not 
emerge as important events in most individuals’ sensemaking of the program.
14 An evaluation of outcomes in the first year subsequently found that 27% of student learning objectives 
had to be revised. Only 7% of these revisions were due to lack of rigor or use of inadequate assessments. 
The largest percentage (38%) was due to teachers not requiring that at least 75% of all students meet the 
objective, as specified in program rules (see note 10). 
15 Focus group respondents were not identified individually in transcripts and are not labeled consistently. 
So, Administrator 1 in one set of quotes may or may not be the same individual as Administrator 1 in 
another set of quotes. 
16 Activities and evaluations for Take One!® were conducted by the National Board for Professional 
Teaching Standards. Mentors were trained in new teacher development by the New Teacher Center at the 
University of California at Santa Cruz. Program staff in Hill ISD coordinated teacher groups for Take One!
®. They also recruited, placed, and evaluated mentor teachers.
17 The mentoring component was described by all school participants as very valuable for beginning 
teachers, though the interviewees (for the most part) had little else to say about it. More experienced 
teachers often commented that they wished they could have or had had similar support. Teachers whose 
experience fell just outside the range for beginning teachers in the program (those with four or five years of 
teaching) particularly emphasized the value that mentoring could add to their teaching. Only one teacher in 
the study had participated in Take One!®. Similar to reports from other teachers in the district, she reported 
that the program had been time-consuming and that she felt she had not gained much professional learning 
from the experience (it should be noted that she did not earn a passing score on the portfolio she submitted 
to NBPTS as the product of her participation).
18 This school classification may have been created, in part, to improve responses to the program by 
teachers at non-highest needs schools. Evaluations after the second year of the program found that teachers 
in those schools were less satisfied with the program than teachers at Highest Needs schools. Fewer than 
half of teachers in non-highest needs schools reported that they would continue to participate in the 
program, given the choice, compared to more than three-quarters of teachers in Highest Needs schools (see 
note 10).
19 Hill ISD provided this information in response to a public information request made by the newspaper.
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20 The statute authorizing DATE states that “an eligible campus must (emphasis added) use 60% of a grant 
award received under 21.704 to provide incentive payments to classroom teachers assigned to the 
campus,” ("Texas Education Code," 2006) Further, the Education Commissioner’s rules for the program, 
contained in the Texas Administrative Code, specify that these funds “may be used only for classroom 
teachers and principals that positively impact student academic improvement and/or growth” ("Texas 
Administrative Code," 2008) Thus, schools are required to distribute 60% of their grant awards to teachers 
who meet performance goals for student growth. Since some teachers may fail to meet one or both of those 
goals, any excess funds must be redistributed to teachers who did meet both goals. This requirement is 
described in the program guidelines. A description of the school’s contingency plan is required in DATE 
grant applications.
21 Students are considered mobile if they miss six or more weeks at a particular school during the school 
year.
22 The statute authorizing TEEG states that “an eligible campus must (emphasis added) use 75% of a grant 
award received under Section 21.655 to provide incentive payments to classroom teachers assigned to the 
campus,” ("Texas Education Code," 2006) Further, the Education Commissioner’s rules for the program, 
contained in the Texas Administrative Code, specify that “an eligible campus receiving program funds may 
distribute an incentive payment only (emphasis added) to a classroom teacher who: (A) demonstrates 
success in improving student achievement. Measures determining a classroom teacher's success in 
improving student performance must allow for program administrators to evaluate teacher impact on 
student achievement; and (emphasis added) (B) successfully collaborates with faculty and staff to 
contribute to improving overall student performance on the campus. The collaboration must be measured 
using campus-based activities. Participation in tutoring sessions or personal-planning periods is not a 
sufficient measure of collaboration,” ("Texas Administrative Code," 2006) Thus, schools are required to 
distribute 75% of their grant awards to teachers who meet performance goals for both student achievement 
and collaboration. Since some teachers may fail to meet one or both of those goals, any excess funds must 
be redistributed to teachers who did meet both goals. This requirement is described in the program 
guidelines. A description of the school’s contingency plan is required in TEEG grant applications.
